314. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)1
K: —possibility of a reply.
S: What’s your thoughts?
K: I asked you first.
S: I think that we ought to go back in the course of tomorrow and first we ought to make a judgment that we give to them—before I say what we say, let me tell you what the problem is. The Jordanian point of view and from our point of view, we are trying to get the King to do this by himself. If not by himself, in order for the Israelis to be responsive in order to be helpful to the King and yet with the least possible adverse repercussions to him. If the situation warrants our presence, will be nothing there on down but the Israelis or if they need help from the Jordanian point of view, minimal air strikes as a way to help Hussein do the job himself. Now from the Israeli point of view, Israelis getting the Syrians out and if need be hold on to a certain chunk of territory for a certain period of time as the best way to assure [omission in the original] against Israel/Iraq [omission in the original]. The Jordanians are thinking much more in terms of an Israeli strike in areas. The Israelis are thinking much more in terms [omission in the original] as a way of achieving the withdrawal of forces. I have overstated both positions for obvious reasons for purposes of clarifying our own thinking. [omission in the original] have said that looking at the situation tomorrow morning and if we [omission in the original] to the Jordanians. We should continue the dialogue with the Israelis.
K: How do you continue the dialogue?
S: Answer their questions, keep the option and try to facilitate a get together between the Israelis and the Jordanians. We agree in principles but we ought to know before they go and we ought to know [the results].2 Ought to be responsive to the Jordanian request.
K: How much more clear can they be than air request?
[Page 888]S: Read the Annenberg cable about Hussein’s complaint about the fedayeen.3
K: It is conceivable…
S: It is conceivable but not certain. Are you sure in your own mind…
K: I am sure in my own mind that we are going one way or the other. Hussein is going to collapse.
S: I don’t at the moment think the facts sustain that.
K: I am not talking about tomorrow, how are you going to keep the Israelis in play by answering their questions?
S: I am not quarrelling with that.
K: You can’t give it to them carte blanche.
S: They ought to go to them but then say before you do, we want to be consulted. Don’t suggest that you don’t answer their questions. If you don’t respond positively in principle, you lose your option.
K: How do we answer their questions?
S: Don’t know. Got this paper and want to reflect on it.4 Think we say the Jordanians are obviously trying to do this job by their own means. Very anxious to have the two of you to get together because both of you obviously feel there has got to be coordination and think one of two ways the Jordanians indicate that the grounds [omission in the original]. The Israelis are ready to go or give a yes and pass along that contact between the two regardless of what the discussions are, we want an opportunity to consult before the final move is made.
K: What did you say, either want an opportunity to consult or the other come…
S: If we go along, we then ought to send a message to the Jordanians, make the [omission in the original] response and let them send the message to indicate to the Jordanians what we are prepared to do and if we say this is what we are prepared to do, we would still say to the Israelis, after you talk to the Jordanians, we would still want you to come back and talk to us. I may have some further thoughts as I reflect on this tonight. Frankly, I haven’t consulted anyone.
K: I have scheduled a WSAG for 8:00 in the morning just to bring ourselves up-to-date.5
S: Okay Henry, see you in the morning.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Box 30, Chronological Files. No classification marking.↩
- Brackets are in the original.↩
- In telegram 7681 from London, September 22, 2050Z, the Embassy reported that Hussein was complaining that the fedayeen were only continuing to fight because the U.S. Government had not persuaded the Israelis to act. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 727, Country Files, Europe, United Kingdom, Vol. III)↩
- Not further identified.↩
- See Document 317.↩