Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 15, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Yemen

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Rodger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
• John Moberly, Counselor, British Embassy
• Stephen W. Buck, NEA/ARP

Mr. Moberly said he was calling on Mr. Davies as a result of a letter from London concerning the November visit there of YAR Prime Minister al-Ayni. Moberly said that in discussions with the British, al-Ayni had gone into some detail on the needs of the YAR’s military. Al-Ayni complained that the YAR had not received weapons, spare parts or adequate maintenance support from the USSR, its principal military supplier, in years. The YARG now found itself virtually unable to maintain its military establishment and was looking for alternate sources of supply. It could not afford to pay for military equipment. Al-Ayni indicated that anything the British could do for the YAR in the military field, including weighing in with friendly parties such as the Gulf rulers and Saudi Arabia, would be appreciated.

Moberly said his Government studied the matter and came to the conclusion that in the Peninsula, their first commitment was to Oman; they could not become involved in helping the YAR militarily. On the other hand they were concerned that a negative reply might lead the Yemenis to the conclusion the West was uninterested in providing support. Moberly asked whether the US might be considering providing some sort of military assistance to the YAR.

Mr. Davies replied that he would not rule out some sort of US role. However, we made it crystal clear to the YAR at resumption of relations and have since then that our assistance would be economic and not military. In strict confidence Mr. Davies told Mr. Moberly that he had talked with the Saudis about their being helpful militarily. Under certain circumstances and provided various legislative requirements were met, we might be willing to authorize Saudi transfers of surplus US equipment to the YAR. However, we would not become a direct military supplier of the YAR because of the likelihood that this would only result in the USSR increasing its arms supply to PDRY and introduce a cold war flavor in YAR/PDRY relations.

Mr. Davies noted that we did not feel particularly well informed on the YAR’s military capabilities and needs. We had asked our embassy in Tehran to obtain an Iranian assessment, but unfortunately the recent breakdown in Iranian-YAR relations over language in the Tripoli communiqué had intervened. Summarizing, Mr. Davies said that we are interested in the Sanaa government’s being provided with the military essentials. But we hope to avoid direct US supply because of obvious problems. We hope that regional cooperation, with possible US encouragement, will provide the answer to the YAR’s military needs. Mr. Moberly noted that the US and UK positions appeared to be the same.

Mr. Davies pointed out that US economic assistance to the YAR would probably free at least some YAR budgetary resources for defense/ security expenditures. He then reviewed US activities and plans for the Yemen, noting that our first resident Ambassador would present his credentials on December 19, the tenth anniversary of US recognition of the YAR.² Our aid program, while modest, would be responsive to Yemeni development needs. A second team of AID experts was in Sanaa developing various assistance projects proposed by the YAR following a visit by an earlier team. We planned to have a very modest AID office operating in Sanaa by February. Its director, Aldelmo Ruiz, was very capable and well-qualified, having served in Yemen from 1962 through 1967 as Director of the Kennedy water project in Taiz. Likely American assistance projects included a temporary water system for Sanaa, rehabilitation and expansion of the Taiz water system, completing Taiz airport, rural water supply, a geological/hydrological survey of Yemen by satellite, extension/agricultural work (small projects in dairy farming, poultry and tobacco), education (fifteen Yemenis already studying at AUB on AID grants) and a Peace Corps-staffed English language training program. We would plan to develop the latter program in close collaboration with the British Council, which Mr. Davies understood was already working in the Yemen.

Turning to Yemen-Iranian relations, Mr. Davies said we were as discomforted as the British by the overly sharp Iranian reaction to the reference to the “Arab Gulf” in the Yemen Unity Summit communiqué from Tripoli. Like London, we are anxious to prevent a break between Yemen and Iran but also anxious not to get in the middle. Mr. Moberly said his Embassy had received a cable that afternoon from the British Ambassador at Tehran saying the Shah had indicated through Foreign Minister Khalatlari that if after 3–4 weeks the YAR wished to send an Emissary, he would be received and in due course aid to the YAR would be resumed.

Mr. Davies asked Mr. Moberly to pass on our appreciation for the productive discussions Ambassador Crawford had had in London and for the FCO’s briefing on their recent talks with Prime Minister al-Ayni.³ Mr. Davies said that like the British, we feel that it is unlikely that unity between the two Yemens will fast materialize. It appeared the British in November saw a danger of the better-organized PDRY taking advantage of any unity arrangement, while our assessment was that in any union the four times more populous YAR would have the upper hand. Moberly replied that he had not followed the matter closely, but perhaps the danger of the PDRY tail wagging the YAR dog was now less.

On YAR–Saudi relations, Mr. Davies said that while the Saudis continue to view Yemen unity with great trepidation and reserve, YAR roving Ambassador Numan had at least gained Saudi acquiescence to it during his recent talks in Jidda. The Saudis apparently expect that Prime Minister al-Ayni would be dropped in return for their tolerance of recent unity efforts.⁴

Turning to Iran, Mr. Moberly said that the British had recently been informed that the Shah had become alarmed by a report from an Iranian military source that a party of 250 Dhofari rebels had moved into the Musandam Peninsula near the Strait of Hormuz. According to the Iranians this information came from a British military officer in Oman. The Shah indicated that Iran would be happy to help the Omanis against the Dhofari rebels. Moberly said the British checked out the story and could find no basis for it.

Referring to Moberly’s statement about Oman’s security having priority for the British, Mr. Davies remarked that Chinese aid to the Dhofar rebels might become minimal. The Chinese seemed to be in a good position in the YAR and the Russians in PDRY, leaving less scope for PRC support for the Dhofari rebels through the PDRY/Dhofar border.

Referring to the Peninsula as a whole, Mr. Davies remarked that there was a good deal of high level interest, emphasized by the Secretary’s trip last summer.⁵ We had a dynamic Ambassador in the Yemen and we seemed to be getting off to a good start there even with only a modest aid program.⁶ If we could play a discreet role in softening differences between Sanaa, Riyadh and Tehran, this would be all to the good. However, we did not wish to get in the middle, especially if this made the Saudis and Iranians think they could rely on us to meet the YAR’s economic and military needs. We continue to believe that the best way to assist the YAR is through regional cooperation. On the other hand the US does not wish the YAR to become so deprived of military equipment as to have to turn back to the Soviets, their original suppliers.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–YEMEN. Confidential. Drafted on December 18 by Buck. Sisco sent talking points to Davies in a December 15 memorandum. (Ibid., POL UK–US)
2. William R. Crawford, Jr. was appointed on October 12.
3. Transmitted in telegram 11154 from London, November 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL YEMEN)
4. Al-Ayni resigned December 15. According to telegram 1112 from Sanaa, December 16, al-Ayni’s departure was a result of “cumulative disenchantment with his administration, suspicion of the way in which he handled Cairo Unity Declaration, and King Faisal’s caveat that he had to go as price for SAG permissiveness toward YAR–PDRY unity.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 YEMEN)
5. A reference to Secretary of State Rogers’s July trip to the Middle East and Europe.
6. Crawford prepared a detailed memorandum on November 10 on the various aid and developmental programs he thought possible, including the Kennedy Taiz Water System, PL–480, USIA language training, Peace Corps volunteers, CU assistance to Yemenis knowledgeable in English, police training, coordination of UNDP and IBRD activity, grants from the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, poultry production through the Near East Foundation, agricultural programs through International Volunteer Services, military assistance, tourism, and logistics for the American presence. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 761, Presidential Correspondence 1969–74, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal ibn Abdal-Aziz Al Saud, 1972)