Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

182. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 36.7–71

Washington, February 11, 1971.

SOUTH YEMEN

Note

This Estimate assesses the situation in South Yemen,² the prospects for Saudi-supported efforts to oust the present government there, and the likely consequences thereof. Its principal conclusions are in paragraph 26.

The Estimate

I. The Setting

1. The British evacuated South Yemen in 1967, turning over the governing of the area to the radical National Front (NF), formerly the National Liberation Front. The Front originally derived from the left-wing Arab Nationalists Movement. Its South Yemen branch has an extremist flavor; some of its principal members are Marxists with a strong ideological affinity for the USSR; others are Maoists. Virtually all its leaders are of rural origin. The Front’s policy has been to wipe out vestiges of colonial tutelage and of government by ruling families. In the past three years, it has nationalized most businesses, expropriated most privately owned land, and abolished the former petty states in favor of six large provinces. Although there has been one shakeup in the Front, which involved the ousting of its relatively moderate wing, the government has not faced serious domestic challenge.

2. The former rulers of the petty states of the hinterland, who were to have been the principal figures in the successor regime Britain had hoped to form, went into exile as the British left. Other South Yemeni exiles include members of the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY) and of the South Arabian League (SAL), both of which had opposed British control of the area. FLOSY lost out to the Front in a bitter struggle for power in 1967. Some of the Front’s less extreme supporters are also in exile now, including the former head of the South Yemen Army. Most of the exiles are in Yemen.

3. The South Yemen regime is virtually without friends in the Arab world. Since Egypt pulled its forces out of Yemen following the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Cairo has largely ignored political developments in the Arabian Peninsula. Neighboring Oman is hostile to South Yemen for supporting rebels in Dhofar. Most other Arab states, even those of a radical bent such as Libya and Algeria, which had extended some aid, have been repelled by the shrill extremism of the South Yemen Government. Syria has extended a little help, however, and Iraq, which until recently provided several air force fighter pilots, now furnishes some technicians and makes occasional statements of support.

4. South Yemen is an odd mixture of modern city and backward rural hinterland.³ Aden developed as a large port, living off business generated by shipping on the Suez Canal route, becoming a fairly prosperous place with a sizable middle class and a flourishing trade-union movement (the source of FLOSY’s support). The hinterland had been largely left to its own devices under its traditional rulers until the 1950s. Dissidence in the rugged and arid mountain country was endemic; the present government experiences the same problem.

5. South Yemen and Yemen are linked by past history, family ties, and a tradition of migration in both directions across the border, and both governments have publicly espoused the concept of Yemeni unity.⁴ However, there has also been sporadic fighting along the border for generations. The two present governments are enemies: Aden sees the reconciliation of San’a with Saudi Arabia and the northern Yemeni tribes as a reactionary move, and San’a is bitterly resentful at the challenge from upstart National Front revolutionaries.

6. The South Yemeni Government is beset by serious economic and financial problems. Before independence, South Yemen lived off payments from the UK and the transit trade through the port of Aden. UK subsidies and the expenditures by British military forces based in Aden stopped in 1967. The UK made payments totalling $29 million after independence, but this assistance ceased after 1968. With the Suez Canal closed, Aden’s bunkering and transit trade has dropped to about a quarter of its 1966 level. Despite rigorous austerity—civil and military salaries are now less than half the pre-independence level—the South Yemen Government is chronically short of money.

II. Soviet and Chinese Interests

7. The Soviets and the Chinese have both used the opening provided by the country’s impoverishment and by the ideological bent of the South Yemen Government. After watching the new regime for about a year, the Soviets began to provide military hardware, mostly on credit, early in 1969. They have provided 10 Mig–15 and Mig–17 aircraft (flown first by Syrian and Iraqi and now by South Yemeni and Arab mercenary pilots), 5 AN–24 transport aircraft, 40-odd medium tanks, artillery, and other military equipment. About 150 Soviet military advisors and maintenance personnel are presently in South Yemen; 50 of these are with the Mig squadron and 10–15 with the AN–24 transport aircraft provided by the Soviets. Most of the remainder—plus some East Europeans—are with the ground forces. The USSR has also extended $13 million in economic aid and East Germany has extended nearly twice as much. Moscow has, so far as we know, refused to replace the former British budget subsidies.

8. The Chinese have worked on a somewhat different basis. For the past two years, they have supplied arms and training to the South Yemen based Dhofar rebel movement operating against the Sultanate of Oman. They have also extended economic credits totalling $55 million on liberal terms to the Aden government. The principal Chinese activity is the construction of a road from Aden to Mukalla. In practice Soviet and Chinese communist efforts in South Yemen are complementary, but this does not stem from any agreed division of effort. Indeed, there is a strong element of Moscow–Peking rivalry in South Yemen, and the USSR is concerned not to appear to be less helpful than China.

9. The Soviets almost certainly see access to South Yemen’s air and maritime facilities as an option worth preserving in the framework of their broader area goals. To date, however, Soviet use of these facilities has been limited to infrequent port calls at Aden. The facilities consist chiefly of the port of Aden, with its bunkering and repair facilities (the latter include drydocks capable of holding vessels of destroyer size) and Khormaksar airfield, just outside the city. Rumors of extensive Soviet military-related construction on the island of Socotra are without foundation, although Soviet personnel apparently did assist in clearing one of the two dirt airstrips on the island to a length permitting AN–24s to land.

10. Soviet naval activity in the Indian Ocean would be facilitated by use of a local port with reliable provision and repair facilities. Aden, as it happens, is one of the best and most convenient ports around the Indian Ocean. Its value to the Soviets would be enhanced if the Suez Canal were open. Khormaksar is a first-class airfield. Socotra, by contrast, has neither harbor nor aids to air navigation; its main attraction is its isolation. In view of the economic and military aid Moscow is providing, the South Yemen regime would almost certainly be willing to permit increased Soviet use of any of these facilities.

III. Saudi Interests and Policy

11. Saudi King Feisal feels that he has a mission to preserve the Arabian Peninsula from radical Arab and communist encroachment. He and his advisors view the Soviet presence in South Yemen with deep suspicion. They are inclined to accept extreme versions of stories about the extent of Soviet military assistance, the construction of Soviet bases, and the influence of the Soviets over South Yemeni Government policies. Feisal himself believes that a prime and near-term goal of the USSR is the overthrow of his monarchy. He is convinced that radical and extremist regimes on Saudi Arabia’s borders are Soviet instruments to this end. The Saudis are aware that the extremist regime in South Yemen is active in promoting dissidence against the neighboring Sultan of Oman and is concerned that Aden may direct the same sort of activity against Saudi Arabia. The Saudis interpret the border clash at Wuday’ah in late 1969 as evidence of South Yemen’s hostile intentions. The Saudis are likely to be encouraged in their efforts against South Yemen by other states, e.g., Iran and Oman.

12. Fear of the intentions of the National Front government in Aden has led the Saudis to aid South Yemeni exiles over the past three years. In 1968 they helped the former ruler of Bayhan move forces through Yemen, with that government’s approval, into Bayhan. [2½ lines not declassified] As it became apparent that the sultans and their followers alone were having little success, the Saudis agreed to help the SAL, then FLOSY, and finally even former NF supporters who had fled South Yemen. Despite their various anti-monarchical attitudes, all have the virtue, in Saudi eyes, of being enemies of South Yemen’s regime.

13. In order to eliminate some of the potential for confusion, the Saudis have encouraged the SAL, FLOSY, and the NF exiles in establishing a National Unity Front (NUF), with headquarters in Yemen. The NUF and other dissident tribal forces are reported to have about 6,000 supporters and hope to raise the number under arms to about 10,000. These figures, even if accurate, must be used with caution, because a force introduced into South Yemen is not likely to have military capabilities equivalent to its numbers. Many recruits will have joined for the opportunity to smuggle weapons, to enjoy the sport of tribal warfare, and to loot. Such recruits are likely to fade away when the fighting gets tough. The record of the dissidents in South Yemen in the past year has not been impressive. They have denied several rugged mountain areas to government troops, but two sizable efforts by tribal forces fizzled out, one in the Hadramaut and one in an area 60–70 miles north of Aden, after the government brought its airpower and armed forces into action. The question is whether a greatly stepped up insurgent effort in the future will produce different results.

IV. Prospects for the Insurgency

14. The dissidents plan a two-pronged thrust at South Yemen in the next few weeks. One operation involves the movement of some groups into Bayhan, the Hadramaut, and Mahra from Saudi Arabia. This phase, [2 lines not declassified] aims at detaching the fifth and sixth provinces of South Yemen or at the least at forcing the South Yemeni Army to overextend itself. Other dissidents are to enter the second and third provinces from Yemen and advance toward Aden; their advance is supposed to be coupled with terrorism in Aden itself against the National Front and its Soviet advisors. [1 line not declassified] The programs are compatible, but we believe that they will not be adequately synchronized and that South Yemen’s Army can deal with them one at a time.

15. The Saudis are not likely to stint in support to a variety of South Yemen dissidents in the coming year. Although some of their aid will be diverted for the benefit of various tribal economies, the dissidents will get enough for their needs. King Feisal has a personal interest in the endeavor, and so do Kamal Adham, Prince Sultan, and the Governor of Najran. The Saudis will, however, threaten to suspend their aid from time to time in an effort to compel cooperation among the various dissident groups.

16. In addition to augmented Saudi support, the dissident tribal forces will have the advantage of operating out of Yemen into areas where tribal rebellions have gone on for years. The Yemeni Government would no doubt prefer to avoid direct complicity in an insurgent drive against South Yemen, but its own bias against the National Front in Aden plus its dependence on Saudi money and goodwill will impel it to continue to support the dissidents—openly if need be. The Yemeni Government, however, is unlikely to commit its own forces.

17. On the other side, much will depend on the loyalty and efficiency of the South Yemeni Armed Forces, about which there is virtually no reliable information. The 10,000-man South Yemeni Army is tribally recruited; although the force is equipped with vehicles, its men and officers are not roadbound. South Yemen’s small air force is capable of flying ground support strikes against tribal forces. Despite purges of the South Yemeni officer corps for political reasons in the three years since independence, the armed forces still appear to support the regime and have had reasonable success against tribal insurgents in the past year. They have, however, been hampered in some instances by the conflicting tribal loyalties of their troops, and some of the latter might rally to the dissidents.

18. Though they will be taxed, the South Yemen Armed Forces should be able to prevent the overthrow of the government. They are unlikely, however, to be able to crush the insurgents. The latter will undoubtedly succeed in denying substantial parts of the hill country to the government; they might even establish effective control over one or more of the former Sultanates near the borders; and with great luck they might succeed in separating at least the inland parts of the fifth and sixth provinces—the Hadramaut Valley—from the rest of South Yemen. But the heart of the South Yemeni Government and regime is Aden and its environs (Aden, Little Aden, Shaikh Uthman). As long as it holds this region and a reasonably large part of the third and fourth provinces, including such towns as Abyan and other administrative centers, the National Front will be able to portray itself as the legitimate government of South Yemen.

19. In the struggle against the insurgents, it is unlikely that the South Yemen Government would need to call on major military assistance from outside, e.g., from the USSR. The Soviet advisors already there would almost certainly increase the maintenance and logistics support which they have been extending. They might in addition fly ground support missions within the boundaries of South Yemen, if Arab pilots are unable to fill the need, but we do not believe that the Soviets would commit their pilots to actions outside that country. In the not unlikely event that the insurgency turned out to be prolonged and inconclusive, the Aden government would need and probably get some additional financial assistance and military equipment from the Soviets. The Soviets would be willing to increase their air role to some extent, if they calculated that they could thereby establish their influence in Aden more firmly and that the risk of international complications would be slight. Moreover, the Soviets might fear that failure to respond to South Yemeni requests would give opportunities to the Communist Chinese.

20. With a view to their future in the Indian Ocean area, the Soviets wish to maintain their present position in South Yemen and continue their access to the air and maritime facilities. We do not believe, however, that the insurgency in South Yemen will develop in such a way as to appear to the Soviets to require a substantial commitment of their own forces. They would, of course, be reluctant to see the National Front government go under, but if its demise appeared imminent, they might decide that it would be advantageous to make a deal with some of the radical insurgent elements. The uncertainties and complications of the situation, the difficulties which they experienced in Yemen in the 1960s, and the prospect of other complications in the Middle East would all militate against extensive direct Soviet involvement.

V. Implications for Saudi Arabia

21. Although Kamal Adham has asserted that the Saudis are prepared to continue their efforts to oust the South Yemen regime for as long as necessary and to use as much force as necessary, the Saudis probably have not looked far beyond currently planned operations. Probably they have not given much thought to the domestic political implications of support for a protracted insurgency. The Saudi leaders’ attitudes suggest that they would not consider one setback, even a serious one, as a reason to suspend aid to South Yemen dissidents. Feisal is almost certain to believe that, if an initial effort failed, it would have been due to inadequate support or poor leadership among the dissidents. The Saudis might try using new dissident leaders, but are almost certain to try the strategy at least once or twice more. The odds therefore favor a prolonged struggle.

22. In the course of such a prolonged contest there are circumstances in which some Saudi Arabian forces might become directly involved in South Yemen. Saudi support of the dissidents is well known to the South Yemen Government, and the latter might try to strike at support bases within Saudi territory, say through air attacks. The logistic and technical limitations of the South Yemen Armed Forces would preclude efforts of any substantial magnitude. The Saudis would, of course, respond to such South Yemeni actions, probably using Saudi aircraft; some skirmishing in the border area could ensue. The Saudis could also employ small numbers of National Guard troops across the border in support of tribal insurgents.

23. The factors operating against a major Saudi commitment of military forces outweigh those in its favor. It is true that Feisal is aging and bitter. He has intense fear about a radical encirclement of his country and feels he must act to prevent it. Feisal apparently feels a need to demonstrate Saudi power in the Peninsula, and he may have been encouraged by the success of his forces in the 1969 border clash with South Yemen. Moreover, he is getting hawkish advice from some of those around him. But a large, direct military involvement is unlikely. In fact, the Saudi Armed Forces have severe limitations, which would rapidly become apparent if a major effort were started. Saudi logistic capabilities to support a sizable move into South Yemen by the regular army or National Guard are poor. There are 300 miles of thoroughly inhospitable terrain between Saudi staging areas and the Saudi-South Yemeni border. Beyond these considerations, the Saudi Government in like situations in the past has been cautious; for example, it refrained from committing regular armed forces in support of the Yemeni royalists in the 1960s, despite great provocations by the Egyptians.

24. Judging from the size of the insurgent force so far reported to have been equipped, the economic cost to Saudi Arabia probably has not been high. If Saudi support continues over an extended period and if the Saudis find it necessary to increase the scale of their activities, the drain on the Saudi treasury could run to several million dollars a year. Measured against the entire Saudi budget this is not a large sum. Over a period of time, however, such a drain probably would be exploited by elements within the country which are already unhappy at its social and political conservatism. If the Saudis were to undertake major military intervention in South Yemen, the economic costs and domestic political risks to the Feisal regime would be considerably larger. If Saudi forces were defeated, then consequences could be very serious for the monarchy.

25. A prolonged Saudi-sponsored insurgency in South Yemen could adversely affect the rather fragile political stability which has existed in Yemen since the Yemeni-Saudi rapprochement and end of the civil war in the spring of 1970. The San’a government, because of its distaste for the South Yemen regime and probably even more because of Saudi financial subsidies, has allowed the NUF to operate freely in Yemen and has served as a conduit of Saudi arms and financial assistance to NUF insurgent forces. There are Yemeni elements, both moderate and radical, however, who oppose Yemeni involvement in Saudi plans, either for fear of South Yemeni reprisals or for ideological reasons. Saudi pressures on San’a to support a continuing insurgency would probably bring these opposing factions into sharper conflict.

26. In sum: (a) the South Yemeni regime appears likely to survive the efforts of the insurgents to overthrow it, but it is unlikely to be able to crush the insurgents; (b) in the course of a prolonged insurgency, some Saudi forces might become directly involved in South Yemen, but factors operating against a major Saudi military commitment outweigh those favoring it; (c) if the Saudis did become involved militarily, the domestic political risks to Feisal’s regime would rise; and (d) the Soviets, interested in South Yemen’s air and maritime facilities, probably will continue maintenance and logistic support to South Yemeni forces. We do not believe, however, that the insurgency in South Yemen will develop in such a way as to appear to the Soviets to require a substantial commitment of their own forces.

[Omitted here is a map of North and South Yemen. See Appendix B.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A, Box 418. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted it with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the AEC and the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. The conclusions of the SNIE were passed on to Jidda in telegram 32516, February 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 YEMEN)
2. The term South Yemen designates the country that formerly included the Crown Colony of Aden and the Aden Protectorate. In 1964 it was termed the Federation of South Arabia, on independence in 1967 became the People’s Republic of South Yemen, and in 1970 changed its name to the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen. This state is not to be confused with the former Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen, since 1962 called the Yemen Arab Republic, and termed in this paper Yemen. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. Current population estimates: Aden, 200,000 (down significantly since 1967); hinterland, 1,250,000. [Footnote is in the original.]
4. The Hadramaut—the present fifth and sixth provinces of South Yemen—is not considered by its own people or by most other people in the area as being part of a greater Yemen. [Footnote is in the original.]