Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

162. Telegram From the Embassy in Saudi Arabia to the Department of State¹

Jidda, July 13, 1972, 1530Z.

2329. No Distribution Outside Department. For NEA. Subject: Next Steps re National Guard Program. Ref: (A) State 119605; (B) Jidda 2255.²

Summary: Embassy finds King opposed to companies and still wishing full government-to-government relationship for National Guard program. While we continue believe there is strong general sentiment that project go to US sources, yet British and French are busily pushing their proposals and we not certain how much longer US can delay without enhancing prospects for other governments. Complexity of Guard project may have been exaggerated and we believe it probably less difficult to carry out than F–5 or Navy programs. Perhaps no more than 20–25 US personnel required supervise implementation govt-to-govt contract for hard and soft ware. Accordingly, Embassy urges decision in favor of govt-to-govt offer as best means assuring substantial sale of goods and services, strengthening of Saudi ties of dependence and close association with US and because direct US involvement is best means assuring that Guard project is run in manner to safeguard long-run prospects for Saudi internal security. End summary. Following is our assessment present situation:

1. King’s attitude: While King was close-mouthed in discussion reported reftel (B) yet his posture quite consistent reports we have had from other sources. He is opposed to private companies, does not want them to “get between USG and SAG” in implementation of project, i.e. he wishes full govt-to-govt relationship for all aspects of program. One aspect King’s view is patently unacceptable to USG: concept that no company at all should be involved and that entire project be carried out by US military.

2. Preference for US: Our estimate there is general sentiment throughout top levels Saudi Government, including (as reported to us earlier by Kamal Adham) King himself, for US to carry out project because of political-military considerations as well as on basis superior US performance.

3. Competition: US has taken two months before making known its views following information received from Prince Abdullah that Raytheon proposal not satisfactory. We have left field open for British and French pursue vigorously their efforts secure National Guard program. British are, of course, well situated with their advisory mission at Riyadh which is in daily contact with senior National Guard officials. Newly arrived British Ambassador had hardly presented credentials before he rushed off call on top levels of Guard. Raytheon reps here inform us French are gleefully stating they have inside track and that Raytheon and USG no longer in running. Both UK and French will, we believe, be happy tailor their proposals (or appear to tailor them) any way necessary overcome King’s objections. We cannot guess how much longer Prince Abdullah will wait for proposals from US which King might accept. While Abdullah is being exhorted to “go American” he may soon be able to point to US delays as reasons for urging acceptance either French or UK proposals in order get on with matter which we know Abdullah most anxious to do.

4. We believe it would not be helpful for us to urge again further consideration of Raytheon at this stage in view of King’s desire company not handle National Guard contract because of association with Kashoggi. (While King did not say this specifically, it has reached us from so many sources that we certain this correct.) Yet in its predicament, Raytheon enjoys widespread respect in Saudi Arabia for its fine record as a performer on Hawk project. All may not be lost for Raytheon but company will have to be patient. Embassy will remain alert for any possible opportunity give company renewed chance, consistent with interest of other US firms who might legitimately wish obtain contract.

5. Believe State and Defense should recognize clearly nature of Guard program and what it might involve for USG were we to play role on following lines: survey team to work out precise character of a practical National Guard program, hardware to be sold SAG on govt-to-govt basis, govt-to-govt contract under which USG would employ private contractor to implement maintenance and training for National Guard. Our understanding first two aspects poses no special difficulties for USG. We concur fully in need of survey team to draw up proposal and that this first step is sine qua non of any further USG involvement. However, complexity of Guard project may have been, we believe, exaggerated. It is not nearly as complex task as Raytheon has undertaken in training Saudi Hawk battalions in Saudi Arabia. (Guard is more homogeneous and considerably less sophisticated organization than Saudi Army.) Point is National Guard should not be difficult organization to guide once a program is formulated nor will it be impossible task provide improved weapons and simple training procedures that can upgrade guard without making it serious competitor to Saudi Army. Army Attaché here was intimately involved in development Raytheon proposals and it his belief program is not unmanageable and that with competent company performing main tasks, US might have to supply perhaps no more than 20 personnel to supervise. We assess National Guard project as far less complex with less risk of failure than either F–5 or Navy programs.

6. King’s obsession with “no companies”: We think King can be convinced a company must be employed if we will offer govt-to-govt contract, since this would eliminate agency fees and assure King of reliable performance. Prince Abdullah, Prince Sultan, others in government, would urge King to accept US–SAG govt-to-govt contract.

7. Accordingly, Embassy urges it be authorized to offer full govt-to-govt arrangement to King on lines described para 5 above for following reasons: (A) sale of some $300 million worth of US goods and services to cash customer, (B) strengthening of Saudi sense of dependence and intimate association and trust with USG, with consequent reinforcement Saudi–US ties (with Arab governments these days we have far too few opportunities forge significant links of kind National Guard program provides), (C) there will be distinct sense Saudi disappointment if we fail come forward to meet their desires, (D) long-run prospects Saudi internal security best assured by USG (rather than French or British) having central role National Guard program implementation. (It certainly seems to be King’s view that he wants sensitive Guard project entrusted to USG.)

8. Disadvantages are that we will have to field supervisory team, thereby increasing number of US military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Yet our best estimate is that if Navy supervisory, G–5 and possible guard in-country personnel requirements added to present USMTM personnel, total would be less than what US military had in this country several years ago.

9. Enormous significance of Saudi Arabia to US is often reiterated. Active willingness take on National Guard program constitutes important USG step by which we can further strengthen our role here, demonstrate support for King Faisal’s government and actively pursue our objectives of insuring internal security and close Saudi–US relations.

10. In order learn of possible further aspects Saudi thinking Amb will be seeing Acting Guard Commander Prince Badr afternoon July 14 and will try convince him accept proposals set out reftel (A).

11. Would appreciate whenever possible guidance on what we might say to Raytheon here (para 12, reftel (B),³ otherwise distorted info on Amb’s meeting with King may percolate back to Raytheon head Adams.

Thacher

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–4 SAUD. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. Telegram 119605 to Jidda, June 30, authorized Thacher to tell Faisal that the Saudi decision to drop Raytheon was a “complete surprise,” and that the United States believed contracting directly with a private firm for National Guard modernization was problematic given the sensitive nature of the National Guard’s role. Thacher could offer the services of experienced U.S. personnel to develop a realistic proposal, although not U.S. implementation of this proposal. In telegram 2255 from Jidda, July 9, Thacher reported that during his authorized talk with Faisal, he was unable to overcome Faisal’s “strong antipathy” toward private firms such as Raytheon due to “their willingness pay large commission to Khashoggi and like.” (Both ibid.)
3. In paragraph 12 of telegram 2255, Thacher noted that it was desirable to coordinate statements to Raytheon both in Jidda and in the United States, and that Raytheon should be given a generalized account of Thacher’s meeting with Faisal along with assurances of continued U.S. support. Thacher was informed in telegram 128308 to Jidda, July 15, that there was “no advantage in continuing to press the company’s case” at this time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6–4 SAUD)