Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

281. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, December 18, 1971.

Nixon: Getting back to the, to the North Vietnamese thing, it may be that they’re just deciding on the—maybe to knock over Laos, that that may be their limited objective, at this point, for this season.² What do you think? [unclear]—

Haig: I—I think Laos and Cambodia, which is really a manifestation of their weakness, but it’s—it happens to be also the toughest thing for us to manage.

Nixon: It sure is. It sure is.

Haig: Well, I think—I don’t think they’re going to knock over either one, but I think they’re going to give us—

Nixon: Well—

Haig: —a big step back.

Nixon: Well [unclear] knock over and to hit Laos [unclear] Cambodia.

Haig: Cambodia, the danger there is an internal collapse—

Nixon: Yes, internal collapse problem—

Haig: —problem.

Nixon: But, now, Lon Nol really wants to step down, actually. He’s not too well [unclear].

Haig: I think he should become a figurehead and get out of things, but then he just seems to be emotionally unable to do that. Now, they’ve got the doctor looking at him this week, and I think—

Nixon: How are the—but the South Vietnamese, in that division, are being any better led at all, or is that [unclear] guy still in?³

Haig: Well, he’s done all right, sir—

Nixon: He doesn’t move—

Haig: —but he’s not, not aggressive.

Nixon: Well, at least—

Haig: He’s capable, but not aggressive—

Nixon: —it’s a hell of a, it’s a hell of a good diversionary tactic, though, isn’t it? [unclear]

Haig: It did take some heat off. They’ve moved two of the regiments of that division back into Chup, but they left the real tough regiment, 271, right along Route 6, and I think we’re going to get some more trouble this week.

Nixon: You mean, that’s the Communist 271?

Haig: But it did. It—it got the other two. It had to go back to protect the base where the ARVN were operating. So, we—we still got some work to do there.

Nixon: Now, what are we doing? [unclear] air power, I suppose—?

Haig: Oh, we’re using massive air, but that’s—

Nixon: It doesn’t help?

Haig: That’s not going to solve everything. It helps, but it’s not the answer.

Nixon: Jesus Christ, you wonder about air power. I’ve got pretty much a command of the air throughout this miserable war. It doesn’t mean a hell of a lot.

Haig: No.

Nixon: Hmm?

Haig: It’s especially helpful with the ARVN, because they’ve learned how to use it. The Cambodians don’t know how to use it. They don’t know how to control it, and bring it in close, and use it like they would artillery.

Nixon: Hmm.

Haig: And, frankly, where, in the earlier days, when there were no Cambodians, just enemy, we could be more indiscriminate about it. Now, we’ve got troops all around, and you can kill your own people, unless it’s properly controlled. So, it’s less effective now than it was two years ago, in Cambodia.

[pause]

Nixon: We will be prepared. You can—you get the word to the Joint Chiefs that the time to hit is right after Christmas.⁴

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: I think that’s the best time.

Haig: I do, too. I think anything now would be very bad—

Nixon: December 26th, 7th, and 8th; it’s a good time. It’s a—all right. And—and give ‘em a hell of a wallop [unclear]. Right?

Haig: That’s why you’ve got—

Nixon: It’s about those—the airfields, at least, where the MIGs came from.

Haig: Exactly.

Nixon: They won’t expect that, do you think—attacks on the airfields?

Haig: No, I don’t think they’ll expect this kind of a sock. This is a three-day sock up as far as Binh, including—no civilian targets, of course, but there are some good military targets around Binh [unclear].

Nixon: And some are in close, that we haven’t hit before, I understand.

Haig: That’s right, sir. And then, we would also include having this South Vietnamese off-shore rocketing, which is a good thing for them, too.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

[pause]

Haig: They’re squealing like pigs about postponement of Paris. That really got their attention there.

Nixon: I think we should’ve gotten their attention, don’t you agree?

Haig: Yes, sir.

Nixon: I mean, my feeling is that those—that Paris talks, they are greased two-for-them and one-for-us, all the time. I mean, we are just—what the Christ has happened at the talks? Nothing.

Haig: Yeah.

Nixon: Nothing, but just delay. What are these people—we’re postponing peace? Shit, they haven’t talked about anything, have they?

Haig: No, these people don’t have any response for you, on this. I don’t think—I think they were going to make some kind of an initiative, which would’ve been a propaganda initiative, and they haven’t had a chance to do it.

Nixon: Oh, good.

Haig: Uh—

Nixon: Now, we pushed it off two weeks, right after [unclear]?

Haig: Yes, sir. Now, Porter has done a superb job over there.

Nixon: He’s done exactly what he was supposed to do, and [unclear]

Haig: He’s very good.

Nixon: He speaks well and everything. And—and that makes sense. Goddamnit, I—I don’t know whether they’ve just been delaying and haggling, filibustering, and so we’re just going to sit there and take it. I think that gets their attention.

Haig: I do, too, because they don’t want to lose that.

Nixon: The propaganda war.

Haig: Right. [unclear]

Nixon: It’s talk, talk, fight, fight. It’s the old trick. You know, they did that in Korea for a long time. I think the postponement, and then, and then a good sock right after Christmas may have some effect. I don’t know. I must say, though, that [unclear] possibility [unclear] talk on March 7th.

Haig: Yeah.

Nixon: It seems to me that the Chinese and the Russians have spoken—given them assurances of help. Don’t you think so? We would—We’ve always figured the Chinese and all the Russians simply won’t talk to the North Vietnamese. Hell, I noticed that the biggest shipments that—since 1964 have come in—

Haig: Yeah.

Nixon: —by sea, right?

Haig: Well, I’ve never trusted the Soviet side. I think the Soviets are real mischief-makers. I think that this India–Pak thing is going to strengthen us with China.⁵ And it’s because China has seen its weakness.

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: Dramatically. It’s got to recoup. The only way it can recoup is by moving closer to us, and they really may be more helpful. They, now, see a new threat. Uncle Sam is no longer the threat; it’s the Indians, and the Soviet-backed Indians. So, I have a feeling we’re going to get some benefits from this with the Chinese—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: —which in turn will translate themselves into benefits in Laos and in Cambodia.

Nixon: China’s with us. China’s a hell of a lot closer to Laos and Cambodia than India.

Haig: That’s right. And that’s one of the few benefits of this exercise. But, I really think we will realize some help from it.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 637–14. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the editors specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 2:10–2:31 p.m.
2. Earlier in the morning of December 18, Haig and Nixon discussed Laos, with Haig reporting that the North Vietnamese had begun an offensive in Laos “thirty days earlier than we hoped it would.” Haig stated that the North Vietnamese had “moved long-range artillery in and a massive amount of anti-aircraft and we have learned in the last operation, last spring, how they can be effective with it.” (Ibid., Conversation 639–09)
3. Not further identified.
4. See footnote 3, Document 278.
5. A reference to the American role in the recent Indo-Pakistan war.