Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

121. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, February 5, 1971, 2:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Dry Season Campaign

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • Ambassador Bunker
  • Robert J. McCloskey
• Defense
  • David Packard
  • Daniel Z. Henkin
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
• NSC Staff
  • Brig. Gen. A. M. Haig
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• WH Staff
  • H. R. Haldeman
  • Ronald Ziegler

Mr. Johnson: I have a draft telegram of instructions which we should go over carefully.²

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s cover the situation first.

Admiral Moorer: All is proceeding on schedule and nothing has changed in the situation or plans. The Khe Sanh air strips are being worked on. We have moved the amphibious force north to serve as deception. Enemy activity is at a low level and we are continuing to position forces.

Mr. Kissinger: How long can we keep the diversion force operating?

Admiral Moorer: Two weeks easily. It really depends on when the enemy realizes that it is just a feint.

Mr. Helms: There are no significant changes on the enemy side.³ We have sent out to all of you a compilation of all intercepts.

Mr. Kissinger: Let us turn to the public relations side. We will put Ziegler in charge of the governmental press side on this and all will work together as a team.

Mr. Packard: There should be no backgrounders or statements by anyone but the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree.

Mr. Packard: All heat should be diverted to Defense.

Mr. Ziegler: I agree. We should push the questions to the Departments and they should push to the field. The field should refer to the Vietnamese.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with that approach.

Mr. Packard: I think the briefings in Saigon should be by South Vietnamese without US participation. There should be no US there.

Mr. Kissinger: I’m not sure that is wise. We are going to be asked what we are doing.

Mr. Packard: I think there should be a briefing by SVN a couple of hours after the operation begins. Then later we can follow up with whatever we want.

Mr. Kissinger: Couldn’t we have an American officer there to say what we are doing?

Mr. Packard: Well, the newsmen will hang on what the US officer says.

Mr. Ziegler: If there is no American there, we will get calls here for response.

[Bunker joins—1455]

Mr. McCloskey: The first point to make is that there are no US ground forces involved. This would come best from an American.

Mr. Haldeman: That is OK, so long as the US officer doesn’t get out in front.

Mr. Johnson: The first briefing will be by General Lam in I Corps.

Mr. Henkin: Is that open for discussion?

Admiral Moorer: I think it would best be done in Saigon. It should be scheduled in Saigon and then Lam could take it from there.

Mr. Helms: Would Thieu go first?

Mr. Kissinger: That would be OK. Then he would be followed by a military briefing with SVN military and a US officer.

Mr. Ziegler: How would Thieu go?

Mr. Johnson: He has a statement to make.⁴

Ambassador Bunker: It is a good statement.

Mr. Johnson: Better than ours?

Mr. Kissinger: Assuming that the Thieu statement would be made at 0800, we could have a news briefing in Saigon at 0830. Can they do this?

Ambassador Bunker: Yes.

Mr. Haldeman: What does this do to our wish to have the SVN first?

Mr. Ziegler: Well it’s OK if Thieu goes first.

Mr. Johnson: We would drop the Lam briefing for the time being.

Mr. Ziegler: Will newsmen move stories from I Corps without briefing?

Mr. Packard: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: We have to make sure they have copies of Thieu’s statement.

Mr. Ziegler: Can we have briefing texts in I Corps the same as in Saigon?

Admiral Moorer: It is difficult in I Corps because the newsmen are scattered.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we get the text of what the American officer would say?

Mr. Packard: Yes, I have one—a point paper.⁵

Mr. Haldeman: How does he describe the kind and amount of air support?

Mr. Henkin: He would make only a statement at first.

Mr. Kissinger: Will that result in speculation?

Mr. Ziegler: Everybody knows from Rogers’ statement that we will give full air support.⁶ He should say that “this may include” and then give the types.

Mr. Holdridge: I agree. They’ll ask if we are going to use helicopters. Then we go back to the statement. We will provide whatever is required.

[Omitted here is discussion of language and timing of the MACV press briefing, of allowing correspondents into Laos, and of language for a cable notifying Souvanna Phouma of the operation.]

Mr. Kissinger: Is this the best time to move the amphibious force or should we wait a while.

Admiral Moorer: It will get there about Sunday⁷ night.

Mr. Kissinger: Is there any indication that NVA is moving toward Tchepone?

Admiral Moorer: No.

Mr. Kissinger: Then if we frightened them after the operation began, maybe this would be best.

Admiral Moorer: The more they have to think about when the operation moves, the better.

Mr. Kissinger: My concern is their reaction after a week when we have succeeded.

Mr. Packard: We’ll give you some other operations and options which we can consider.

Mr. Kissinger: My only question is “Is it better to have the amphibious operation a week later to hold them from reinforcing at Tchepone”?

Admiral Moorer: I will look at this again.

Mr. Johnson: I have another long cable.⁸ It is the basic instruction and guidance. Secretary Laird will go up to the Hill on Monday for closed session for briefings. This was agreed between Laird, Rogers and the President.⁹

Mr. Kissinger: But then the evening television news will be all Rogers and Laird. It would look like an American operation. Wouldn’t it be better to hold up until Tuesday. I think we should check this again with the President.

Mr. Packard: Mel wants to go up. He wants to make clear that no American ground troops are involved. We are continuing Vietnamization and withdrawals.

[Haldeman returns 1605 hours]

Mr. Kissinger: [to Haldeman] What do you think?

Mr. Packard: The idea would be to reassure the committees.

Mr. Johnson: When Rogers calls Fulbright on Sunday, it would have a tactical advantage to volunteer to come up on Monday.

Mr. Kissinger: There still is some advantage to waiting until Tuesday.

Mr. Haldeman: Monday is critical for the public. We want to keep the US posture low. The President is concerned that we set it in the right context at the outset. He wants to rely on Monday on the Congressional people who will already have been briefed.

Mr. Johnson: Then no administration people will be saying anything on Monday?

Mr. Holdridge: Whatever others say will be without the base of having talked with the Secretary. [All agreed to talk this over again with the principals.]

Mr. Johnson: We need to get out a cable to our posts. I will send out an alerting cable to Ambassadors.

Mr. Packard: We want to be less specific about the particular areas of operation.

Admiral Moorer: How about limited duration? [All agreed on limited duration.]

Mr. Kissinger: We want to add the point that this is particularly important in light of the closing of Sihanoukville.

Mr. Johnson: In paragraph 2, 4th line of the cable we should delete reference to artillery firing and also delete it in the next line.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree. We also should say logistic and combat air so that all use the same public line. We need to be sure to get a standard statement. We will meet tomorrow at 10:30 to discuss cable again.

Mr. Johnson: On the Congressional side. All contacts are to be done on Sunday [all agreed]. Abshire and Capen will do this from the list we have approved.

Mr. Kissinger: Should Ford be singled out and briefed as the Minority Leader?

Mr. Haldeman: Yes, he should.

Mr. Kissinger: [to Haldeman] Should you call Scott?

Mr. Haldeman: He should be singled out separately also. Mr. Kissinger should do this.

Mr. Kissinger: The congressional briefing will follow the line of the cable.

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

[All agree] [The meeting is adjourned]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. According to a chronology attached to a memorandum from Howe to Haig, February 9, the meeting ended at 4:45 p.m. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. IV) All brackets except those that indicate omission of unrelated material are in the original.
2. Draft telegram to Bangkok, Canberra, London, Phnom Penh, Seoul, and Wellington, prepared by Sullivan on February 5. Holdridge forwarded a copy of the telegram with handwritten edits to Kissinger under a February 6 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Box H–79, WSAG (Principals Only) Vietnam 2–6–71)
3. Helms sent Intelligence Memorandum SC02374/71, February 5, to Kissinger, under a February 5 covering memorandum, in which he noted that the enemy’s intelligence prior to Lam Son 719 was poor. (Ibid., Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam Operations in Laos and Cambodia, Vol. II) Lam Son 719 was the new name for Phase II of the Tchepone operation.
4. In telegram 1750 from Saigon, February 5, the Embassy transmitted the text of the GVN statement announcing the commencement of Phase II of Lam Son 719. (Ibid., NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–79, WSAG Meeting Southeast Asia 2–5–71)
5. Not found.
6. During a press conference on January 29, Rogers stated that the United States would not rule out the use of U.S. air power to support Asians in any effort they make to fight North Vietnam. See the Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1971, pp. 189–197.
7. February 7.
8. Apparently the draft; see footnote 2 above.
9. See Document 118.