Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

265. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

• Soviet Reaction to US Involvement in Jordan

The Soviet attitude toward the latest round between the King and the Army and the Fedayeen is probably mixed.

On the one hand, the King appears to be the preferable alternative to a radical guerrilla regime, which the Soviets have treated with some disdain, which could turn out to be sympathetic to the Maoist brand of revolution and more “spontaneous” than the Soviets like. The probable chaos resulting from the King’s overthrow and the psychological impetus that would give to the Iraqi and Syrian regimes cannot be something the Soviets would watch with much satisfaction or equanimity.

On the other hand, Jordan has never been of special concern to the Soviets except in that it reflected the basic policy toward the UAR. The disappearance of a regime influenced by, and sympathetic toward the US would also represent a gain of sorts for the USSR. In the end if faced with the new situation, the Soviets might convince themselves that they could work with Arafat, who, of course, has been in Moscow, and that the new pressures on Israel would strengthen the Soviet hand and weaken ours.

Whatever their theoretical ruminations, the practical matter is that the Soviets will not be happy to see US military power used in the area in any way. They will have to denounce it, harass us (including by horse play and close UAR-based reconnaissance against the 6th Fleet), and generally oppose us. The precedent is what will worry them most of all, and the demonstration that we could and will use our air power and naval presence will cast a shadow over their calculations about how far we might go in support of Israel at a later date in a new crisis, and our international posture generally. (This may be all to the good if our operations are, and are perceived to be successful.)

Israel and Iraq

1. Air strikes in support of Jordan against the fedayeen alone; this would be the least complicated for the Soviets and call for the least physical riposte; mostly propaganda and agitation, as long as the Arab states stood by.

2. Hussein vs. the fedayeen and Iraqi troops; if the conflict remains limited to these participants, no Soviet military action would be likely, especially if the US intervention was quick and effective; a more prolonged US air intervention, however, might produce some Soviet diplomatic actions, say in the UN, to castigate and condemn, to force the US to desist. —If the Israelis became involved against the Iraqi troops, Soviet reaction could become more problematical and dangerous for two reasons: first, the Israelis might feel compelled to launch preemptive strikes against the air defense build-up along the canal, and second, the UAR might feel it had to activate that front.

• —If this occurred, then the Soviets would be involved, and might shift to an entirely different diplomatic position and military calculation.
• —It would be a situation in which the June war would be reopening piecemeal; the Soviets would be concerned that the Israelis would launch a massive attack on the new air defense complex; in which case, the UAR would almost certainly want to begin using the TU–16s against the Bar-Lev line; Soviet pilots would probably be flying missions, etc.
• —In this contingency the Soviets would still want to avoid a confrontation with the US, but might engage in a greater show of force in the Mediterranean.
• —The main danger would be a de facto Soviet-American air battle in the entire area, with Soviet pilots flying out of the UAR, and Syria and perhaps Iraq.

3. Armed Intervention for evacuation: Soviet calculations might be similar to the first case; i.e., that our action could be tolerated, but they would be concerned that we leave the area; and permanent entrenchment of American forces in Jordan would be a radical change in the situation and might lead the Soviets into a tough threatening stand.

• —One danger would be that the Soviets would begin putting in organized ground units in the UAR, if it looked as if the American forces were in to stay for some time to come.
• —Again, the total Soviet reaction would also be affected by Israeli involvement; Israeli intervention, plus US landings of ground troops would look to the Soviets like a power play changing the ball game in a major way in Israel’s favor.
• —The Soviets and the UAR would then have to consider whether to put pressure on the canal front, ranging from raids to a full scale attack; the Soviets would probably not encourage such a course, but they also could not afford to veto such a decision; thus the Soviets themselves could become involved at this point.

In sum, the Soviets want, first of all, to protect their stake in the UAR. Their decisions and actions will be influenced by Nasser, and, in turn, the Soviets will be counseling him to think of his own security first and his prestige as an Arab leader second.

The secondary, but still important Soviet aim will be to limit and prevent American intrusion with any military action or presence. They are probably not prepared to take much of a risk to do this in the situation in Jordan but the critical factor is whether Israel becomes involved and the fighting erupts along the canal. Should it do so, a proxy war would be underway, and the Soviets might just figure that decisive action along the canal would be preferable to a war of attrition. This is the main danger.

One important area of uncertainty is the impact of a crisis on the top Soviet leadership, which was sharply criticized after the June war for being too soft, and for mismanaging the entire affair. In another major crisis, particularly one in which the US demonstrated it was free to act militarily, the Soviets might feel they had to justify themselves. On the other hand, they could not afford to open up charges of mismanaging a risky affair by imprudent actions.

On balance, it seems that the Soviets would probably conclude they had little choice but to let the US get away with a limited intervention, as long as Israeli forces were not involved in attacks against the forces of Arab governments.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive; Outside System. Urgent; sent for information. Kissinger’s initials are on the first page.