Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980

206. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 7, 1978.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Conclusions from July 5 SCC Meeting on SALT

The SCC met July 5 to discuss positions for Cy Vance’s July 12/13 meetings with Gromyko. The Summary of Conclusions is at Tab A.²

In brief, there is a consensus that we should make a new proposal on the new types issue under which each side would be permitted to flight test but not deploy one new type of ICBM through 1985. (In the current M–X program, testing begins in 1983 or 1984 with initial deployment in 1986.) This proposal would be made contingent on Soviet acceptance of one of our proposed alternatives on new types of SLBMs, our new types definition, our proposed missile fractionation limit, and dropping their proposal for a limit on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. This approach may entail a decision to go to MAP for Minuteman III during the Agreement and to deploy M–X after 1985, in order to assure the necessary political support here, including the JCS. Harold has reservations about how firmly you can or should make such a commitment since the costs and other program issues are still unclear. He also noted that if we go this way on new types, then we will have to go to full-scale development of M–X in the next budget or SALT ratification will be much more difficult.

On the Backfire, you will have to decide whether to maintain our current position or propose a reduced set of assurances. In essence, Cy and Paul both want to go forward now and propose a reduced set of assurances. They think this might make the Soviets more forthcoming on new types. I believe we can go with a reduced set of assurances but that this concession should be saved for a Summit meeting and traded for identifiable quid pro quos such as changing the Protocol cruise missile limits to a statement similar to the Backfire statement, and counting Bison in the aggregate. Harold and Dave Jones agree with this approach. Harold also feels we need more time to consider possible military counters to Backfire.

I have attached memoranda from Cy and Paul (Tab B) and Harold and the JCS (Tab C)³ endorsing the new proposal on new types (although with some minor variations). On the assumption that you approve the approach proposed, on which all are in agreement, I do not believe it is necessary for you to read in detail their memoranda. I attach them, however, for the record.

To get the full flavor of the issues regarding new types and Backfire, you might wish to review the Summary of Conclusions at Tab A prior to checking the decision boxes below.

Issues for Decision

New Types Alternatives

—Offer new proposal under which each side would be permitted to test but not deploy one new type of ICBM through 1985. This proposal would be made contingent on Soviet acceptance of one of our proposed alternatives on new types of SLBMs, our new types definition, our proposed missile fractionation limit, and dropping their proposal for a limit on the number of ALCMs per heavy bomber. (Consensus position.)

—Maintain current position.

Your Decision:⁴

Approve new proposal as above

Maintain current position

Backfire Alternatives

—Maintain for now current position (i.e., continue to insist on complete set of assurances) looking towards a trade-off at the Summit. (Harold, the JCS, and I recommend.)

—Offer now to accept reduced set of assurances covering freeze on production rate, ban on upgrading, and no association with an intercontinental mission. (Cy and Paul recommend.)

Your Decision:⁵

Maintain current position, looking to a trade-off at the Summit.

Offer to accept reduced set of assurances as above.

Other Issues from July 5 Meeting

—Recommend that you approve SCC conclusions on other issues as set forward at Tab A and corresponding instructions to the Delegation (Tab D).⁶

Approve

Disapprove

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 56, SALT: Chronology: 4/21/78–7/10/78. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.
2. Attached but not printed.
3. Brown’s memorandum, July 7 is attached; Vance’s and Warnke’s has not been found.
4. Carter approved the new proposal.
5. Carter approved the second option, but added the following note: “but only if SU responds favorably (accepts) US offer re new types.”
6. Carter did not act on this recommendation. Tab D is printed as Document 207.