Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Iran¹

Washington, September 19, 1970, 2316Z.

154391. For Ambassador MacArthur. Ref: State 152503; Tehran 4059.²

1. We have read with interest Shah’s assessment of Jordanian situation. Please convey Department’s sincere appreciation when you share with the Shah our own assessment of the current situation as given below:

2. Militarily King appears have upper hand in Amman, Zarqa and southern part of country. Situation around Irbid not clear, but GOJ assures us army intends reestablish control over that city in the near future. Thus far there has been no active interference on part of Syria and Iraq, although we have reports of fedayeen belonging to Saiqa and other unidentified Palestinian organizations entering Jordan from Lebanon and Syria. With particular reference to Iraq, Iraqi troops in Jordan have not involved themselves in current fighting. Moreover, they have reportedly stood by while Jordan Army moved against fedayeen in Mafraq area. In addition other reports indicate Iraqis have begun as yet unexplained withdrawal of Iraqi units from Irbid area back to Mafraq.

3. In sum, security situation in Amman appears somewhat better than yesterday, although no doubt some bitter fighting remains to be done before King’s authority entirely reestablished at least over urban centers of his kingdom.

4. You might also discreetly probe Shah’s thinking on possible Iranian moves should Iraq actively intervene in Jordan.³ You may inform him privately that we are prepared intervene if it becomes necessary to evacuate American citizens should there be complete breakdown of public order in Jordan and American lives are in serious danger. Beyond this, any other kind of intervention would obviously depend on future developments in Jordan situation. In the event of Iraqi and/or Syrian military intervention, which we consider unlikely, the King might request outside air support to interdict foreign forces moving against King. You may inform the Shah very confidentially that because of the importance we attach to the survival of the Hashemite regime and because of our previous commitments to him, we are considering how we might be responsive.

5. If the Shah should ask what the U.S. position would be re Israeli intervention, you should reply that we doubt such intervention would have positive effect except in connection air interdiction against Syria and Iraqi military forces at time King’s regime seriously threatened. You may inform him that we are in close and continuing contact with Israelis re current situation in Jordan.

6. Re Nasser’s position vis-à-vis Jordanian situation, we believe that Nasser would, all things considered, prefer to see Hussein stay in power, particularly in view of what we continue to believe to be Nasser’s desire for some sort of Near East peace settlement. However, Nasser is aware of the growth of Palestinianism as a political force in the area, and he may rate the Hashemite dynasty’s chances of long-term survival as slight. In the present crisis he appears to be trying to stay on the fence and in a position to deal with whatever forces emerge. He would probably prefer a situation of stability in Jordan with the King in control and the Palestinian guerrilla movement dominated by Yasir Arafat, the one among Palestinian leaders with whom Nasser has greatest rapport. He would probably have little problem with an attempt by the King to crush the extremist Palestinian guerrilla groups; however, the King’s move against al-Fatah as well as the other groups probably aroused Nasser’s concern. In general we can expect Nasser to play a moderating role. His recent appeal, in conjunction with Qhadafi and Numeiry, for a ceasefire and political solution of the crisis in Jordan can be seen in this light. We doubt whether Nasser will provide either Hussein or Arafat with any tangible assistance.

Rogers

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted on September 18 by Scotes; cleared by Davies, Kissinger via Haig, Seelye, Childs (NEA/IRN), and Sterner (NEA/UAR); and approved by Sisco. It was repeated Immediate to Amman and Tel Aviv.
2. Telegram 152503 is Document 259. For telegram 4059 from Tehran, September 17, 1345Z, see footnote 2 thereto.
3. Telegram 4113 from Tehran, September 21, 1315Z, conveyed the Shah’s comments to MacArthur that there was little Iran could do to help King Hussein since Iran was not an Arab state. However, the Shah had sent a message to Nasser proposing that the UAR, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Turkey, and Lebanon formally urge all nations to avoid intervention in Jordan. The Shah intended the formal appeal to be aimed specifically at Iraq and Syria. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)