Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

263. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, September 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

• The Situation in Jordan

The major change in the situation from yesterday seems to be that while the army still has the upper hand, it is proceeding methodically in Amman and is meeting fairly stiff resistance from the fedayeen. It also appears that the problem outside of Amman will require some time to resolve. This confirms that the struggle may turn out to be more protracted and the results less clear-cut than may have appeared from reporting yesterday afternoon.² It is even possible that Hussein could decide on some compromise settlement with the fedayeen when he feels that he has regained much of his status and authority and before he gets bogged down in a longer term campaign that could sap his army’s strength and determination. He may, of course, opt to try to completely crush the fedayeen.

The following are the major developments since yesterday afternoon.

The Military Situation

During most of yesterday it appeared that the Jordanian army was gradually expanding its control of Amman in the face of stiff resistance from the fedayeen. The fighting fell off to occasional outbursts of small arms fire and artillery during the night but intensified again at dawn when the army went back on the offensive.

The situation is less clear outside of Amman, although apparently there has been some heavy fighting in some of the cities to the north. The central committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization has announced the creation of a “liberated area” in northern Jordan where it claims to be taking over the government of three districts. Northern Jordan has a history of separation going back to the late 1950’s, although, as the embassy comments, the liberated area may have come too late to help the fedayeen cause. The Israelis say that fedayeen forces from Syria and Lebanon are moving into the “liberated area” presumably to strengthen the fedayeen forces already there. The Israelis also report having seen some movement of Jordanian armor and infantry northward but are not sure how much progress has been made in this direction so far.

So far the Syrian and Iraqi forces have stayed out of the fighting. Units of the Iraqi expeditionary force in Jordan, however, have been put on full alert and are being centralized. Some move by the Jordanians, such as the surrounding of an Iraqi camp, could trigger Iraqi involvement in the fighting, if only in a limited way to demonstrate solidarity with the fedayeen. The Israelis, who are watching this situation very closely, believe that for the present there will be no Iraqi intervention nor do they think there will be intervention by Egypt and Syria, barring unexpected moves.

Arab mediation efforts are underway. Nasser and the leaders of Libya and Sudan have sent a carefully worded and balanced message to both King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat. They call on both sides to stop the fighting and provide a chance for fresh talks or consultations. The Arab League Council also met yesterday and called for an end to the senseless fighting, so that the recently established four-nation conciliation committee—composed of Egypt, Sudan, Libya and Algeria—could undertake new efforts to achieve a settlement.

The Negotiations for Hostages

The Bern Group is continuing its efforts to come up with an agreed mandate for the Red Cross to continue its negotiations with the PFLP for the release of the remaining hostages. We are pushing—so far without much apparent success—a formula whereby the five powers would authorize the Red Cross negotiators to say they will agree to consider the most recent PFLP proposals at such time as the PFLP provides its total demands, including a specific list of the fedayeen they want from the Israelis.

The Bern Group last night met to consider an acceptable British redraft of the language of our formula but no progress was made.³ The Israeli said that he thought his government would also find the British draft unacceptable and would prefer to wait for another report from the Red Cross representative in Amman, for further information on the general situation in Jordan and for the results of Mrs. Meir’s trip to the U.S. The Germans were also opposed to the British draft saying that it did not meet German demands specifically emphasizing an Israeli contribution to a package settlement.

It has become increasingly clear at recent sessions of the Bern Group that unless the Israelis soon join into the multilateral package approach there is a good chance that the British and Germans will break ranks and conclude unilateral deals with the PFLP. Our Chargé in Tel Aviv talked to Eban just before he left for the U.S. to urge favorable Israeli consideration of the formula being discussed in Bern.⁴ Eban again refused to go along with our approach on the grounds that Israel was being asked to write a blank check. The Chargé concludes that it will not be easy to bring Israel along and suggests that pressure be applied at as many points as possible—including with Mrs. Meir—to achieve the maximum impact.

The issue here, of course, is that the fedayeen are conditioning the release of our citizens on the performance of a third country—Israel. Israel is in fact being asked to ransom the nationals of third countries— although the situation is complicated by the fact that the fedayeen classify some of the American Jews as Israelis which raises another problem of discrimination on the basis of religion.

According to a spokesman for King Hussein the Jordanian army commanders have been given orders to look for and liberate the hostages as quickly as possible. We have no further information on the safety of the hostages although there are some indications that at least some of them may be held at locations where they could be exposed to the fighting.

U.S. Actions

The decisions taken at yesterday’s WSAG meetings⁵ are being implemented. The WSAG is meeting again this morning.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 615, Country Files, Middle East, Jordan, Vol. V. Secret; Sensitive.
2. Telegram 4894 from Amman, September 17, 2230Z. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 JORDAN)
3. Telegram 2337 from Bern, September 17, 1925Z, relayed the British attempt to reformulate language from U.S. proposal made the previous day. British insistence on revising the text met with resistance from Israel, West Germany, and the United States, while Switzerland was willing to accept the British formula. (Ibid., PS 7–6 JORDAN) Regarding the September 16 Bern Group meeting, see Document 250 and footnote 4 thereto.
4. As reported in telegram 5120 from Tel Aviv, September 17, 0923Z. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)
5. See Documents 254 and 260.
6. See Document 264.