Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

165. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 16, 1972.

SUBJECT

• Saudi Arabian National Guard Program

PARTICIPANTS

• The Honorable Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary, NEA
• The Honorable Nicholas G. Thacher, Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
• The Honorable James H. Noyes, DOD/ISA
• Colonel George Maloney, DOD/ISA
• Mr. Francois M. Dickman, Country Director, NEA/ARP
• Mr. Brooks Wrampelmeier, Country Officer for Saudi Arabia, NEA/ARP

Mr. Sisco invited Colonel Maloney to outline his findings on the Saudi National Guard. Colonel Maloney said that as the National Guard has no Saudi officers and its personnel are 99% illiterate in Arabic, 10–20 years are estimated to be needed to carry out the program envisioned by the Guard leadership. Commercial dictates, however, obliged both the UKG and Raytheon to agree to National Guard Commander Prince Abdullah’s requests to do the job in five years. Observers in Saudi Arabia believe that Abdullah is seeking to develop a force with a wallop in as short a time as possible so as to have some say in the succession when King Faisal passes from the scene.

Mr. Sisco asked if we want to give Prince Abdullah this capability. Ambassador Thacher observed that the King feels a need to reward Abdullah for past loyalty, especially for the role played by the National Guard during the March 1964 confrontation between Faisal and then King Saud. Mr. Sisco wondered what alternative options to U.S. help existed for Abdullah. The Ambassador thought that, if rebuffed by the USG, Abdullah would return to the King and say that he wants the British. The Ambassador doubted that the King would agree and was positive that Minister of Defense Prince Sultan would oppose a British role. Colonel Maloney remarked that Abdullah has threatened to go to either the UK or to the French if turned down by us.² He felt, however, that the King rather than Abdullah would make the final decision.

Asked how we should proceed, Colonel Maloney noted that the King wants to move promptly on National Guard reorganization to satisfy Abdullah. He suggested that the USG might offer to start with organizing two, rather than four, battle groups with the option to add more later on. No finite time limit for this program should be set. Complex or sensitive items, like artillery, should be supplied much later. Mr. Sisco agreed that for political reasons he would prefer to see artillery be a later add-on to the program. Continuing, Colonel Maloney suggested that the National Guard be given as much communications equipment as it wants and that its trucks be replaced with armored cars (armed initially with machine guns) and APC’s. The Guard already has 103 X 106 mm recoilless rifles on order from Spain.

Mr. Sisco asked who would handle the software portions of the program. Colonel Maloney said that this could be Raytheon or any other qualified American commercial firm. The American business community in Saudi Arabia is aware of the National Guard project but no companies other than Raytheon have expressed active interest in obtaining this contract. Mr. Dickman and Mr. Wrampelmeier confirmed that there have been no approaches from other companies here.

Mr. Sisco then asked about the possibility of a government-to-government arrangement. Mr. Noyes said that DOD/ISA has studied this question carefully and sees no alternative if the National Guard project is to be carried out by U.S. sources. He cautioned, however, that Secretary Laird’s approval still needs to be obtained before a USG commitment can be given to the Saudis. Mr. Sisco said that he had talked to Secretary Rogers about this project and could state categorically that Mr. Noyes has the Department of State’s clearance to proceed on a government-to-government basis. Mr. Sisco added that if need be, he could ask the Secretary to speak to Secretary Laird.³ Mr. Noyes said that DOD/ISA will begin promptly to draft a paper to Secretary Laird recommending his approval for negotiation of a government-to-government agreement with the Saudis for the National Guard.⁴

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–4 SAUD. Confidential. Drafted by Wrampelmeier.
2. In an October 17 meeting with Thacher and Wrampelmeier, Defense Department representatives pointed out the potential problems associated with U.S. arming and advising of two potentially conflicting Saudi forces, the regular army and the National Guard. Thacher countered that it was better for the United States to arm both sides than to allow for Britain or France to arm and advise them as “that could lead to a situation in which different foreign governments backed rival forces.” He thought a double U.S. role could mitigate the rivalry. (Ibid.)
3. On November 28 Rogers wrote Laird that a favorable response would be sent to Faisal concerning a government-to-government agreement for modernization of the National Guard, making “maximum use of American contractors with supervision exercised by a modest Department of Defense contract administration element.” (Ibid., AID(US) 8–7 SAUD)
4. A meeting between State and Defense Department representatives took place on October 19 at which they discussed practical steps for proceeding with the negotiation of a government-to-government agreement, once Laird gave the green light. See Document 167.