Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

50. Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, December 9, 1970, 11:05–11:50 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Soviet and Friendly Naval Involvement in the Indian Ocean Area, 1971–1975 (NSSM 104)

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State—John N. Irwin
• Joseph J. Sisco
• Thomas Pickering
• Joseph Neubert
• Defense—David Packard
• G. Warren Nutter
• Robert J. Pranger
• CIA—Richard Helms
• Bruce C. Clarke
• JCS—Lt. Gen. Richard Knowles
• Admiral William St. George
• Mr. John Thompson, UK Cabinet Office
• NSC Staff—Dr. K. Wayne Smith
• Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt
• Mr. Harold H. Saunders
• Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• Jeanne W. Davis
• Mr. Robert Sansom

SUMMARY OF DECISIONS

It was agreed that:

… CIA would prepare a paper on the Soviet offensive buildup in the UAR;

… JCS would consider how Soviet moves in the Indian Ocean relate to other Soviet naval moves;

…we must now examine the political implications of Soviet moves in the area, analyze our own interests and those of others and work out a coherent strategy.

Mr. Kissinger: We welcome John Thompson of the British Cabinet Office to our meeting today. As you know, the President and Prime Minister Heath had agreed to cooperate on an Indian Ocean study² and Mr. Thompson’s presence here will give us an opportunity to hear the British perspective. (to Mr. Thompson) It will also give you an opportunity to compare what you are told privately and publicly. We have prepared a paper of our own and the British have a study.³ I suggest we talk about some aspects of our own paper and then ask Mr. Thompson to comment on how the British see the issue. (to General Knowles) Could you give us a rundown on how the Soviet naval threat developed in this area.

General Knowles: (handing out an annotated map which is attached)⁴ The current situation in which the Soviets have a small task force in the area is about par for the course. They came into the area for the first time in March of 1968 and have kept 2 to 4 ships, or more, there ever since.

Mr. Kissinger: Do they come around the Cape or from Valdivostok?

Admiral St. George: Both.

Mr. Thompson: The bulk come from Vladivostok; some from the Black Sea.

General Knowles: In addition, the Soviets have six space-related ships and three hydrographic research ships in the area. They seem very interested in airfields and may be looking for a radar site. They have made frequent port visits, apparently practicing old-style gunboat diplomacy. They may also be looking to fill the void left by the UK withdrawal, though there is still the key UK base at Singapore to which our ships are allowed entry. The Soviets are gaining operational experience in the area, learning the facilities, becoming acquainted with the people, and generally increasing their presence. With regard to port visits, Soviet ships spent 1106 ship-days in area ports in 1968 and 2127 ship-days in 1969. US ship-days were dropping during this same period. In 1970, the US had 560 ship-days in port and the USSR 2239 ship-days. This is not significant in itself but it is an indicator. Annex B of the study gives one a feel for the number of visits by area.

Mr. Thompson: (showing Dr. Kissinger a map) This will give you an impression of the intensity of their presence.

Mr. Kissinger: I have a number of impressions that I would like to mention. First, this study was focused on the Navy, and the response is entirely in naval/military terms. We should, of course, discuss the relationship of the increase in the Soviet naval presence and their political objectives. Is it true that political influence grows commensurate with naval presence? At what point? When they increase from two to four ships? From two to twenty ships?

Second, if there is some relationship, can or should it be countered by a build-up of the US Navy alone? With Free World navies? And/or with other means? We should look at the political context of the littoral states.

Third, assuming we should react by increasing our naval power, what should be the timing? Should we wait for the Soviets to increase and then react, or should we preempt Soviet action by an increase of our own?

Fourth, our recent experience in Cuba indicates a world-wide overseas deployment of Soviet power.⁵ Is this more pronounced in the Indian Ocean? What is the US position? I think we should look at the whole outward projection of Soviet forces, including all the exercises they have run recently.

I’m aware, of course, that we didn’t ask for that in this study, but I think we should address these questions in the next phase. I would like to ask Mr. Thompson to outline for us any preliminary conclusions the British have reached from their study.

Mr. Thompson: I am extremely grateful to have this opportunity— it is a privilege. I had a long talk with the Prime Minister before I left, and he views the problem of Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean as of great importance but not very singular. He wants to examine it jointly, and has it in mind that, depending on the outcome of the joint study, we should be prepared to do something. It would be imprudent at this time to try to indicate what that “something” might be.

We see the development of Soviet power in the area as part of their general political-strategic policy. They are increasingly confident—for example, in Europe and the SALT negotiations. They are assertive, as in their building of both an offensive and defensive capability in the UAR. Their general attitude in the Caribbean and the Mediterranean is one of confidence. They have built their navy to a point where they have some spare capability beyond that required for their national security. They can use their capacity for political purposes, and we think this tendency will increase. They are interested in the acquisition of power for its own sake, and there is some probing of Western intentions. We believe their activities in the Indian Ocean are in line with this general policy and are not defensive—they have no high defensive priority in that area. Their actions there fit with their general assertiveness, their desire to probe our intentions and the potential for picking up some political dividends cheaply. The Russians in general don’t see the Indian Ocean as a unified area, but the Soviet Navy is an exception. While others see it as different bits, the Soviet Navy puts it together. They are exploiting their naval power to acquire more political influence so as to use this influence in the littoral countries as the opportunity arises. And, of course, they are not averse to creating that opportunity. In Mauritius, for example, which has the highest population density in the world, they can exploit the existing political instability and use their presence to keep a pro-Soviet party in power. It is the sort of situation they can create and exploit. By increasing their power in the Indian Ocean they are putting themselves in a position to threaten Western interests. They are creating new options for themselves— primarily political, but some military—and are putting constraints on Western actions. I think these general statements apply, but we will have to go into specifics in our later talks.

There have, however, been three recent developments which have sharpened our interest in this problem. First, the development of Soviet offensive capability in the UAR in the Aswan area, by which they could have military domination of the Red Sea.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the buildup in the UAR?

Mr. Helms: (to Mr. Thompson) Which thing are you referring to John?

Mr. Thompson: The three airfields the Soviets now have in the UAR which appear entirely unconnected with Israel. Their communications systems are different, and their facilities indicate that they are entirely offensive in nature.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) May we have a separate paper on that?

Mr. Helms: Yes. We have been reporting regularly on these and working with DIA on them. We will tie it all together in one paper.

Mr. Packard: They have some long-range missiles that they need aircraft to guide in. Having air fields and aircraft in this area would greatly increase their capability by making it possible to use these missiles, some of which have a 200 mile range.

Mr. Kissinger: Where are the missiles they would guide in?

Mr. Packard: On submarines, for example.

Mr. Thompson: We do not think it accidental that Aswan was chosen as the site for this facility. They can operate both ways from there. While is is probably designed to move against the 6th Fleet, it is also well-placed for coverage of the Indian Ocean.

Mr. Kissinger: Why should they go so far south if it is directed against the 6th Fleet? To get out of the range of Israel?

Mr. Thompson: Partly, but also because if gives them more capability in the other direction.

The second development which interested us was the extreme pressure the Russians put on Lee Kuan Yew during his visit to Moscow.

The Russians are obviously interested in acquiring facilities in Singapore. This would not be terribly serious for us but it would be awkward. It would enable them to keep their fleet at a higher state of operational readiness.

The third development is the Soviet activity with regard to Grand Port in Mauritius. The Russians are clearly aiming to establish a facility there, which was a World War II port, now used hardly at all. If they succeed, they would have an exclusive port in the area.

Mr. Kissinger: Do the Russians have representation in Mauritius?

Mr. Thompson: They have the biggest Embassy in the country. They have signed a fishing agreement and a cultural agreement with Mauritius, and we recently persuaded the Mauritius Government to turn down their request for a communications facility. They are also bringing in a Soviet mother ship for their fishing fleet. They have gone a long way in Grand Port although in a fairly low key. They are establishing facilities around the area—we think Aden is a high-priority target. When and if the Suez Canal is opened, this will mean a significant up-grading of their naval capability because they can use Alexandria.

But, while we do not think what is happening in the Indian Ocean is exceptional, we shouldn’t close our eyes to it. We believe the Russians think they are getting good dividends for some expenditure, and that they will continue along this line and that the dividends will increase.

Mr. Helms: If you look at the world from Moscow, the Middle East, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean all tie together. It would be logical to tie it off at the bottom of the Indian Ocean—it makes a tidy package. We see the Arab-Israeli conflict in a narrower context because we are deeply engaged in it, but the Soviets are looking at it in a larger context. What can the conflict do to promote their interests in the Persian Gulf, Indian Ocean and other places?

Mr. Thompson: Also, there are a lot of sensitive things in the area that the Soviets would like to put their finger on. For example, 88 percent of Japanese oil goes through there.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) What do you think, Jack?

Mr. Irwin: I think Mr. Thompson has given us an excellent summary of the situation and that Dick Helms’ comments about the view from Moscow are very perceptive. This is also tied into Soviet China policy. We have always known that one of the reasons for their desire for access to Suez was that it quickened the route to the Far East. The paper is, of course, limited in scope, and we should put the issue into a larger context and try to tie the whole thing together. The Indian Ocean is a back-door to our interests in the Middle East and in South East Asia. We don’t have a real interest in the Indian Ocean as such, although we want to fly over it and sail through it and maintain commercial relations with the countries bordering it. We have treaty ties with some of them through SEATO, CENTO and ANZUS.

Mr. Kissinger: Except in the sense Mr. Thompson describes, I agree that any one interest in the area is not vital. There is, however, the domino effect of an increased Soviet capacity to exert a political effect in the countries.

Mr. Irwin: To the degree one can take advantage of a great-power competition, I believe we should keep our presence low.

Mr. Kissinger: Are you saying that the best way to counter the Soviet presence is to keep ours low so as to avoid competition?

Mr. Irwin: I’m saying that I’m not sure the best position is to increase our naval presence there.

Mr. Packard: We should study this issue on a much broader basis. Our interests are quite important if we add them up. We need a more imaginative view of this problem. The SST might well be more important to our interests in the Indian Ocean than nuclear submarines. It would give us a tremendous capacity to improve our relations. Our ability to move in with the SST for commercial travel and with the attendant economic support could be an important factor. Remember that one SST would be equivalent to four Queen Mary’s so far as the passengers it could carry. We need to think about ways to exert our influence, not based on the way it has been done in the past but on ways in which it might be done in the future. I see no case for a big naval buildup. The Soviet buildup was not decided on recently; we are only now beginning to understand it. Soviet forces have been designed to thwart our capabilities in the Mediterranean and we must now recognize this. We have the advantage of nuclear propulsion on carriers and support vessels. But I don’t think any short-term naval moves are necessary. Economic, social and other supporting moves are just as important.

Mr. Irwin: Three things have helped the Soviets in their entry into the Indian Ocean, as elsewhere: 1) The Arab-Israeli conflict, which ensures them the support of all Arabs. If the Middle East conflict is settled, this would start the possible removal of one of the mainbases for Soviet strength in the area.

Mr. Kissinger: How does the Soviet presence in the Indian Ocean relate to the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Mr. Irwin: Soviet strength in the Mediterranean has been increased by their bases in Egypt and by their potential in the lower end of the Arabian peninsula. If we solve the Arab-Israeli dispute, we lessen in some degree the base that enabled the Russians to come in.

Mr. Packard: I disagree completely. If the Arab-Israeli dispute is settled, the Suez Canal will be reopened which will enable the Russians to move still further forward.

Mr. Kissinger: The effect is not felt equally in all areas. In the Persian Gulf, for example, the Arab-Israeli dispute is peripheral.

Mr. Irwin: The other two elements are the situation in South Africa and its effect on US relations with Africa as a whole, and the revolutionary influence throughout Africa which creates a situation which the USSR and China can both take advantage of.

Mr. Kissinger: How is South Africa related?

Mr. Irwin: It is an added difficulty in US relations with East Africa.

Mr. Kissinger: Short of the collapse of South Africa, what can change this?

Mr. Irwin: I don’t know that anything can change it, but it is a factor we should consider.

Mr. Sisco: I agree with Mr. Thompson and Dick Helms that we are confronted in the Indian Ocean with a basic Soviet strategy and that their objective is political. The Soviets have, in their naval presence, an important tool with which to exercise political influence. Mr. Thompson’s examples are all good ones. We as a government have not been as keenly aware of what is going on. We have a gradation of interests and not all areas are of equal importance to the US. We have focused on the Arab-Israeli dispute and on the Mediterranean. We must assume that the Arab-Israeli problem won’t be solved probably in the next five years. There is no doubt that it has improved the climate for Soviet influence—in the first instance in the Mediterranean, but it has also had tremendous impact in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Even if the problem is resolved, I don’t think the Soviets will get out of these areas. We are confronted with a long-range political strategy, bulwarked by increased naval strength used for political purposes. I can draw no conclusions on this but it definitely needs more study. It would be difficult to come to a judgement in which we would not have to take the increased Soviet projection into account. Mr. Thompson’s major contribution today was to underscore the systematic approach Moscow has taken to this problem.

Mr. Packard: It can’t be solved in World War II terms.

Mr. Irwin: It is also related to the overall strength of the US Navy. We can’t solve the problem by thinking in terms of the past in the military sense.

Mr. Kissinger: This study and this discussion have been a good introduction to tell us what we are up against in the military sense. Mr. Pranger’s group has done an outstanding job with this paper. Now we need an analysis of the implications of what Mr. Thompson has said. We need to examine our interests, those of others and the long-range political implications, and work out a coherent strategy, taking in account the impact of the Middle East dispute and of South Africa. Let us also get from the JCS a feel as to how Soviet moves in the Indian Ocean relate to other Soviet naval moves. (to Mr. Irwin) We will talk to you on how to set this up. There is no sense discussing the number of ships and port calls until we have addressed these other questions. (to Mr. Thompson) We will stay in close touch with you on this.

Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Thompson) Our problem relates to the question of the political atmosphere on the East Coast of Africa with regard to South Africa. To the degree that the US is implicated in South Africa through US–UK military ties and UK supplies to South Africa, it affects our relations with and abilities in East Africa. It also affects Soviet abilities there. How much, is the question.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Senior Review Group, SRG Minutes Originals 1970. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. According to Talking Papers prepared for the meeting, OSD was to argue for postponement of any decisions until after discussions with the British were complete because 1) it was not clear that a U.S. naval response was the best way to counter an increased Soviet naval presence; 2) the United States and its allies had significant political assets in the area; 3) an enlarged Diego Garcia facility would encounter Congressional opposition; 4) the Navy was already over-committed; and 5) the United States might be “getting out ahead of our allies and the local powers in our military presence, and thereby be contradicting the Nixon Doctrine.” (OSD paper, undated; Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–067, Box 73, Indian Ocean, 1970) The JSC recommended Alternative C, a moderate increase in U.S. presence. They based their decision on 4 principles: the importance of U.S. interest in the region, the connection between increased Soviet naval presence and economic and political inroads, the possible drawdown of British forces, and the need to be able to mount a response in the event of a naval threat. (JCS paper, undated; ibid.)
2. See Document 41.
3. See Document 46. The British paper was “The Indian Ocean Area—Soviet and Chinese Capabilities: Intentions and Opportunities.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files, (H-Files), Box H–176, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 104)
4. Not attached.
5. Reference to the Soviet submarine base at Cienfuegos, the southern coast of Cuba.