Office of the Historian

336. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

Athens, June 14, 1972, 1655Z.

3335 Subj: Further Comments on the Position of Prime Minister Papadopoulos.

1.
Recent developments tend to confirm our earlier reports2 that while PriMin Papadopoulos has ostensibly strengthened his position by taking over regency, he has in fact isolated himself further from his colleagues and stimulated further potential opposition within the establishment. He continued to be concerned about the loyalty of his combat unit commanders and has now taken steps to institute his own independent surveillance over the activities of these units (see [less than 1 line not declassified]). He has irritated both Makarezos and Pattakos, stripping them of their ministries in his effort to consolidate his personal power. In addition, it is becoming clear that while General Angelis is still loyal, he has an independent position. The PriMin tried to induce Angelis to take his man as deputy, but Angelis was able to insist on naming his own deputy. Further, the precipitous appointment of Colonel Roufogalos over some general officers as head of the intelligence service (KYP) seems to have been designed to pre-empt that position before the selection board assigned another officer there. This has not strengthened the PriMinʼs position in a critical area within the regime.
2.
In my view, Roufogalis is unsuited for this sensitive position. He is emotional and impulsive whereas the Prime Minister needs even reporting and straight analysis. Moreover, Roufogalis is not particularly liked by his colleagues in the establishment.
3.
Another indication, always reliable during my tour of duty here, that the PriMin feels insecure is the marked stepup in press and TV coverage of his meetings with top U.S. military. This appears to be message to his colleagues that U.S. military is supporting him. One recent example was awkward way in which he requested permission to have General Burchinal and himself photographed with myself at beginning of recent special briefing by Burchinal. Another recent example was insistence that General Ryder, newly arrived MAAG Chief, place wreath on tomb of unknown soldier with TV coverage, although this had not been included in original U.S. program.
4.
Moreover, his health has apparently been bothering him, which led him to have a basic examination not long ago. This tended to coincide roughly with period of Burchinal briefing. He is deeply concerned about his personal safety and security precautions have obviously been increased in recent months, which contribute to his growing isolation.
5.
His position is likely to be improved by recent military promotions. However, larger than usual number of retirements combined with stirrings among both officers in grade for lengthy periods and some indications of growing restlessness among younger officers, also probably increase his feeling of insecurity. It may be that it is this feeling of insecurity that leads him to some extent to take measures which in fact, by increasing his isolation, only serve to make situation worse.3
6.
All of this must be measured against the background of a regime that has had its successes, notably in the economic field, but that as yet has failed to give a clear indication of the nature of the regimeʼs basic objectives and measurable achievements against these objectives. The failure to implement the 1968 Constitution has been a key factor in this context. There is thus an atmosphere of attentisme in the country with a growing uneasiness that the regime lacks political direction and momentum.
Tasca
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis.↩
  2. Tasca discussed the stability of the Greek regime in telegram 2842 from Athens, May 19. (Ibid.)↩
  3. The Embassy provided an analysis of discontented elements within the Greek armed forces in telegram 5586 from Athens, September 29. (Ibid.)↩