Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

376. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 11, 1971, 3:55–4:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • John N. Irwin, II
  • Joseph Sisco
  • Christopher Van Hollen
  • Thomas Boyatt
• Defense
  • Armistead Selden
  • Brig. Gen. Devol Brett
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts
• CIA
  • Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
  • John Waller
  • William Parmenter
• NSC
  • Harold H. Saunders
  • Samuel Hoskinson
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that the State Department would prepare:

• —a paper on possible ways to prevent an outbreak of fighting over Cyprus;
• —contingency planning in the event of an outbreak;
• —a scenario for possible UN or European mediation, including what we would wish to see come out of such mediation.²

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Sisco): Can you bring us up to date on the situation. I understand there is no immediate decision required, but we want to know what preparatory work we should do and where we would like to see things come out.

Mr. Sisco: I would like to start with 1960 and the independence of Cyprus. There were three main forces involved: (1) the Greek Cypriots, backed by Greece, who wanted union with Greece; (2) the Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkey, who generally favored partition; and (3) the British whose objective was to preserve their military and strategic position. The Bible for independence was the London-Zurich agreements of 1960, which contained three elements: (1) it left the British in occupation of their sovereign bases; (2) a treaty of guarantee, which gave the right of intervention to the Greeks, Turks and British if any move were made to alter the constitutional status; (3) a treaty of alliance which permitted the stationing of Greek, Turkish and British troops on the island.

The first crisis came in 1963 when Makarios tried to alter the constitutional basis of the government by trying to eliminate the veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President in foreign affairs, defense and fiscal matters. In 1964, there was a second crisis, and we intervened very directly. George Ball and I flew to the island and defused the situation at a great price. The situation became more heated, and we called on the Security Council and got a UN force on the ground. We had to intervene with the Turks in the most forceful manner—you may have heard of the famous (President) Johnson letter. Subsequently, we launched Dean Acheson, who came up with a plan for a form of partition which was sensible but didnʼt work.

We had a similar crisis in 1968, when Cy Vance went out and succeeded in defusing the situation. Following that, we launched the inter-communal talks which are now foundering. Makarios was looking at the increased Turkish activity and was concerned at the possibility of the Greeks and Turks getting together and “imposing” a solution. As you know, he went to Moscow.

If we assume that the inter-communal talks will end, we need to do some planning on possible ways to prevent an outbreak, and also some contingency planning if shooting starts. We also need to develop scenarios for a substantive meeting, probably focussed largely on the UN. I think we have three options here:

(1) Get the UN involved in some form of mediation. Makarios is likely to move in this direction, since the UN has historically broadly supported his position. This would deflect moves by either Greece or Turkey.

(2) U.S. mediation, and we will develop some pros and cons on this for you.

Mr. Kissinger: And what we would try to bring about.

Mr. Sisco: (3) Mediation by a prominent European such as Brosio or Lester Pearson. We could get together with key European countries, since this is a NATO problem, and try to stimulate mediation in some way. Of course, these ideas have not been staffed out.

Mr. Irwin (to Mr. Sisco): Would you comment on the status of the negotiations and the possibility of Makarios moving to the UN. Would this be good or bad and what specifically would it mean?

Mr. Sisco: It is possible that Makarios may move quickly to the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: How?

Mr. Sisco: There is a UN presence on the ground in Cyprus. He could inform the UN representatives there or he could move directly to the Security Council, asking them to launch a mediation effort. In this connection, the Turks are as nervous about the UN as the Israelis are.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we do?

Mr. Sisco: We would be in a difficult position. This would preempt the situation for Makarios and close off the other options.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we support his move to the UN?

Mr. Sisco: We would be hard put not to go along. It would be difficult for the U.S. to try to block UN mediation, although the Turks would be sure to ask us to.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom would we pay a price if we opposed it?

Mr. Sisco: With Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: My impression of Makarios is that he is a very cool customer. We canʼt antagonize him.

Mr. Sisco: He is an evil man of the cloth. Even though the Greeks are more amenable now to cooperation with the Turks on Cyprus, when the chips are down they will inevitably back the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Kissinger: So we would have to choose between Turkey and Cyprus.

Mr. Sisco: We have generally supported Turkey all along.

Mr. Kissinger: If we came out against UN mediation, what would be the cost?

Mr. Sisco: Itʼs a question of the impact on Greece and Turkey. I believe we would have to give some support to Turkey. If we supported Makariosʼ efforts—which would mean, in effect, supporting the status quo—we would increase Turkish nervousness and possibly encourage Turkish thinking that they might have to take military action. We would inevitably be in the middle of two of our principal allies. Tom (Boyatt), what do you think?

Mr. Boyatt: If we were faced with UN mediation, we would have to offer the alternative of European mediation.

Mr. Sisco: Makarios wouldnʼt buy U.S. mediation. Itʼs a question of what adjustments we might make in the form of UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: And what suggestions we might make to make it a positive mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we consider a reasonable posture? Does anyone have any ideas?

Mr. Irwin: We donʼt know.

Mr. Sisco: We have some ideas but we havenʼt surfaced them yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly any agreement by the two sides is better than anything we might do.

Mr. Irwin: Itʼs a question of how we can take advantage of the mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: Itʼs essential that we know in what direction we want the mediation to go. Are we agreed that if Makarios goes to the UN, we would try to tilt toward Turkey? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Sisco: Itʼs fair as a generality.

Mr. Kissinger: We wouldnʼt necessarily go along with UN mediation?

Mr. Sisco: We would have great difficulty in taking a position against it.

Mr. Irwin: If we would move the UN mediation in the direction we like, it might be possible to get the Turks to go along.

Mr. Sisco: We could take the position that although it might not be the best possible undertaking, what could they lose?

Mr. Kissinger: They would have the majority of the UN against them.

Mr. Sisco: The UN canʼt prejudge the substance in any way.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless Makarios goes back to the UN with a proposed formula. I wouldnʼt underestimate his deviousness.

Mr. Sisco: Thatʼs quite possible. While there is a greater Greek desire to work with the Turks than before, they have always broken off at the critical point to support the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Irwin: If they are pushed to the point of conflict, they will always support their brothers.

Mr. Sisco: But they might support the UN. We have no concrete judgments, but we will produce a paper for you very quickly on this.

Mr. Kissinger: Weʼll wait for that. (to Mr. Saunders) Do you agree?

Mr. Saunders: Yes.

Mr. Sisco: We might counsel the Turks that the intercommunal talks are still the best vehicle to maintain flexibility. This might have a good effect on the Turks and buy a little more time. We want to avoid U.S. mediation. The final Acheson formula was that we would accept anything the parties would agree to, and that is where we are now.

Mr. Kissinger: Once Makarios launches himself, persuasion alone wonʼt help. What could we do to him?

Mr. Sisco: The thought of Turkish invasion scares hell out of him. Thatʼs why he is playing the Moscow game.

Mr. Kissinger: Moscow wonʼt support him far.

Mr. Sisco: Theyʼre fishing in troubled waters. They donʼt want a war there, but theyʼre willing to exploit the situation. They would give strong support to UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: The Russians will use their new-found strength in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Boyatt: We might have some interest in opposing UN mediation before Makarios acts.

Mr. Kissinger: But once we mention mediation and say European, he will say UN.

Mr. Sisco: That would get us out ahead, and we donʼt want that.

Mr. Selden: We could let someone else do it.

Mr. Sisco: Thatʼs what I mean by European mediation.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. No drafting information appears on the document. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Davis sent these minutes to Kissinger on August 16 with copies to Kennedy and Saunders. (Ibid.)
2. See Tabs A and B to Document 378.