Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

363. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 15, 1971, 1155Z.

404. Subj: Cyprus: The Gut Issue in Intercommunal Negotiations. Ref: Nicosia 362, 237; A–07.²

1. My conversations with Clerides and Denktash in last week have thrown into sharper relief what we consider fundamental point of difference between Greek and Turk Cypriots in intercommunal negotiations: the ultimate locus of decision-making authority for settlement of intercommunal differences.

2. As previously reported,³ Denktash has responded to Cleridesʼ Nov 30 plan providing for local Turk Cypriot authority at village and area level by suggesting it be supplemented by exercise of Turk Cypriot community authority at central govt level. He has introduced series of alternative proposals with this objective. Common feature of all of these is that in last analysis intercommunal problems must be “coordinated,” probably by Greek President and Turk Cypriot Vice President acting together to maintain “partnership,” which (as contrasted with “minority rights”) GOT and Turk Cypriots say is sine qua non of a satisfactory constitutional settlement.

3. The word “coordination” in this context entails a requirement for agreement by the two sides. This seems to us to amount to a demand for a Turk Cypriot community veto in specific fields. Existence of such a veto under London-Zurich Constitution, though for different range of subjects, had been major factor in 1963 constitutional breakdown. Early in intercommunal talks Denktash renounced London-Zurich veto; now he seems to have reintroduced concept.

4. Denktashʼs latest version central intercommunal institutional structure provides for creation of central authorities of local govt by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with representatives of these authorities to coordinate settlement of intercommunal problems. When Clerides objected on Mar 8 that this involved formation of “govt within a govt” and that structure was not connected with existing central govt machinery, Denktash said he had suggested that the two authorities report to President and Vice President respectively. Alternatively, he proposed that joint secretariats drawn from officials of various ministries could act as a standing committee for all local govt matters and advise President and Vice President.

5. Current status is that Clerides has told Denktash he thinks latterʼs proposals involve a veto, and that each man has said ball is in otherʼs court to make further proposals. Denktash has told us (Nicosia 362) that where agreement between President and Vice President could not be reached, courts would be asked to rule, applying constitutional provisions which would spell out Turk Cypriot rights. Cleridesʼ rejoinder is that, while human rights cases may be susceptible to judicial determination, local improvement and development projects involving allocation of funds and resources, as well as other types of contentious political issues, are not. Discussion has stalled at this point.

6. Clerides has made logical point that failure under Denktash proposals to create a single decision-making authority is inconsistent with agreement by all parties, including GOT and Turk Cypriots, that there should be a unitary govt in Cyprus. When I pressed Denktash on this matter, he took line “unitary govt” meant a govt of the London-Zurich type, which included concept of veto. To Greek Cypriots, this means Turk Cypriots are demanding 50–50 partnership in most critical area of dispute.

7. We have felt that 18 percent Turk Cypriot minority cannot realistically expect to enjoy such privileges; indeed, Turk Cypriots appeared to have abandoned them in agreeing in 1968 to renounce London-Zurich vetoes and in accepting idea of unitary state. We believe Turk Cypriot community must have a strong voice, but not a veto, at the center—that in last analysis govt must be able to make necessary decisions. Rights of Turk Cypriot community would have to be preserved by guarantees: internal, through constitutional provisions and recourse to courts wherever possible; external, through maintenance at least temporarily of mainland Greek and Turkish army contingents in Cyprus, treaty guarantees like those of London-Zurich agreements, and provision for a UN or other channel to receive and handle allegations concerning denial of human or community rights.

8. I will continue to explore with the protagonists the implications of Denktashʼs proposals, in order to determine whether any further progress can be made. This will at least make underlying issue quite clear and may help to set stage for new mediation effort, which we foresee looming up as intercommunal negotiators eventually conclude they have reached end line in their talks.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.
2. In telegram 362 from Nicosia, March 4, the Embassy reported on the Ambassadorʼs March 2 talk with Denktash. (Ibid.) Telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11, reported on Popperʼs February 11 discussion with Denktash and Inhan. (Ibid.) Airgram A–7 from Nicosia, January 16, reported Cleridesʼ views. (Ibid., POL 15–5 CYP)
3. Not further identified.