Office of the Historian

60. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY of the CEYLONESE PROPOSAL

On September 22, the Ceylonese handed us a 7-point aide-mémoire describing Madame Bandaranaike’s proposal for an “Indian Ocean Peace Zone.”2 The proposal is generally similar to Option 7 of the arms control paper,3 barring nearly all forms of external military presence, though the Ceylonese have hinted at considerable flexibility in their position.

1.
No armaments of any kind, defensive or offensive, may be installed on or in the sea, on the subjacent seabed, on land areas within the zone that are under the jurisdiction or control of any state. The Ceylonese apparently intend this to apply only to external states. They have informed us that Diego Garcia would not be affected as long as it remains a communications facility, but it would presumably rule out Bahrain and certain allied facilities.
2.
Ships of all nations may traverse the area, but warships and ships carrying war-like equipment must remain in transit and cannot stop other than for emergency reasons of a technical, mechanical, or humanitarian nature. This would prohibit all non-transit deployments in the area such as MIDEASTFOR, 5-Power operations, unless specifically excluded. While we would retain freedom to utilize the Indian Ocean as an LOC, this prohibition could set undesirable precedents for other ocean areas, and it would constitute a ban on projection of naval power as an instrument of foreign policy by external powers. It is unclear whether it would prohibit port calls.
3.
Submarines cannot rest on the seabed except for emergency reasons. This is unclear in that SSBNs do not normally operate on the seabed. It is also unverifiable. If it ruled out SSBN patrols, or obliged us to conduct them clandestinely, it would obviously affect the central strategic question raised by our arms control study.
4.
No warships of any state may carry out maneuvers in the area. This would rule out U.S. and allied exercises in the area and preclude surge operations of any kind. (No escape clause appears in the proposal [Page 197] which “ideally” would take precedence over all defense pacts now operative in the area.)
5.
No ships may carry out intelligence operations in the area. This is probably not verifiable.
6.
No tests of weapons of any kind may be carried out in the area. This would probably not affect the U.S. and appears to be directed primarily at China and, possibly, India.
7.
The regulative prescriptions will be supervised by an international authority. While this is not spelled out, it could subject outside powers, including the U.S., to a continuing propaganda exercise, and would not necessarily reduce East-West polarization in the Indian Ocean context.
  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–060, Senior Review Group Meetings, SRG Meeting Indian Ocean 10/6/71. Secret.↩
  2. Attached but not printed is telegram 2728 from Colombo, September 22.↩
  3. See Document 59.↩