Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State and the Embassy in Jordan¹

Tel Aviv, September 20, 1970, 1910Z.

5181. This message sent Exdis because Amman has no Nodis capability. Dept handle as Nodis for distribution purposes. Subject: Syrian threat. Ref: Amman 4973.²

1. Agree with Amman view on utility spooking Syrians. To some extent assume this is what we are trying to do with oral note to Sovs, UNSC meeting, moves of US forces, etc. For US to try to get Israelis into act, however, would add a dimension that should be viewed with caution. Most important question, to us, is whether GOJ can survive and hopefully win out on its own or with whatever moral or material support US can give. If it can, then outcome of present Jordan situation may still be a plus in fundamental problem of getting Mideast settlement, since it will tend to convince UAR and USSR of dangers in continuation present impasse and need to take steps required to permit negotiations to resume.

2. If Israel is brought into present Jordan situation, however, we fear this would have fallout in terms of providing a point for Arabs, including fedayeen and moderates, to rally round, and turn fight from one between GOJ on one side and fedayeen plus Syria on other into one between Arabs and Israelis. Even if IDF massing of forces opposite Syria had desired effect on Syrian forces and caused them to pull back, it might also provoke some reaction from USSR that would complicate situation. If IDF had to [garble—go?] further and actually move into Syria to objective of turning Syrian armor around, then we would surely have opened a new situation.

3. As Dept will recall, Dayan has previously (April) given us some ideas which are applicable now, principally one that in situation like present one GOI would move to buttress King only if we asked them to. If it appears that this is going to be only way of saving GOJ, then that would appear to us to take precedence over any other doubts expressed above, and we think GOJ would be responsive.

4. Have just seen Amman 4976 and agree with para four therof that most meaningful thing we could do at this stage would be to leak that plan right away.³

Zurhellen

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 ARAB–ISR. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 3:49 p.m. A note at the end of the telegram indicates it was passed to the White House.
2. In telegram 4973 from Amman, September 20, the Embassy suggested “spooking” the Syrians by massing Israeli forces at the Syrian border and flying low-level Israeli reconnaissance over Damascus. (Ibid.)
3. In paragraph 4 of telegram 4976 from Amman, September 20, the Embassy suggested leaking a U.S. contingency plan to evacuate U.S. citizens from Amman in the hopes of deterring the Syrians. (Ibid., POL 23–9 JORDAN)