Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972

335. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Presidentʼs Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 26, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Status of Homeporting in Greece

In case your discussions with the Soviets² touch the point of our respective military presence in the Mediterranean, I thought you should be up to date on the present status of the Navyʼs homeporting proposal for Greece. Also, it is not going smoothly and could either fail altogether or reach a point of friction with the Greeks. The main purpose of this memo is to give you a chance to inject any thoughts that may arise from your dealings with the Soviets.

Background: You will recall that the Navyʼs Greek homeporting proposal is justified purely as an administrative measure to improve morale and increase personnel retention. It will not substantially increase the number of ships deployed in the eastern Mediterranean or our military capabilities in the region.

We now have in Greece about 6,100 personnel including dependents. Homeporting, if fully carried out, would boost that permanent presence by some 3,500. The main elements of the original proposal were:

• —Phase I—Within Six Months After Agreement: Assignment of a Carrier Task Force headquarters staff, involving some 56 personnel and 22 families (57 dependents) in Athens.
• —Phase II—Six to Twelve Months: Homeporting of a destroyer squadron (six ships) and a dependent support ship (reconfigured hospital ship), involving some 2,554 military personnel and 528 families (1,400 dependents) in Athens.
• —Phase III—Nine to Twelve Months: Homeporting of a carrier and air wing and possibly a small number of miscellaneous support ships, involving some 4,500 military personnel and 800 families (2,100 dependents).

At the turn of the year, State concurred in Secretary Lairdʼs decision to homeport in Greece,³ subject to informal discussions (but not “consent”) with appropriate Congressional leadership. State quickly laid on a scenario in January to (1) seek Greek agreement in principle and agreement that the arrangement be handled as an exchange of notes extending our 1953 Millitary Facilities agreement,⁴ rather than as a new and separate agreement, and (2) brief Congress.

• —Towards the latter part of January, Ambassador Tasca had secured Prime Minister Papadopoulosʼ assent in principle as well as that of General Angelis.⁵ The general reaction in Athens was relatively positive, even among opposition who accepted the arguments for home-porting but took standard umbrage at the fact that the agreement would be concluded with an “undemocratic” government in Greece.
• —State, with Admiral Zumwalt, then briefed Congressional leadership in late January. The big blasts have come in hearings run by Congressmen Rosenthal and Hamilton, respectively Chairmen of the Subcommittees on Europe and the Near East of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; they have been previously highly critical of U.S. policy towards Greece. They say they are not finished with the issue.

As the news began to filter to the press after the Congressional briefings, Ambassador Dobrynin made his oral démarche to Secretary Rogers and reiterated it to Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand (Tab A).⁶ State instructed our embassy in Moscow to clarify homeporting as an administrative measure, noting it does not imply a change in the U.S. defense posture in the Mediterranean in any appreciable way (Tab B).⁷ Palamas told Tasca that the Soviets had lodged a parallel protest in Athens but were told by him that Greece would act in its security interests. Greek spokesmen denied allegations that any U.S. “bases” were being established.

The timing of the publicity on homeporting coincided with tensions on Cyprus. The Soviets also put that angle on it by linking our homeporting agreement with alleged NATO intrigues against Cyprus, a sentiment which also found its way into Sadatʼs public rhetoric. The Greeks again turned this publicly aside by denying that any bases were involved and reaffirming their friendly ties with the Arab states. It seems quite likely that, whatever the general Soviet purpose may have been, the Soviets were retaliating for the comments in the Presidentʼs foreign policy report on Soviet facilities in Egypt.

The Present Situation: The present situation results primarily from discussions at a technical level between our Navy and the Greek authorities. It turns out that, as the Greeks look closely at what is involved, they are not anxious to have many more Americans crowding into the Athens area.⁸ This may simply be a problem of what the domestic economy will bear, but it may also be concern over having a large fleet in the waters around Athens. In any case, the Hellenic Navy has agreed to homeport the staff of our task force commander in Athens, but this would simply be the twenty-two families described above as Phase I. For the main portion of the task force, however, they have said that congestion in the broader Athens area makes it desirable to carry out the bulk of the home-porting program in some other part of Greece. The Navy has said it would be willing to host a technical survey group to find some other such area. The farther that area moves from Athens, the less attractive and more expensive it will become for our Navy.

The Navy says it would like to go ahead and move its headquarters group into the Athens area, regardless of whether the rest of the homeporting plan is carried out or not. It will probably also want to send the survey group that the Hellenic Navy has invited. State and Defense may soon authorize those two actions.

At that point, however, the issues are reached which could become a source of friction between us and the Greeks. The U.S. Navy is not in a mood to take no for an answer and wants to be as close to Athens as possible. The Greeks apparently do not want the bulk of the exercise close to Athens and the temptation then will arise for our Navy at the service level to begin squeezing the Greeks.

The alternative, of course, would be to return to some of the other possible sites in Italy—Naples, Syracuse, Augusta. There is no indication yet that our Navy has come to that point.⁹

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. Concurred in by Odeen and Sonnenfeldt. “OBE” appears on the first page of the memorandum.
2. Apparently at the Moscow Summit May 22–30.
3. See footnote 2, Document 329.
4. For text, see 4 UST 2189.
5. Tasca reported on his discussions with senior Greek officials in telegram 1158 from Athens, February 29. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)
6. See Document 330.
7. See footnote 3, Document 330.
8. The Embassy outlined Greek objections in telegram 2071 from Athens, April 14. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)
9. In a May 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Saunders updated information on negotiations with Greece and secured Kissingerʼs approval to proceed with Phase I of the project. (Ibid.)