Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

215. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, June 8, 1971, 3:36–4:25 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. John N. Irwin
  • Mr. William Sullivan
  • Mr. Arthur Hartman
  • Mr. Mark Pratt
• Justice
  • Attorney General John Mitchell
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Warren Nutter
  • Rear Adm. William R. Flanagan
• JCS
  • Gen. William C. Westmoreland
  • Brig. Gen. Foster L. Smith
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. William Nelson
  • Mr. Thomas Karamessines
• NSC Staff
  • Mr. John Holdridge
  • Mr. Chester A. Crocker
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie
  • Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. General Strategy. The SRG agreed that the U.S. should seek to negotiate a standdown in North Laos which permits Meo retention of the Long Tieng area (Option 3 of the Laos Ad Hoc Group Study of May 13, 1971).² However, in the event a standdown cannot be achieved or is violated by the enemy, the U.S. should be prepared to augment military support to permit Vang Pao to hold Long Tieng over Lao Patriotic Front and North Vietnamese opposition (Option 1 of the Laos Ad Hoc Group Study).³

2. Scenario. A scenario to implement the above strategy will be prepared by the Laos Ad Hoc Group and will be submitted to the President for approval. The scenario should spell out the steps necessary to trigger negotiations for a standdown and should list actions which the U.S. must take in order to retain the flexibility to shift to Option 1 as rapidly as the situation may require. Such steps would include movement of additional Thai and Laos SGUs into the Long Tieng area, increased FAR participation in the defense of Long Tieng, and earmarking U.S. tactical air assets for use in North Laos if needed.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Bill, why don’t you start off by outlining for us the options presented in your paper [Principal Policy Alternatives for North Laos]?

Mr. Sullivan: Okay. I’ll start with the problem as we see it. Basically, we’ve run out of the two assets that we had: local manpower and territory.

Dr. Kissinger: Otherwise we’re in good shape!

Mr. Packard: We never had money anyway!

Mr. Sullivan: So long as we had the hills and valleys leading up to the Plain of Jars, we were able to do more with a lot less people. The guerrilla groups were able to move behind the enemy’s lines. Now the Meo forces are compressed in an area west and south of the Plain of Jars. A static war has developed, in which the Meo must defend fixed positions against the pressure of North Vietnamese forces that are almost always qualitatively superior. The problem then is how to hold the land between the Mekong and the Plain of Jars. We have to decide how much we are willing to pay for the retention of this territorial buffer zone. Under the highest option, we would continue what we are doing now but would enhance the value of our forces. We would put in [5,000] additional Thai SGUs and 1500–2000 RLA troops. We would also provide better equipment and more air support. This option will be pretty expensive to implement. All factors being equal, and if the money is available and if there is no objection from the Congress, this is the most certain way of holding the buffer zone between the Plain of Jars and the Mekong basin.

We can also go to the other extreme—Option 5. Some of the people who worked on the paper say that the North Vietnamese are not interested in the Mekong Valley but only want to secure the area around the Plain of Jars and near the North Vietnamese frontier. If the Meo fall back, the supporters of this option argue, it might be that the North Vietnamese would not follow them down to the Vientiane Plain. Our experience does not bear this out. Even if they did move down, their LOCs would be overextended. Making a defense would then be cheaper for us.

Dr. Kissinger: I don’t understand this. If we don’t have enough maneuver room now, how does it become easier for us to make a defense if they make a further advance? It makes no sense.

Mr. Sullivan: I am not advocating this option. I’m just putting it forward.

Dr. Kissinger: If our present position is inadequate and if we then fall back to the ridge just beyond the Mekong Valley, from which we can’t retreat further, I don’t see how we are improving our position. Aren’t we compounding the problem by doing this? I understand the first part of this argument about the NVA not following our forces down to the Vientiane Plain, but I don’t understand this second part.

Mr. Packard: The only argument you could make is that it creates a logistical problem for the NVA.

Dr. Kissinger: The distance is only about 30 miles.

Mr. Sullivan: About 30 miles laterally and 50 miles vertically.

Mr. Packard: There is something to that. The terrain [between Vientiane and Long Tieng] is difficult. We can’t support the Long Tieng line by ground very well. We have to do it by air.

Mr. Irwin: If we pull back from the Long Tieng area we may not have Meo forces to help defend the plain. We may only have FAR forces and additional Thai troops.

Mr. Sullivan: This was simply put in as an option. I think, frankly, that the attention of this group should be devoted to the three central options, rather than to the extremes. These three options involve an effort to produce a standdown or a military pause in North Laos. The common assumption for these three options is that neither side has gained much but that each has expended quite a lot during the last two years. The casualties among the Meo and the Laotian regulars have been heavy. It has also been difficult for us to get support in Congress. The NVA have deployed two-plus divisions in North Laos. They’ve taken significant casualties (mostly from our air attacks), and they’ve gained almost nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the offensive in the Long Tieng area last year? Didn’t they gain something there?

Mr. Sullivan: They really didn’t achieve anything.

Dr. Kissinger: Were they trying?

Mr. Sullivan: They didn’t make a committed thrust, but they certainly maneuvered as though they were trying. The problem was that we raised the ante when we discovered what they were trying to do. Then they didn’t have the forces to accomplish their objective.

Mr. Karamessines: We launched the Ban Na operation.

Mr. Sullivan: Lam Son also probably restrained them.

Our assumption is that there might be a willingness on both sides to negotiate a military standdown. There are three potential ways of doing this. Let me say, though, that I think it’s a mistake to talk of real negotiations. The North Vietnamese will not permit real negotiations between the Pathet Lao and the RLG until they see how the situation in South Vietnam will bounce.

Our idea is for the talks to provide the rationale for a standdown. The talks could take place in Khang Khay. We would then seek a cease-fire in Xieng Khouang Province, where Khang Khay is located, and perhaps in Sam Neua Province as well. This [proposal for a ceasefire in the area where the talks are to be conducted] is in essence the proposal the North Vietnamese finally came down to last year in the preliminary discussions. Now, however, they are proposing a complete cessation of bombing in all of Laos.

We think it would probably be feasible to get an agreement for the talks to take place even if they don’t get anywhere. This [preliminary agreement] could involve a halt to North Vietnamese movements into the area, cessation of our bombing although not our aerial reconnaisance in the area, and cessation of forward actions by our friendly forces.

Souvanna would have several bargaining chips in the talks. These would include pulling back his own forces (Meo and FAR) that are now forward of the Plain of Jars, withdrawal of the Thai units, and cessation of U.S. bombing and Lao military air operations. These are all features that can be thrown into the kitty.

We also have to consider the movement or retention of the Meo. Vang Pao wants to move his people to Sayaboury unless the situation becomes more secure where they are. We feel that with a military standdown his people could retain Long Tieng. It is essential to remember that if we lose the territory down to the Mekong Valley, the fighting may come close to an area where our SEATO commitments (the Rusk-Thanat agreement, SEATO Plans 5 and 22) would be triggered. This territorial strip is valuable. It’s also important to keep the fighting away from an area where we have definitive obligations to the Thais under SEATO.

We should therefore improve the defense of the Long Tieng area. This could only be achieved during the rainy season—which is starting now.

Our proposal involves having the U.S. encourage Souvanna to go ahead with the talks. We may also have to restrain some of his right-wing military officers from upsetting the applecart. If these officers are convinced we are trying to retain the territory, they will go along. On the other hand, if they felt this was going to be a sellout, they would resist. My view is that the only sort of standdown that is acceptable would include a clear understanding that the Meo would remain in place and would retain Long Tieng and the whole complex north and east of the Plain of Jars. We think this is worth trying for this rainy season. If we fail, we can go back to Option 1.

Dr. Kissinger: You say we should try to do this during the rainy season. Do you mean Souvanna should try?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes. But he hasn’t had a clear signal from us yet about the support we would give him. We’ve never told him we would be willing to suspend bombing operations in North Laos in order to facilitate talks.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think, Dick?

Mr. Helms: Damned good summary of the situation.

Mr. Packard: I think we should give this a try. If it doesn’t work, we can go the other way.

Dr. Kissinger: What would we have to give up if we do this?

Mr. Sullivan: We would give up the prospect of keeping their heads down—something which is done for the most part by our aircraft. We run the risk that they will build up an overwhelming force for a confrontation at Long Tieng.

Dr. Kissinger: This would probably be next March?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes. But because of our intelligence, I don’t think they could surprise us. If we see them building up their supplies, we could bring in SGUs. (to Gen. Westmoreland) Don’t you think so?

Gen. Westmoreland: I agree with you.

Mr. Irwin: As I understand it, one reason that Luang Prabang could be defended is that the enemy outran their logistical support. Basically, I agree with what Bill is saying. There is a risk that the enemy could build up his supplies. Even if he doesn’t bring in any more troops, he could have a greater logistical capability than before.

Mr. Sullivan: There certainly is at least a minimal risk.

Mr. Packard: That’s one chance we just have to take.

Mr. Irwin: I’m perfectly willing to take it.

Dr. Kissinger: Can Souvanna survive it?

Mr. Mitchell: (to Mr. Sullivan) What effect could these rightist officers you just talked about have on Souvanna?

Mr. Sullivan: If we give them assurances, they may not overthrow Souvanna Phouma.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s be realistic. If we see a big build-up developing and we move with characteristic smartness, we will come up with six options, which will later be pared down to three. Can we bring the SGU units and air support to bear on that situation in time to make any difference?

Mr. Sullivan: Yes, if we continue the training programs we have under way.

Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Sullivan) I have a question. Bill spoke about the risks if this doesn’t work. He said that in that case we could go back to Option 1. The real question is what we really think we can do to increase military support, in the Long Tieng area, considering at the same time our problems in Vietnam and in obtaining support from the public and Congress. How realistic is it to say that we will go back to that area with sufficient force to do the job? This option is open to us, just as right now we have the option of augmenting the forces in North Laos. But what it really means is that if Vang Pao’s forces are eroding so badly, we bring in Thai troops to a much greater degree than they have been used in the past. Are the Thais willing to do this, especially when they see us planning to withdraw from Vietnam and Thailand?

Dr. Kissinger: I thought we stopped the drawdown in Thailand.

Mr. Irwin: I had the impression it was continuing.

Dr. Kissinger: It was my impression that there was to be no further drawdown there. Has that changed?

Mr. Packard: We are keeping some tactical air units there, just in case we need them.

Dr. Kissinger: But I had the distinct impression that we stopped the drawdown.

Mr. Sullivan: When I was out at CINCPAC recently, I saw a fiscal guidance paper that indicated that drawdown was continuing. Of course, that may have been changed subsequently.

Adm. Flanagan: We are making some studies. The idea is to have forces of comparable effectiveness.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the most extraordinary thing. We seem always to be able to cut forces without reducing effectiveness. I want to know if the forces will still be there when the studies are completed. Are you going to let the President know about this?

Adm. Flanagan: Yes, this would be done.

Dr. Kissinger: What would be done?

Adm. Flanagan: The decisions would be made subsequent to the studies. The studies are proceeding, but we don’t have any specifics yet.

Mr. Irwin: Even if we leave the tactical air units in Thailand, would we be prepared to use them in North Laos?

Mr. Mitchell: I infer from Option 3 that Souvanna and the generals require some sort of commitment from us about what we would do if there is a violation of the standdown. Is this true?

Mr. Sullivan: Not exactly. They don’t require a commitment. They do, however, want an understanding of what our reaction would be to a violation.

Mr. Mitchell: We should have resources for whatever we decide to do. Otherwise, this may not be an option.

Mr. Packard: We’re looking at the air sortie situation right now. Seamans (Secretary of Air Force) is there getting a first-hand look. We could set up a given number of sortie options. One way of doing this would be to put the sorties in the bank, so to speak. We could authorize a given number of sorties, for example, and not use them during the negotiations. If we needed them after the negotiations, we would be able to do so.

Dr. Kissinger: Last year the margin by which we held Long Tieng was not excessive. If we do what Bill suggests, can we react fast enough to hold the situation in the event of another attack? The enemy buildup will be ambiguous for a few weeks, and our intelligence doesn’t work that fast.

Mr. Sullivan: We assume that the North Vietnamese will be withdrawing one division [from North Laos] during the rainy season. We assume that they would not be permitted to bring that division back.

Dr. Kissinger: This would be part of the standdown arrangement?

Mr. Sullivan: We would try to work it that way.

Dr. Kissinger: You think we should try to achieve a military standdown but keep our capability in the Long Tieng area in order to be able to go to Option 1. As I see it, this is not a question of two choices but of two steps to be taken sequentially.

Mr. Sullivan: The only other possibility is Option 5.

Mr. Packard: I think we should try this option [Option 3]. At the same time, we should also reserve air sorties. I think this approach will work.

Adm. Flanagan: We should also get the RLG involved in the reinforcement of the defensive lines in the Long Tieng area.

Dr. Kissinger: If we scare the NVN too much, they might get desperate.

Mr. Irwin: I don’t want to be pessimistic, but I want to point out that we might have difficulty going to Option 1 because of a combination of factors: cost, resources, the attitude of Congress and public opinion. I’m just pointing these things out, but actually I agree with Bill.

Mr. Packard: We also have to consider Vang Pao’s attitude.

Mr. Irwin: What do we do if the situation is very bad next March, if the NVN forces have staged a big build. We should recognize that the risks will be much greater at that point.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have lost two or three months.

Mr. Irwin: I’m not saying that we ought to change, but we ought to understand the risks involved in the course of action.

Dr. Kissinger: Bill, why don’t you try writing a scenario showing how we trigger Option 3. This should include what we have to do to start negotiations for a standdown. You should also set forth standby actions required to give us the flexibility to go to Option 1. For example, what additional forces, including SGUs, will need to be available? What kind of FAR training is needed? How do we react with maximum speed if we find the other side has violated the standdown? Then we can put this before the President for approval and show him how it can be done sequentially.

Mr. Sullivan: Part depends on what we get out of Congress. If there’s a new Cooper-Church or Fulbright resolution or some legal prohibition against the use of our forces there, that’s one thing. But if there is something like a Symington Resolution—that is, a dollar limit—we will have to husband our resources.

Dr. Kissinger: I like the bank idea [for air sorties] that Dave brought up.

Mr. Packard: We can do it.

Mr. Johnson: Just be sure you have a deposit in the bank.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we can move forward on this basis. (to Mr. Packard) You are agreed on the organizational arrangement for the other thing [DOD support for CIA paramilitary operations in Laos].

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. Sullivan forwarded the study, entitled “Principal Policy Alternatives for North Laos,” to Kissinger, Packard, Moorer, Johnson, and Helms under a May 17 covering memorandum. The underlying assumption of Option 3 was that the DRV and LPF would be more flexible in practice than they had been with their opening position of insisting that the United States end all its bombing in Laos. (Ibid., Box H–56, SRG Meetings, Laos 6–8–71)
3. The study indicated that Option 1 would involve much more effort, greater Thai participation, and increased costs. The other options were as follows: 2) Keeping the Meo (Hmong) in Long Tieng, which would initially require the United States and Lao forces to maintain their existing defensive posture, but as they reduced their military actions would eventually entice the enemy into reducing its forces; 3) Described in footnote 2 above; 4) Negotiating with the enemy in conjunction with a U.S./Lao military stand-down that would be followed by an evacuation of the Meo (Hmong) from Long Tieng; and 5) Withdrawing the Meo and having the Laotians and Thai take over defense of the region.
4. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Helms, and Moorer on June 15, requesting the study by June 21. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meetings, Laos 6–8–71)