186. Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research1
YEMEN: NEW CABINET, OLD PROBLEMS
The third cabinet under the 1971 Yemeni constitution came into office on September 18, 1971, under Prime Minister Muhsin al-Ayni. The cabinet, which is a mixed bag of old and new faces and of left- and right-of-center politicians, reflects the political compromises Al-Ayni must achieve in order to survive. His chances for remaining in office at least over the next year appear to be fairly good, but the basic divisiveness of Yemeni politics and the desperate economic situation could shorten his tenure. Though not anti-American, Al-Ayni will probably be more cautious about renewing diplomatic relations with the US than either his predecessor, Hassan Al-Amri, or President Al-Iryani.
Al-Ayni Resigned Just in Time. Al-Ayni has served as Prime Minister before, but, after a year in office, resigned in May 1971 just prior to the start of the Yemen’s first constitutional system of government. During this tenure, he presided over the successful conclusion of the civil war, which had lasted eight years, and despite his earlier Ba’athi leanings, he managed to win the confidence of the Saudi government. In the view of many observers, Al-Ayni quit while he was still ahead. He apparently intended to wait in the wings while the first Premier under the new constitution, Ahmad Nu’man, struggled with the new system, an economic crisis, and the machinations of a powerful political rival, Army Commander Lt. General Hassan Al-Amri.
As was generally expected, these problems were too much for Nu’man, who resigned after less than two months in office. Following extended negotiations with General Al-Amri, President Iryani finally appointed him as Prime Minister in late August. Al-Amri immediately challenged the President in a struggle for power. Meanwhile, Al-Ayni served quietly as Ambassador in Paris, biding his time far from the stormy Yemeni political scene.
Al-Amri’s Ouster Opened Way for Al-Ayni’s Return. Al-Ayni’s sudden recall as Prime Minister was the result of chance rather than calculation on his part. On August 29, Al-Amri, after scarcely a week in office, became involved in an incident with a Sanaa photographer whom he [Page 575] then shot and killed. President Al-Iryani saw his chance to oust Al-Amri by taking advantage of the adverse local reaction to Al-Amri’s lack of self-control. Al-Amri was stripped of all his posts (Premier, Army Commander, and member of the Presidential Council) and went into exile in Beirut.
Iryani thereupon called on Al-Ayni, who, after having received the blessing of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, formed a new government on September 19. The relative speed with which Al-Ayni was designated can be attributed in part to the Yemeni President’s desire to have a government in office on September 26 when Libya’s Prime Minister Qadhafi had been scheduled (before last-minute cancellation) to visit Yemen for the Revolution Day ceremonies.
Al-Ayni’s Prospects Fair to Middling. Al-Ayni has assumed the premiership during a period of political stability, by Yemeni standards. The new constitutional system appears to be operating reasonably well; the departure of Al-Amri has removed a major source of political controversy; and after two cabinet crises in three months, the Yemeni body politic is probably ready for a period of relative calm.
On the other hand, the critical economic and political problems that Al-Ayni passed to his successors when he resigned six months ago have become worse. The Yemen is nearly bankrupt. Promised Saudi aid has not yet materialized. Moreover, although Al-Ayni removed an irritant to relations with South Yemen by shifting the exiled South Yemeni dissident leader, Abdullah al-Asnaj, from Foreign Minister to Economics Minister, relations with South Yemen are still poor. They are not likely to improve as long as Yemen continues to court, as it must, Saudi political and financial support. Adding to the new government’s problems is the pressure the Soviets could exert, as the Yemeni Army’s principal source of military equipment, to halt Yemen’s drift to the right.
A Balancing Act. Al-Ayni will have to contend with a variety of external factors—Saudis, Soviets, South Yemenis, Americans—as well as internal pressures from both extremes of the political spectrum. His government can be expected to pursue Yemen’s post-civil war “opening to the right,” but very cautiously. Al-Ayni’s nostalgia for leftism and neutralism, coupled with the removal of the most effective check on Yemeni leftists—Al-Amri—will probably lead him to be slightly to the left of what Al-Amri’s government would have been and what President Al-Iryani may personally desire. Relations with the US are not likely to worsen, but Al-Ayni will probably move slowly in the matter of resuming formal diplomatic ties to the US.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 YEMEN. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared on September 24 by David E. Long (INR) and approved by Curtis F. Jones (INR).↩