Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

280. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, December 12, 1971.

[Omitted here is discussion of the crisis in South Asia. A transcript of this portion of the conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 177.]

Nixon: I’ve got an idea—some ideas on Vietnam I’d like just to go over now. What—take a couple of minutes. One—one on Vietnam. [pause] And I should think there’s no appeal from this. I was shocked, though, to find that Porter was dancing around. I know because we have not given him better instructions with regard to this postponement of the meeting, and where they—he allowed the other side to say that we were sabotaging the meetings. Now, the instruction is: there is to be no meeting for two weeks.²

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: Maybe three weeks—two weeks.

Haig: [unclear]

Nixon: I marked it down on the news summary. Two weeks, there is to be no meeting [unclear]—

Kissinger: There won’t be one next week, already.

Nixon: I—I understand. He’s not going to have one the next week, either.

Kissinger: All right.

Nixon: We—

Kissinger: Well, if we crack them, they’ll cancel next week—

Nixon: We, we have to be [unclear]. Well, let’s be quite honest with ourselves here with regard to the Russian thing, and with regard to this. You know, we—and there is a difference of view on this, and I may be wrong, but I believe that the North Vietnamese, in the talks that they’ve had with us, from the time of the bombing halt, their talks with you, and so forth, they’re diddling us along. I don’t think there’s ever been any serious intention—

Kissinger: Except for a four-week period last summer, but—

Nixon: Maybe, maybe. I doubt it. But, nevertheless, if there was a four-week period, there was, but you have gone over to Paris. I—I have no regrets that we have. I think it’s necessary to make the record, and so forth, so we’ve made the record. But, at this point, as far as those talks are concerned, it’s ten for them and one for us. The illusion that they’re talking peace at this point is ridiculous.

Kissinger: Right—

Nixon: They haven’t. They’ve sabotaged them. When you talk about sabotage, they’ve sabotaged. Now, of course, I’ve got to—you’ve got to put the boys—Haig is the best—while we’re gone on the plan, because I may decide to move a lot sooner with regard to calling Porter back. The plan, of course, is—that we presently have—is to go, is to make our public statement shortly after the first of the year. You know, our six-month withdrawal, or whatever the hell we’re going to do. And it will be that. There isn’t going to be any more of this shit-ass stuff of runnin’ over to Paris and waiting two more months. We’ve done that enough.

Kissinger: No—

Nixon: We’re not going to hear from them. And so, not hearing from them means that we have no choice, having told them. If we waste another two months in office, in January, they’ll think we’re the weakest, because that’s the whole problem we’ve got here.

Kissinger: No, the two months—no, I think—

Nixon: You see, the other two months was right, because we made that in the context—

Kissinger: Well, the advantage of two months in January, Mr.—first of all, I think—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —which—the two-month announcement in January was not a sign of weakness to them, but a sign of strength. They expected a total [unclear]—

Nixon: The last one, well, I know, was right, because—

Kissinger: Well—

Nixon: —because—and it flabbergasted them totally. But, if this time, we follow it again the other way, then there is—there’s nothing in it for us, because we say, “Well, we’re going to negotiate for two more months.” They know they’re not negotiating. They know that we don’t expect them to negotiate—

Kissinger: No. It wouldn’t be the negotiation. The advantage—I—we—as you remember, our original plan was to go the full thing, then, in January, and there’s something, a lot to be said. The advantage of two months is to get you over the China trip, while keeping the thing still fogged up.

Nixon: We may do that. My point is—

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: My point is, whatever the situation is in January, Porter’s coming home.

Kissinger: That’s fine.

Nixon: He cannot continue to be over there with [unclear]. That is just not making any sense.

Kissinger: That, I agree with—

Nixon: We must not continue for three years, and we are—we are the ones responsible here. After we had called a bombing halt, they were originally responsible. But, starting in January of ’69, first with Lodge and Walsh,³ and then with poor old Bruce and the rest, we have been suckers. We’ve thought we played to them, and those talks have been nothing but nothing, believe me. They haven’t helped us a bit in this country. The talks have hurt us in this country, very badly. I polled this, and I found 80 percent of the people think the talks are finished. From our standpoint [unclear] the beginning—80 percent of the American people.

Kissinger: Well, what I would recommend—

Nixon: So—

Kissinger: —is to call Porter home—

Nixon: —we’ve got to stop kidding ourselves—

Kissinger: No, no. I would—I would consider very seriously putting the full record out in January, calling Porter home, and making—

Nixon: Putting the record out is [unclear]—

Kissinger: —and making a two-month announcement, and that—just to keep your opposition off, off balance.

Nixon: All right. We’re on the same track. The two months is fine. What I meant is, what I meant is, we cannot put it off two months on the basis that we’re going to wait on the, on the ground for—

Kissinger: No, we just say—

Nixon: —on the negotiating track. That’s the point.

Kissinger: No, no, we—I—

Nixon: We do it for two months. If we don’t do it for the purpose of negotiation, why are we just waiting two months, Henry? That’s the point—

Kissinger: Why are we doing two months? So that we can gauge it [unclear].

Nixon: We can gauge in terms of the—I know, I know, the infiltration, and the other things, I understand—

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: And then, I—and then, right after the China trip, when you’re riding high on a lot of other things, I’d do the rest of it, ‘cause otherwise—

Nixon: And then, after the China trip goes, we should do the rest of them, and then, we do have to do it in some way where we get the POW thing in there. [unclear] That’s when we have to do that, and at that point. You see? You understand? You cannot—that is the—that’s the clinker in this whole plan. The clinker in this plan is that there’s—that down the road, you’ve still got those, those POW things, and—well, there ain’t no problem there. At that point, when you’re down to—[laughs] You know, we’ll be down to 70,000 [military personnel in South Vietnam] at that point, won’t we?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: So, at 70,000 you say, “Well, we’ll keep 40,000 here ‘til we get the POWs.” Correct?

Kissinger: That’s right.

Nixon: Is that what you had in mind?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: All right, we’ll get a plan. But getting Porter back is essential.

Kissinger: I agree.

Nixon: We’ve got to stop those goddamn Paris—

Kissinger: I’m strongly in favor of that.

Nixon: —the Paris thing. Now, how about sooner than the 31st with Porter? How about sooner?

Kissinger: No, I’d do it the first week of January.

Nixon: All right—

Kissinger: The first ten days.

Nixon: Now, that brings me to the second part of the equation. It may be that we should not delay the strikes in the North.⁴ Now, your concern is the Chinese, as I understand it?

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: I don’t believe that is a—if the Chinese respect strength—after all, that is strength—and I’m inclined to think that if they, if they want to see the Yankee do—if they see him do any place, anywhere—it’s like EC–121 and its relationship to the rest. It may be that we’re better off to get, on a crash basis, to get those people to where we can get them to man, man up, right now. Now, do you understand?

Kissinger: I would, I would wait until—while we’re screaming at the UN about world opinion, I wouldn’t get it confused. These five days don’t make any difference.

Nixon: Good. All right. What is—

Kissinger: If you’re concerned about the—

Nixon: I am concerned about the effect on the Chinese, and the Russians, and the Indians. Now, if the Russians, and the Chinese, and the Indians have an impression that the man in the White House is tough, that’s the only hope we’ve got. You see, you’re—we’re not throwing enough toughness into the equation. We look soft every place in the world.

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: So, my feeling is, one way we can look somewhat tough in a collateral area is to hit that. See, that’s been my argument on the bombing, anyway.

Kissinger: I agree. And for that, it would have—now, I think to do it right now, when maybe—

Nixon: Yes—

Kissinger: —the Chinese are moving, it will give the Russians a ploy. I’d—I’d do it un—after the—after this UN thing has played out. If you give the order on Wednesday,⁵ we can get it done by Friday.

[Omitted here is further discussion of China.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 637–3. No classification marking. This transcript was prepared by the editors specifically for this volume. The exchange is part of a larger conversation, 8:45–9:42 a.m.
2. Nixon is referring to the plenary (public) meetings in Paris.
3. Lawrence E. Walsh, Deputy Head of the Delegation to the Paris Talks on Vietnam, January 20-November 21, 1969.
4. See footnote 3, Document 278.
5. December 15.