Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

120. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, February 4, 1971, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Southeast Asia Dry Season Campaign

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • Ambassador Bunker
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
• NSC Staff
  • Brig. Gen. A. M. Haig
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
• WH Staff
  • H. R. Haldeman
  • Attorney General John Mitchell

Mr. Helms: There are no major NVA forces moving into the area. They are concentrating on increasing readiness and setting up defenses.

Admiral Moorer: There are about 14,000 enemy combat forces in the area but no new combat forces have moved in.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a plan for diversionary landings today.² Admiral Moorer: I will have this done (Admiral Moorer then briefed on the positioning of US and ARVN forces, all of which is moving according to plan and on schedule).

Mr. Kissinger: When will major movements of ARVN forces occur?

Admiral Moorer: The majority will occur on Saturday and Sunday.³

Mr. Kissinger: When will the NVA know that they are coming down Route 9?

Admiral Moorer: On Sunday night.

Mr. Haldeman: There presumably will be much movement in the east at some point—when will it be seen and reported? Will there be a particular movement when it becomes more obvious?

Admiral Moorer: No there won’t be a specific point at which it becomes more obvious. It is a continuous movement which has been going on.

Mr. Johnson: What about the period about 12 hours ahead of H-hour?

Admiral Moorer: The ARVN armor will move up to the border but so much will be moving, the enemy won’t be able to tell what is taking place. It will be clear by Monday morning the ARVN is attacking into Laos—the enemy will know then. The ARVN airborne won’t go in until Wednesday.

Admiral Moorer: The Chup operation is going quietly and well and is on schedule. They will get into a fight there sooner or later. In summary—in North preparations are going well. We have had no casualties so far and the enemy is not moving forces—just alerting them. The enemy forces at Tchepone got the same instructions to tighten defenses last spring as they have now.

Mr. Johnson: We need to decide on terminology. Can we refer to these areas as NVN Base Area 604 and 611 in Laos?

Ambassador Bunker: We should not talk about Tchepone.

Mr. Johnson: I think there is some advantage to saying that they are going after both base areas. [All agree.]

Mr. Kissinger: D-day remains February 8. We do not want any identification of a terminal date for the operation in any briefings or instructions. The President feels strongly about this. This should be covered in instructions.

Mr. Haldeman: What will the ARVN briefer Lam say?

Admiral Moorer: He will say that as long as the operation is lucrative he will want to stay.

Mr. Haldeman: The problem will be with the Senators on the Hill.

Mr. Johnson: Why should we say anything about when the ARVN will withdraw other than at the end of the operation?

Mr. Kissinger: There would be no problem with saying on background that how long the ARVN remains depends on whether the NVA stays.

Mr. Packard: We have to avoid having the clock run on us.

Mr. Kissinger: We must notify Bruce.

Mr. Johnson: I will do this.

Mr. Kissinger: [To Helms] Would you please keep an eye on what Hanoi, the Russians and Chicoms say and do?

Mr. Helms: Yes, I will do a daily report.

Mr. Kissinger: We need a contingency plan in the event the NVA attack west into Laos.

Mr. Johnson: We are doing a contingency plan if Souvanna falls and will have that by the end of the day. We also will do one on an NVA attack west into Laos.

Mr. Helms: Reinforcing in the north part of SVN is tough. The weather is bad and thus it will be hard to increase the amount of air activity.

Admiral Moorer: We will try to pick up the air activity—but the weather has been bad.

Ambassador Bunker: Thieu asked if we could increase our air support.

Mr. Packard: We have the assets and Abrams has authority to use them if weather permits.

Mr. Kissinger: We need to include in our contingency plans the use of B–52s if needed.

Mr. Kissinger: Let’s go to how we proceed with Souvanna. We should inform Thieu and Souvanna now. As to questions about consultations with Souvanna, no comment won’t do as an answer. We should say that this is a GVN operation and we don’t know what they did. [All agree.]

Mr. Haldeman: How do we deal with the Saigon report that any announcement would come from USG?

Mr. Johnson: I will draft an instruction to Berger to say that there should be no reference to the USG. I will also get a draft of a proposed GVN letter to the Security Council out to Berger for comment.

Mr. Kissinger: [to Bunker] When should you return?

Ambassador Bunker: Well, after they get started.

Mr. Kissinger: It is up to you.

Mr. Johnson: Can we let Souvanna know tomorrow evening when we can get to him, the language of letters to the Security Council?

Mr. Kissinger: We might tell Godley now.

Mr. Johnson: I will repeat the cable to Godley and be sure he can reach Souvanna over the weekend.

Mr. Kissinger: We should get word to Thieu now that the President approves the operation.

Mr. Johnson: I will do this.⁴

Mr. Kissinger: The President will inform Senator Mansfield and the Speaker tomorrow morning. Only thing remaining is when to see Stennis.

Mr. Johnson: We’ll have problems on security with Mansfield.

Mr. Haldeman: The President has not. When will we tell Fulbright?

[Attorney General arrives 1545.]

Mr. Johnson: Senator Fulbright is last on the scenario.

Mr. Kissinger: If it gets blown we’ll know we were wrong. I will call to President’s attention the possibility of leaks.

Mr. Johnson: Do we want to go through the Congressional list? We put Scott and Ford first.

Mr. Kissinger: I’ll see Ford tonight.

Mr. Packard: We have a different view. We believe Capen and Abshire should tell them on Saturday that we will have a briefing Sunday or Monday for them.

Mr. Johnson: I’ll agree with low key phone approach on Saturday.

Mr. Haldeman: We should be sure they understand that we are willing to give them word in advance.

Mr. Kissinger: If we call on Saturday, someone will leak that something is coming up.

Mr. Helms: Why not tell them on Sunday morning that the ARVN is going into Laos Sunday night and that we are willing to brief them Sunday afternoon or Monday. [All agree to calls Sunday morning.]

Mr. Kissinger: We need a new list for Saturday afternoon and Sunday calls. State and Defense should provide this first thing in the morning.

Mr. Johnson: On diplomatic side of the scenario, we should redo Item 7.⁵

Mr. Kissinger: The countries listed in Item 7 should not get the prepositioned cable instruction delivered until H–2 or a reasonable later hour. Why should we tell Japanese?

Mr. Johnson: We will do it here in low key.

Mr. Kissinger: The Canadian who you will advise here has all Sunday afternoon to hold this.⁶

Mr. Johnson: That will be no problem. We believe the GVN letter to the Security Council should go first.⁷ I will get this out tonight to principals.

Mr. Kissinger: Why do we have to send a letter to the Security Council?

Mr. Johnson: We are involved.

Mr. Kissinger: But we are bombing all the time—this is not “low posture.”

Mr. Johnson: We are already charged with being the ones to make the decision.

Mr. Kissinger: Why shouldn’t we wait until the question is raised in the Security Council and then support the GVN.

Mr. Johnson: I thought we would release the letters on Sunday night.

Mr. Kissinger: But we’ve been bombing all the time.

Mr. Haldeman: What will Southerland have said? There is some advantage in having a paper on table.

Mr. Kissinger: On the other hand it forces all others to take a position.

Mr. Helms: What do we add by putting letter in? I don’t think it’s a good idea.

Mr. Kissinger: It will make it tougher for us. If Russians have to respond to the document it will be difficult for everyone. We want to avoid a diplomatic step which suggests that we are invading Laos. If they scream we can still send a letter to the Security Council later.

Mr. Johnson: [to Bunker] Will GVN buy this?

Ambassador Bunker: Yes.

Mr. Johnson: I still feel we need a paper which gives US positions.

Mr. Packard: But this is a GVN operation.

Mr. Johnson: It won’t work—would the appearance of the Secretary of State at the Foreign Relations Committee do it?⁸

Mr. Kissinger: We have had a deliberate policy not to high key this—we’ll have to look at this again.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. According to a chronology attached to a memorandum from Howe to Haig, February 9, the meeting ended at 4:21 p.m. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. IV) All brackets are in the original.
2. In memorandum CM–565–71 to Laird, February 4, Moorer detailed a plan to deploy an Amphibious Ready Group and Marine Amphibious Unit to operate off the southern coast of North Vietnam for the purpose of holding NVN troops in-country because of concern on the enemy’s part as to U.S. intentions. The forces were to come from U.S. Naval Task Force 77. The following was written on an attached note from the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense to Packard: “The President decided not to do this at this time. Reason—it might excite the Russians more than is desirable. It may be done later.” (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–207, Box 10, Indochina 381, Jan–Dec 1971)
3. February 6 and 7.
4. In telegram 19640 to Saigon, February 4, sent 6:24 p.m., the Department indicated that Nixon had approved Phase II and instructed Berger and Abrams to inform Thieu, emphasizing that he should be clear that this was a Vietnamese operation and decision, and that he should closely maintain its security until it was launched. The Department added that it wanted to avoid continued press speculation from Saigon that the GVN was awaiting Nixon’s decision. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 84, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol. IV)
5. Reference is to the diplomatic, Congressional, and public relations scenario for Phase II. Under Diplomatic Actions, Item 7, which was scheduled to begin at “H–2,” i.e., 2 hours before Phase II began, reads as follows: “Inform representatives of other selected friendly nations in Washington as follows: Germany, Norway, Italy, Netherlands, Mexico, China, India, Belgium, Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia.” The scenario is attached as Tab A to a memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, February 4. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–79, WSAG Meeting Southeast Asia 2–4–71)
6. According to Item 5 of the scenario, the Japanese and Canadian Ambassadors in Washington would be informed at H–4 hours.
7. Under Item 9 of the scenario, the GVN observer in New York was to deliver a letter to the President of the Security Council explaining the action at “H+2.”
8. In his February 4 diary entry, Haldeman noted that during the discussion of whether Rogers should brief the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he argued in favor “because it would give us our story on television Monday night, after the Sunday night move.” He added: “Henry didn’t want it done that way and was furious at my stepping in, slammed his book shut, sat and stewed at the head of the table for a few minutes and then abruptly adjourned the meeting for a five minute recess.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Complete Multimedia Edition)