Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

277. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1971, 8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
• Henry A. Kissinger

The dinner lasted three and a half hours. It was marked by great cordiality.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

Vietnam

Dobrynin then wanted to return to the Middle East, but I interrupted him to tell him that I wanted to discuss Vietnam. I began by reciting the events that had led to the Vietnamese cancellation of the meeting, adding to it my conversation on September 29 with the Soviet Foreign Minister.² (See note to North Vietnamese at Tab A!)³ I said I wanted to make it absolutely clear that we were reaching the end of our patience. If present methods continued, we would have to reserve the right to take whatever action was necessary. We would not tolerate the humiliation of the President, and if the North Vietnamese thought that they could bring about a military solution, they would confront the most violent opposition from the United States. In fact, I wanted the Soviet leaders to be aware that we reserved the right to take strong action to bring about the release of our prisoners in any event.

Dobrynin said he was very surprised. He could understand, of course, that we would react strongly to an attack. This would not be approved in Moscow, but it would be understood. But we had always said that we would end the war either through negotiation or through Vietnamization. Had we lost faith in Vietnamization? If we escalated the war without provocation by the other side, then the reaction in Moscow might be very serious, and Moscow might have to take certain preparatory steps in any event to make clear its position in advance.

I said that I wanted to sum up our views. If there were a North Vietnamese attack, then we would respond without restraint. If there were no North Vietnamese attack, then we nevertheless reserved freedom of action. If we went substantially beyond the existing framework on such matters, e.g. operations approaching Laos and Cambodia, the Soviets would have some advance indication that methods like this were being considered.⁴

Dobrynin then asked whether I was disappointed in the Chinese efforts to end the Vietnamese war. I said that I had never expected any significant Chinese effort to end the Vietnamese war, and therefore I was not. Dobrynin said that he knew that Hanoi had brought Peking back into line by threatening a public attack on Peking’s policies and by taking its case to the Communist Parties around the world, on the ground that Peking was betraying their revolution. I said there was no cause for it because we had never expected Peking to intervene directly in the negotiating process.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. Kissinger forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Nixon on November 26 along with a summary of the conversation. (Ibid.) The full text of the memorandum of conversation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 13.
2. The meeting was on September 30; see Document 263.
3. Tab A is a copy of the note sent to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris on November 19; see Document 272.
4. Kissinger also delivered a note to Soviet Minister Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, who was acting for Ambassador Dobrynin who was on leave in the Soviet Union, on December 2 at 6 p.m., expressing Nixon’s “extreme disappointment about the Soviet actions on Vietnam.” The note warned if the Democratic Republic of Vietnam sought to rely on a military solution, “the President wishes to leave no doubt that he is prepared to take appropriate measures regardless of the impact on other policies. If the road to a negotiated settlement is closed, the President will reconsider the advisability of continuing the private Paris talks. It goes without saying that in this channel the U.S. is not interested in pro forma talks but in serious negotiations by qualified representatives at the highest level to bring about a rapid and just solution of the war.” The full text of the note, which also discusses the Middle East, is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 16.