Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXIV, Middle East Region and Arabian Peninsula, 1969–1972; Jordan, September 1970

123. Telegram From the Embassy in Kuwait to the Department of State¹

Kuwait, October 29, 1972, 0952Z.

2072. Subj: Military Sales: Kuwait Views on Arms Procurement. Ref: Kuwait 1753.²

Summary: Conversation Oct 24 with Kuwait Army Major Shaikh Jaber Hamoud al-Sabah provided frank insight into current status GOK arms procurement. Jaber said travel plans of Kuwaiti military procurement team have been currently shelved. He cited involvement of Crown Prince/Prime Minister Jaber al-Ahmad (his cousin) into routine military affairs and implied this was cause of delay. Jaber also gave strong hint that Kuwaitis were leaning toward improved Hawk, but said final decision would depend on first hand demonstration. Re aircraft, Jaber reiterated remarks of Shaikh Saad (reftel) that only Mirage and Phantom were real possibilities: he said Northrup F–5 was inadequate for technical reasons, primarily its slow speed and lack of range to strike into Iraq. End summary.

1. On Oct 24, Emboff made call on Army Major Shaikh Jaber Hamoud Sabah (member ruling family and cousin Prime Minister) to pass information received from Washington re schedule Hawk live-firing demonstration.³ In resulting hour-long conversation, Jaber gave frank expression his views regarding weapons procurement. Jaber’s comments, while admittedly personal, are also indicative of current GOK thinking re arms (reftel). Highlights of conversation are described below:

2. Kuwaiti military procurement team: Jaber said that travel plans of military team had been shelved for time being. He himself was unhappy over delay and expressed dissatisfaction with whole arrangement. Jaber said army had completed its study several weeks ago and was ready to make inspection tour. He said “politicians” were interfering and holding up team’s trip. Jaber asked how much advance notice would be needed to set up US portion of trip. Emboff replied that we would like to have minimum one month’s notice in order arrange appropriate program. Jaber noted this but indicated that it was anybody’s guess when and if team would actually depart.

3. Role of Crown Prince: Jaber indicated that CP/PM Shaikh Jaber al-Ahmad was becoming more directly involved in day to day affairs of GOK military procurement team. He said Jaber al-Ahmad was now making all decisions including most routine ones re team’s schedule, itinerary, and composition and implied this was real reason why things were moving so slowly. Interestingly, name of MinDef Shaikh Saad or Chief of Staff Mubarak did not come up at all during conversation.

4. Improved Hawk: Jaber said Kuwaitis were satisfied with Raytheon’s presentation and that next step would be see actual live firing of improved Hawk in order get better idea about its capabilities. Jaber said he had already done research on Swiss, Italian, and French air defense systems. He hinted strongly that Kuwaitis were leaning toward Hawk but that it was imperative see system first hand before making final decision. He noted there would be no Hawk firings in November and December and indicated this would be taken into consideration in scheduling team visit.

5. Northop’s F–5: Jaber said Kuwaitis do not consider Northrop’s F–5 as best choice of aircraft to replace British Lightnings for several reasons: F–5, when fully loaded with armament and topped off with fuel, did not have sufficient range to cover northern areas of Iraq past Baghdad and could barely make it from Kuwait to Bahrain. F–5’s speed was another weakness cited. Jaber said MiG–21s presently deployed in Iraq near Kuwaiti border had speed of Mach 2.2, F–5 had only Mach 1.7 capability which he personally felt was closer to Mach 1.5.

6. Mirage and Phantom: Jaber said Mirage (F–1) and Phantom were only real choices for Kuwait. Phantom had greater capability but also required more maintenance. Mirage, he said, had advantage of being single engine aircraft. He stated that Phantom was not real possibility anyway since Washington would probably never sell it to Kuwaitis. Emboff replied that decision re selling Phantom as well as other types aircraft was still in hands of Washington. Jaber was specific in singling out Iraq as main source of threat; he did not touch upon Arab-Israeli considerations. Jaber also voiced concern about Russians’ MiG–23 Foxbat which he said had successfully overflown Israel without detection. His real worry was that Foxbat would be deployed in Iraq. F–5, he said, would be hopeless against this threat.

7. Comment: Jaber’s remarks constitute first time Kuwaitis have openly expressed their views to us at this level. It should be noted Jaber is key member of MOD military procurement team and one of few officers who attended both Hawk and TOW briefings two weeks ago. Jaber’s comments also echo remarks made to Ambassador by Shaikh Saad himself, particularly re aircraft. Although Jaber is only an Army Major, he is a Sabah and probably well informed on Kuwaiti military affairs. We have no reason to doubt his remarks re plans of the military procurement team or other subjects discussed. We were impressed by his specific reiteration of point made by Shaikh Saad that Mirage and Phantom were only ones now in running and his rationale, presumably after he had seen memo Northrop rep had sent General Mubarak re comparison of Mirage and F–5. Jaber’s unprecedented frankness on subject may have been another warning GOK was going to buy the Mirage—or just more pressure on US to offer Phantom. We tend to accept his sentiments as one more straw in the wind, while realizing that the final decision will be taken by the Crown Prince after consideration of the views of Shaikh Saad and General Mubarak and that different considerations may come into play.

McClelland

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 KUW. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
2. In telegram 1753 from Kuwait, September 20, Stoltzfus reported that during a September 14 meeting with Shaikh Sa’d, the Shaikh insisted that Kuwait wanted to purchase Phantoms and implied that the French Mirage was the second choice. Stoltzfus had urged the Shaikh to look more carefully at the F–4s, as had Saudi Arabia, and suggested to the Department that A–4s be offered also. (Ibid.)
3. Following a formal presentation of material on improved Hawk and TOW systems, the Kuwaitis made a formal oral request for live demonstrations of the systems in the summer of 1973. (Telegram 1907 from Kuwait, October 10; ibid.) The Embassy noted strong competitive pressure from the French. (Telegram 2020 from Kuwait, October 24; ibid.) The Department of the Army agreed in principle to the request for a live demonstration, but insisted that Kuwait pay for it despite French competition. (Telegram 200110 from the Departments of State and Defense to Kuwait, November 3; ibid.)