Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

390. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 7, 1972, 1615Z.

258. Subject: Consequences of Makariosʼ New Arms Deal with Czechoslovakia.

1. Summary: Assuming information that Makarios has imported a large new consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia is correct, we conclude that an important new element of tension has been added to an already most unstable situation. There will be deleterious effects on imminent Turkish contingent rotation, enlarged intercommunal talks, prospects for U.S. deconfrontation proposal, GOG relations with Makarios, and to much lesser extent on GOT relations with GOG. Makariosʼ bid for more security in the longer term could precipitate and hasten the very kind of challenge he is seeking protect himself against.

2. It now seems almost 100 percent sure that Makarios has secretly imported new weapons to arm an internal protective force of approximately 2,000 men, that these arms came from Czechoslovakia, and that transaction is at least double the size of that concluded in August 1966. Being a shrewd analyst as well as a determined brinkman, Makarios undoubtedly calculated the angles closely and concluded this move was essential to protect himself against a direct challenge from Grivas, whom he believes to be backed by Greece. But the medicine is of a sort used in extremis; it could provoke the challenge he seeks to defend against; and it will cause a lot of headaches to others, not least to USG. To take a quick look at some of the most likely consequences:

3. Next rotation of Turkish treaty contingent (TURDYK) is scheduled for Feb 23. (Since there was 7 month gap between last two rotations of 50 percent of contingent, there is 5 month interval this time, to keep on 12 month cycle for rotation of entire contingent.) Usual negotiations—angry bickerings would be a better description—are going on about list of equipment GOC will authorize for import with contingent. According Turkish Embassy, GOC, trying make up for its display of relative reasonableness last time, has been especially picayune in initial cuts this time. Also from Turkish Embassy we aware TGS has long been restive with having submit its equipment requirements for contingent to GOC scrutiny and—in its eyes—demeaning cuts. Makariosʼ import of arms gives GOT every excuse to be very tough, perhaps to point of saying contingent will import what it wishes without GOC scrutiny, and interference will be met with force. We are already hearing noises along this line and UNFICYP, which is the traditional middleman in working out rotations, is very apprehensive.

4. It goes without saying that psychological boost given atmosphere by Guyerʼs successful trip, with its resultant prospect that new talks will begin later this month has been blunted by arms importation. Fortunately, everybody had been brought on board before the news broke; otherwise Turkish Cypriots and probably Turkey would have been a lot harder to convince. As it is, Turks both mainland and local will start new phase with an even more than usually bitter taste in their mouths about Makariosʼ life style.

5. The U.S. deconfrontation proposal has been dealt a partcularly hard blow. From UNFICYP Commander General Chand we understand Guyer carried the ball as we had asked, speaking to the parties in a general sense and leaving the specific suggestions, in writing, with UNFICYP for appropriate follow-up. One half of this was done promptly after Guyerʼs departure. National Guard Commander Haralambpopoulos promised Chand complete cooperation if Turkish Cypriots were willing move as proposed. Turks, as Chand noted to us February 5, would have been very hard to move anyway. Now they have intense emotional and some real justification to perpetuate their preferred intransigence.

6. It seems hard to believe that the state of real, as opposed to oratorical relations between the GOG and Makarios could get worse than it has been since last summerʼs refusal by Makarios to accept Greek suggestions for compromise, and Grivasʼ subsequent return. (Weʼre not saying the two are necessarily related, but such is now the case.) From Greek Embassy, which is undoubtedly understating the case, we are aware GOG feels Makarios has disregarded its strong advice against purchasing arms from the bloc; has acted behind its back; is throwing down a public gauntlet by showing that he does not trust intentions of mainland National Guard officers and therefore of Greece itself; and is playing his old game of building up Communists against “nationalists.” Despite public denials, some harsh words have already been said by Haralambopoulos and Panayotacos, and more are likely to be.

7. GOG–GOT recent and cautiously evolved understanding, about not letting Cyprus be the determinant of their relations and a possible cause of war, is not very robust. The suspicions, particularly in Ankara, that Greeks will in the last analysis get together against Turks, whatever the temporary realism and reasonableness in Athens, is omnipresent. GOT will, we suspect, feel GOG should have done more to prevent this, and will expect more than is possible to remedy it. We doubt the better understanding about Cyprus will rupture because of arms transaction, but there seem likely to be some strains.

8. Finally, the core issue is whether Makarios has really improved his security situation. Once 2000 or whatever number of men he intends for special constabulary have been recruited and trained in use of these new weapons, the answer will probably be yes, whether one is considering a threat from Grivas and/or a dynamic solution push by Greece and Turkey. Until his new force has been created, however, Makariosʼ deterrent is an intense irritant that could have an effect opposite from that he intends.

9. We will comment in a separate message on what steps USG might take to minimize the potentially disruptive consequences, reviewed in foregoing, of Makariosʼ latest move, and to keep process of negotiation moving forward.²

Crawford

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated priority to Athens, Ankara, London, Prague, USUN, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and EUCOM. Another copy of the telegram is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.
2. Not found.