Office of the Historian

375. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, August 6, 1971.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Cyprus Contingencies

Introductory Comment

In response to NSSM 130,2 the IG/NEA has submitted the paper at the next tab, “US Policy Toward Cyprus Contingencies and Options.”3

The framework for contingency thinking in the IG paper begins with the last line of page 17 and continues through page 35. The rest is background. It was written as a broad framework for handling any possible contingency, not just those arising from the present situation. So one of the purposes of this Analytical Summary is to relate that rather abstract presentation to the present situation.

The Analytical Summary which follows is in two parts:

  • —Part I describes the present situation, how it came about and the contingencies it is most likely to produce. It weaves in material from the first half of the IG paper but does not attempt to summarize or parallel it.
  • —Part II is a direct summary of the IG paperʼs discussion of the most likely contingencies. Again, we have concentrated on those contingencies more likely to arise from the present situation. We have skimmed over—after describing them—three which seem more remote.

In short, trouble could come in one of two ways: (1) As the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots communities about a permanent constitutional arrangement move closer to impasse, Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots with or without Greek cooperation will be increasingly tempted to make some move that could precipitate a crisis. This is the slow-burning fuse, more likely leading to a crisis, if any, after September than now. (2) Incidents between the two communities on Cyprus have increased and, although Ankara has told the Turkish community not to respond to recent Greek Cypriot provocations, and CIA has no evidence of Turkish military preparations, accidents could ac [Page 911] quire a momentum of their own. Such incidents in 1964 and 1967 led ultimately to the threat of Turkish invasion.

The issues for discussion are these:

1.
With impasse in the intercommunal talks foreseeable, should there be an effort to rejuvenate them or rather to find an alternative? What role should the US play? [Contingency A.]4
2.
If Greece and Turkey or Turkey alone decide, as an alternative to the talks, to try to impose a solution after their talks in September, what should be the US posture? [Contingencies B and C]
3.
What should the US do if a local incident escalates, especially if Turkey threatens to invade? [Contingency F]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–059, SRG Meeting—Cyprus 9/8/71. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, but it is attached to a September 7 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger.↩
  2. Document 372.↩
  3. The 35-page paper is attached but not printed.↩
  4. All brackets in the original.↩