Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 6, 1971, 0740Z.

201. Subject: Cyprus: Makarios Takes Hard Line on Intercommunal Problem.

1. At the end of my Feb 3 meeting with President Makarios² I told him that on return to US for consultation I would like to carry back with me his latest thinking on general status of intercommunal problem. Speaking personally, it seemed to me Archbishop could look to future in two different ways. On one hand, he could conclude that with all its faults, existing situation was best that could be obtained from Greek Cypriot standpoint. This would mean dragging intercommunal negotiations on indefinitely, and hoping that in course of time through superior numbers, talent and economic strength, Govt might gradually consolidate its control of entire island.

2. I said that while this course had advantages, it also entailed serious dangers. Intercommunal peace could never be assumed: any incident or irresponsible act might lead to violence. No one could guarantee that destabilizing developments would not cause trouble either from inside or outside country. Moreover, over time, Turk Cypriot provisional administration seemed to be slowly consolidating its position. All in all, status quo was bound to have a fragile foundation.

3. In these circumstances I suggested Archbishop might well take advantage of his current position of strength, within his own community and generally, to follow an alternative course: i.e., to make an extraordinary effort now to reach intercommunal agreement. Turk Cypriot side had agreed that Cyprus should be unitary state. Denktash had been talking to Clerides in terms of “image of partnership”; to me this meant that it might be possible by cosmetic means to satisfy Turk Cypriots without bifurcating central govt authority. If Greek Cypriot side could give Turk Cypriots some kind of voice at central govt level which would not impair functioning of central govt on majority basis within limits of constitutional guarantees for Turk Cypriots, then it might be possible to reunite all Cypriots under GOC control. Was this not, I concluded, the more desirable objective for him and for Cyprus in longer terms?

4. Archbishopʼs reply was that, since he did not want violence and did not believe that Turk Cypriots did, he would be prepared to tolerate present de facto situation for a long time to come. It was far from ideal, but GOC could live with it. He was not willing to pay price demanded by Turk Cypriots to move toward intercommunal settlement. He simply would not agree to anything which could lead to partition, cantonization or federalism. Turk Cypriots could have local autonomy in form offered by Clerides, or they could have representation in executive branch of central govt in form of vice president and some ministers, but they could not have both. He could defend local autonomy proposal since it could be said that Turk Cypriots were already exercising local autonomy. But he would make no further concessions because he thought Turk Cypriots were trying to whittle down Greek sideʼs position bit by bit. Turk Cypriots would have to choose among alternatives as he had just outlined them.

5. I came back to “image of partnership” concept and said that surely some way would have to be found for Turk Cypriot community to have a voice, though not a veto, at central govt level. Archbishop was very firm: if Turk Cypriots obtained local autonomy, they could not be represented as a community in central executive. They would elect members to House of Representatives, but would have no vice president and no Turk Cypriot community representative in Council of Ministers. I closed conversation by saying that I frankly did not see much possibility of progress in intercommunal talks unless this position was changed—in ways in which I thought GOC could well afford to move.

6. Comment: This is hardest official version of GOC position I have heard. We must assume Archbishop wants us to believe he would rather go on indefinitely as at present than make any substantial concession to produce an intercommunal settlement. His attitude may be the upshot of his difficulties in contending with Greek Cypriot right-wing extremists. More probably, it is only latest reflection of his consistent and stubborn refusal to approach intercommunal problem in magnanimous spirit which could lead to agreement. Conclusion we reach is that progress toward settlement is unlikely in absence of very strong internal or external pressures. We see no evidence that such pressures will be generated in near future, unless GOG–GOT dialogue develops in that direction.

Popper

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.
2. Reported in telegram 187 from Nicosia, February 4. (Ibid.) Popper also held meetings with Clerides, reported in telegram 225 from Nicosia, February 9; with Denktash and Inhan, reported in telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11; and with Panayotakos, reported in telegram 224 from Nicosia, February 11. (All ibid.)