Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

214. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, June 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 8 June 1971

PRESENT

• Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Packard, Mr. Johnson, Lt. Gen. Richard T. Knowles, and Mr. Helms
• Messrs. John Irwin, William Sullivan, Mark Pratt, Thomas Karamessines, William Nelson, and John Holdridge were also present.

Laos

Mr. Kissinger opened the meeting by asking what was to be considered specifically.

Mr. Sullivan: We should probably stick to the Clay Report² itself as the later meeting will cover other aspects.

Mr. Kissinger: We have only just received the Secretary of Defense comment and the attachments and I haven’t had time to study it.³ You will note that this was all triggered by Mr. Helms’ paper at San Clemente in March. Actually, our problem is how to continue paramilitary operations in Laos when we are in the process of scaling down in Vietnam and how to conduct a substantial covert effort within a satisfactory framework.

Mr. Packard: Well, our paper doesn’t alter much. DOD will move to provide logistical support, and the conduct of the operations will be left as they were—run jointly by the Ambassador and the CIA. We will unify the logistics from Udorn.⁴ That’s about the only course there is to follow.

General Knowles: Our earlier problem was that the support requirements were not synchronized with the DOD budget cycle . . . You will note that Secretary of Defense has directed CINCPAC to prepare detailed plans . . .

(There was a brief exchange about the title for the new logistic setup with Mr. Johnson saying that a “warlike” title might raise hackles on the Hill. It was agreed that the nomenclature could be tackled in another forum.)

Mr. Kissinger: Does this meet the original concern of Mr. Helms?

Mr. Helms: The answer is yes. However, the question of vital air support is not made clear by Secretary of Defense’s cover letter.

Mr. Packard: Well, that means we have to allocate our air resources with care. We just don’t have enough to provide for everything.

Mr. Helms: Where are the A–1’s to be based and how are they to be supported? Will this be at the same level? The Secretary of Defense’s memo categorically states “that A–1’s will be devoted to Vietnamization as planned.”

Mr. Packard: All air support has to be within programmed resources. We have to balance our allocations between North Vietnam, the Panhandle, etc. The T–28 problem is under study and here the Laotian pilot training will also be a factor . . . These specifics could probably be modified.

Mr. Kissinger: I remind all of you we are trying to get through the next year. From what you say A–1’s will not be available.

Mr. Packard: We might better leave the air supply question until after the second meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: You should be aware that higher authority does not want any severe setbacks in this theatre during the coming months. Are the procedures outlined acceptable?

Mr. Karamessines: I should like to say that without the A–1’s and with the T–28’s “under study” we might well be caught short.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the price we are paying? Is it a question of money? Can we use something else? We should probably hold the A–1’s until the next rainy season.

Mr. Karamessines: These aircraft are extraordinarily useful. They are vital to the irregulars. A critical diminution could occur at a time when we are already on notice that this area has been coming apart at the seams.

Mr. Helms: I thought that higher authority wants to save the remainder of Laos.

Mr. Mitchell: I agree but Mr. Packard seems to have another point of view.

Mr. Packard: It is not my view that higher authority wants to wind down in Vietnam and escalate in Laos.

Mr. Mitchell: Everything I have read indicates that the air support is a must.

Mr. Packard: But not including increases . . .

Mr. Sullivan: A possible increase would be a helicopter lift.

Mr. Johnson: Well, the whole thrust looks to me like reduced tactical air support.

Mr. Packard: There’s always been a considerable amount of emotion in all A–1 discussions.

Mr. Kissinger: Is the general position acceptable? (Those present assented.) How quickly can this be effected?

General Knowles: It is already under way.

Mr. Kissinger: How is the programming and funding to work?

Mr. Packard: This envisages DOD budgeting for support and CIA paying the “direct costs” in Laos.

Mr. Helms: I notice a distinction between Laotian regular army and the irregulars. I thought this was no longer an issue.

General Knowles: Well, yes, it is. We find that in the long run regulars will fight for their country; you can count on them.

Mr. Kissinger: Could you provide any example of the FAR standing their ground?

General Knowles: Not off the cuff, but what I’m saying is that in the long term the regulars will do better when trained.

Mr. Sullivan: The FAR may once have stood their ground near Luang Prabang, but unless you sack or exile everybody above the rank of colonel, the outlook is forlorn and political realities in Laos will not permit any such radical surgery.

Mr. Kissinger: These studies can proceed, but we must keep on with the main business at hand.

(At this point the meeting melded into an SRG gathering which was to confront the problem of what USG policy on Laos is to be. The minutes of this meeting were taken separately and are available elsewhere.)⁵

Comment: The meeting suffered to the extent that the Secretary of Defense memorandum arrived less than two hours before the meeting, and some of the principals did not have time to digest same. Also, some of the determinations above would depend in part on the outcome of the meeting which immediately followed.⁶

Peter Jessup

1. Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes 1971. Secret; Eyes Only. Jessup prepared the memorandum on June 10. Copies were sent to Mitchell, Packard, Johnson, Moorer, and Helms. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting ran from 3:11 to 4:14 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
2. Report prepared by an interagency Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by General Frank Clay, in response to the 40 Committee’s instructions on March 31. (See Document 172.) Moorer forwarded it to Laird under covering memorandum JCSM–190–71, May 3, and Laird circulated it to Rogers, Mitchell, Moorer, Helms, and Kissinger on June 8. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 40 Committee Meetings)
3. Haig forwarded the Clay Report to Kissinger under a June 8 covering memorandum, noting that Laird had just sent it over for the meeting that afternoon and the NSC staff had had no time to review it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 549, Country Files, Far East, Laos, Vol. VII (Pt. 2))
4. Both Moorer and Laird in their memoranda transmitting the Clay Report endorsed giving the Ambassador “overall responsibility for all US actions in Laos” and the CIA Station Chief control over “irregular operations.” They also endorsed having CINCPAC and COMUSMACV organize a headquarters in Udorn, Thailand, that would coordinate U.S. air support for operations and validate the logistic requirements.
5. See Document 215.
6. In a June 25 memorandum for the record by Jessup, reporting on a meeting of the 40 Committee on June 22, Johnson noted that at the June 8 meeting he had questioned the wisdom of having a military coordinator in Udorn interposed between the Embassy and the 7/13th U.S. Air Force, but that this was not in the minutes and that the issue needed to be resolved once CINCPAC produced its detailed plan on the arrangement. (National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes 1971)