272. Editorial Note
On October 25, 1971, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam responded to the message and statement of principles delivered on October 11 (Document 269). According to a message from General Vernon Walters, Senior Military Attaché at the Embassy in Paris, he met with Vo Van Sung, the Delegate General at the North Vietnamese Embassy in Paris, 9:30 a.m. that morning at their usual rendezvous spot—73 Rue Jules Lagaisse—and Vo read him the following message, which Walters later translated from French into English:
“Today I am authorized to give you the reply to the proposal dated 11 October 1971 of the American government relative to a private meeting on 1 November 1971 between Special Adviser Kissinger on the one hand and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on the other. Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy are agreeable to meeting with Special Adviser Dr. Kissinger privately at the usual address at 1000 on 20 November 1971. This date has been chosen because Special Adviser Le Duc Tho has at the present time activities under way in Hanoi and furthermore Minister Xuan Thuy is still under medical treatment.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971)
In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled that the North Vietnamese replied “with customary arrogance, only six days before the date suggested for the meeting. There was no expression of goodwill, no comment on our proposal, no reference to an eagerness to settle in any particular time frame.” (Ending the Vietnam War, page 228)
The Nixon administration replied as follows: “Dr. Kissinger agrees to a private meeting with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy on November 20, 1971 at 11:30 at the usual address. He will be accompanied by Messrs. Walters, Lord and Negroponte. The U.S. side assumes that the other side will make no public negotiating proposals before this meeting takes place. For its part the U.S. side will not make any such proposals.” A handwritten note on the U.S. reply indicates that it was delivered orally on November 3. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971)
In a backchannel message on November 13, Kissinger informed Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker in Saigon about the upcoming meeting and the fact that he would not use an intermediary to pass the eight-point proposal to the North Vietnamese. Kissinger also told Bunker that he would not inform the North Vietnamese of Thieu’s offer in his conversation with Haig on September 23 not to run for office in new elections after a peace agreement was reached to forestall the possibility [Page 986] that Thieu would change his mind. He instructed Bunker to inform Thieu of these details at his discretion. (Ibid., For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Encore Sept. 71–15 Feb. 72, President’s Speech January 25, 1972)
Bunker replied to Kissinger in backchannel message 96 from Saigon, November 17, that he had reported on the situation to Thieu who responded that it was worthwhile to continue pursuing some type of agreement, but he was not sanguine about the prospects for the meeting. He stated that because of the United Nations decision on October 25 to admit the People’s Republic of China and the upcoming visit of President Nixon in February 1972, Hanoi’s “‘stubbornness’ might appear to increase while they utilized the time to build up resources and morale which had both suffered in recent months.” He also believed that the Soviet Union, in an effort to counter China’s recent diplomatic successes, might encourage the North Vietnamese to continue fighting by promising them additional aid. Thieu asked Bunker whether the United States would consider asking the French to put some pressure on Hanoi to reach an agreement. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 854, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XIII)
According to a November 17 memorandum for the record by General Walters, Vo Van Sung had called him the day before to set up a meeting at 9:30 a.m. at their usual location. After some tea and small talk, Vo read the following message:
“At our last meeting I told you that Minister Xuan Thuy and Special Adviser Le Duc Tho were disposed to meet with Dr. Kissinger on 20 November. Today we have the regret to inform you that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho has suddenly become ill and will not be able to take part in this meeting. Minister Xuan Thuy is still agreeable to meeting with Special Adviser Henry Kissinger on 20 November at 11:30 as agreed.”
Walters wrote that Vo had no idea what type of illness Le Duc Tho had and did not know who else would be able to represent him at a meeting. Vo informed him that Xuan Thuy was still ill as well and that his doctors would not allow him to resume his full duties. (Ibid., Box 1039, Files for the President, Vietnam Negotiations, HAK II 1971) For the North Vietnamese account of this exchange and Le Duc Tho’s “political illness,” see Luu and Nguyen, Le Duc Tho–Kissinger Negotiations in Paris, pages 211–212.
The Nixon administration responded to the cancellation of the meeting on November 19 with a brief note summarizing the recent exchange between the two sides following the October 11 U.S. proposal and noting that while the United States regretted Le Duc Tho’s illness “under these circumstances, no point would be served by a meeting.” The note continued: “The U.S. side stands ready to meet with Special [Page 987] Adviser Le Duc Tho, or any other representative of the North Vietnamese political leadership, together with Xuan Thuy, in order to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just for all parties. It will wait to hear recommendations from the North Vietnamese for a suitable date.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 861, Camp David Memos, July–Dec 1971)
Kissinger also instructed General Walters to pass a similar message to Huang Chen, Ambassador to France of the People’s Republic of China, on November 20, with the following additional message addressed to Chou En-lai:
“As I told you and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, and as we have made clear to the North Vietnamese, the United States is prepared to treat North Vietnamese concerns with generosity. At the same time, the People’s Republic of China, as a great country, will recognize that we cannot permit ourselves to be humiliated, no matter what the possible consequences for other policies. We know that the People’s Republic, like the United States, does not trade in principles. We have no specific request to make, and we do not expect an answer to this communication.”
The message to the PRC and the Memorandum for the Record by Walters, November 20, are ibid., Box 849, For the President’s Files, China Exchanges/Vietnam Negotiations, China Exchanges, October 20, 1971. See also Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Document 63.