Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 9, 1972, 1710Z.

722. Subj: Cyprus: Next Moves by Greek Government.

1. Summary: Greek Government has so far shown restraint, but Czech arms import, growth of Communist Party on Cyprus, and threat of Soviet involvement may be beginning tip scales in favor of some Greek initiative to protect its national interests in Cyprus. In such event Greece may make further attempt, either alone or in concert with Turkey, to induce Makarios to abandon his intransigent position on compromise solution. We should be prepared to put forward suggestions of our own in this context that will keep situation in path of negotiation. End summary.

2. Until now we have sought to avoid speculating on possible Greek moves once it concluded that situation in Cyprus was threatening important Greek interests. While Greek Governmentʼs relations with Makarios were precarious they were manageable, and a complementary feeling of good will between Greece and Turkey was slowly growing. Greek interests seemed temporarily best served by a continuation of intercommunal talks, even if prospects for reaching a solution through them were not great. Under those circumstances, attempting to determine what might cause change in Greek position and what action Greece might take as a result was highly speculative exercise indeed. Now, however, in wake of import of Czech arms by Makarios we consider time has come to offer some thoughts on how Greeks may assess their interests in Cyprus and what steps they could take. We caution, however, that our comments are based more on logic of situation than on evidence.

3. Cyprus at present time mainly important to Greece for negative reasons. While Papadopoulos could become national hero through successful union of island with mother country, risks are too great. Cyprus remains extremely important to Greece, however, because of (A) possibility of military conflict with Turkey over Cyprus; (B) effect of national crisis over Cyprus on tenure of present Greek regime; and (C) threat of Cyprus to Greece should it become center of Communist subversion and potential Soviet base.

4. Any of these problems could be serious for Greece, the regime, and Papadopoulos personally. Until now, however, the Greek Government has shown considerable restraint in dealing with Cyprus. Dangers of taking initiative, whether in concert with Turkey or alone, have outweighed dangers of allowing Cyprus problem to remain unsolved. It is now beginning to appear, however, that scales may have come even or perhaps even tipped the other way. Thus, from point of view of its own national interests, Greece may decide that some action is better than allowing situation to continue to drift to point of possible no return.

5. Since past experience has demonstrated that Greece cannot reach an agreement with Makarios that is satisfactory to GOG nor can it coerce him into doing what it wants, the question will arise whether stronger pressures on Makarios could succeed.

6. Greek Government may soon reach conclusion that importation of Czech arms, (which they may fear for distribution to leftist and Communist elements supporting Archbishop), growing strength of AKEL, and possibility if not probability that situation will develop in such a way that Makarios will call for Soviet help are creating situation which Greece can only neutralize by inducing Archbishop to give in on compromise solution. In such event, following courses are open to GOG:

A. Arrange Makariosʼ removal from power, possibly to some other ecclesiastical position, and hope that ensuing confusion on Greek Cypriot side could be brought under control before it degenerated into chaos;

B. Reach an agreement with Turkey on the terms for an interim settlement and present Archbishop with form of ultimatum, while taking steps to prevent violent reaction by forces under his control;

C. Reach an understanding with General Grivas that Greek Government would not look unfavorably on a mounting campaign of intimidation against Cypriot Government, which would eventually so weaken Makariosʼ position that he would be forced either to resign or acquiesce in Greek proposals for intercommunal solution giving Turk Cypriot greater autonomy than he is now prepared to concede; and

D. Mount political action campaign to discredit Makarios with his own community and to build up prestige of alternative leadership, presumably Clerides, with expectation that—under a somewhat longer timetable—Archbishop could be forced out of office.

7. There are obviously variations and combinations of possibilities enumerated above. All are dangerous, and we strongly doubt that Greek Government would resort to any of them unless it concluded its interests seriously threatened by Makariosʼ policies and actions. We have no evidence that GOG has embarked on new campaign of pressure on Makarios, but possibility that it will feel obliged to do so is becoming real. Question then arises what should U.S. do once evidence is in that Greeks are preparing to move.

8. If a situation such as we have described should develop, then we can assume that Greek Government has reached a very difficult and serious decision based on its own interests. Under these circumstances U.S. counsel of moderation, support for intercommunal talks, and expressions of concern that NATO allies may be drawn into conflict will no longer suffice.

9. We believe we should begin now to consider how we can work in conjunction with our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, with British, and with UN to bring maximum influence to bear on Cyprus situation. We favor strong effort involve UN in custody of Czech arms and concerted effort to induce Greece and UK take more serious view of threat to peace on Cyprus from Grivas.

10. In addition, time has clearly come, as Nicosia has already suggested, for USG to do some serious contingency planning.² We would welcome Department comments, as well as those of Ankara and Nicosia.

Tasca

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara. Another copy is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–CYP.
2. See Document 390.