Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

217. Telegram From the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State¹

Amman, September 9, 1970, 2032Z.

4521. Ref State 147107.² Following are our thoughts on questions raised Dept’s reftel:

1. We are uncertain that Husain would be willing at this time— even at our instigation—to undertake final military confrontation with fedayeen. This suggested we believe by his lack of response to the many fedayeen provocations of past two weeks. Several of these could have furnished pretext for confrontation if this had been in his mind. More recently it suggested also by his commissioning Chief of Staff to establish cease-fire on basis previous much-abused agreements. King’s unreceptiveness to such proposal from U.S. finally suggested by our having received no feelers from him this subject. If destruction of fedayeen were high on King’s list of plans, we believe he would have raised matter with us by now.

2. Even if Husain were to imply to us that it now propitious time for strike against fedayeen, we would counsel restraint. Fedayeen have large number civilian hostages—including several U.S. officials—in their hands. If Husain were now to give army its head, it quite possible that many hostages would be killed and that former TWA/ SwissAir passengers now at al-Urdun Hotel might be endangered. Our having given diplomatic support to GOJ strike at such inopportune time, moreover, would sooner or later become public knowledge.

3. If ICRC rescue operation fails, however, and hostages killed Embassy believes that we should then emphatically urge King to settle fedayeen hash once and for all. Safety of hostages in fact might be promoted if GOJ made it clear that harm to them would be signal for repression of entire fedayeen movement.

4. If Husain shows disposition—after encumbrance of aircraft passengers removed—to contemplate fedayeen roll-up we believe JAA adequate for job. This judgment would still hold even if Iraqis joined opposition, except that conflict would then be bloodier one.

5. If confrontation seemed advisable or in the offing, we would discourage Husain’s request for direct military intervention as follows: we would point out that such assistance probably not needed, and that victory achieved even with token U.S. presence could be political suicide. Any direct U.S. participation would discredit King in Arab eyes and strike at base of political and social order for which King feels self deeply responsible. We could offer instead assurances of political and diplomatic support with international community and with some of Husain’s Arab neighbors. (In former capacity we could seek obtain assurances of at least neutrality of USSR.) At same time we should caution King against launching one-man campaign against fedayeen. We should urge that he make any drive against them appear legitimate inter-Arab police action and seek participation of at least small units from Saudi Arabia and UAR. In aftermath recent PFLP successes and probable leftward shift of whole fedayeen movement, both these states might be prepared to come out more strongly against fedayeen than heretofore.

6. Comment: We realize that action suggested para three (above) differs from recommendation Amman’s 4495.³ Past seven hours of violent confrontation, however, suggest to us that status of passengers is shifting from that of pawns in terrorist publicity game to that of instruments to be used by fedayeen in political struggle against GOJ. As passengers’ political significance increases so do dangers to which they exposed. For this reason believe it now appropriate to ask GOJ to issue warning of most dire consequences if passengers or any other hostages are harmed.

Odell

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 330, Subject Files, Hijackings. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 8:20 p.m. It was repeated to Tel Aviv.
2. In telegram 147107 to Amman, September 9, Rogers solicited the Embassy’s opinion on whether the U.S. Government should “press Hussein to provoke major confrontation” with the fedayeen and also asked if this could be done without Hussein requesting U.S. military intervention. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AV 12 US)
3. See footnote 7, Document 214. Odell recommended against the Department urging King Hussein to threaten the PFLP with harm if anything happened to the hostages. Odell argued that such a threat might panic the PFLP into an act of desperation.