Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume V, United Nations, 1969–1972

420. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, October 16, 1971, 0054Z.

3608. Subj: Chirep—Contingency Planning.

1. Japanese, Australians, ROC and New Zealand have all approached us on desirability of contingency planning against possibility we fail to carry IQ by a few votes.² All are aware of extreme sensitivity of any such planning since any leaks on the subject would undermine our ongoing efforts to round up votes for priority, for IQ, for DR and for negative votes on AR. At same time, Ministers wish to be assured that every possible effort will be made to retain seat for ROC. Above Missions believe that such planning best done in New York and that it should be in general terms to avoid firm positions which might not fit precise contingency that arises.

2. Following are our preliminary views on fallback positions on which we would like Dept’s reactions as soon as possible. Once our general lines are set, we would plan to discuss in first instance with Japan, Australia and New Zealand. After three of us are agreed we could then bring in ROC.

3. Amendments to AR. Australians are under some pressure from Canberra to urge consideration of substantive amendments to AR along lines previously discussed with us (USUN 2507).³ Neither we nor Australian Mission are attracted to this approach. If we do not have the votes to obtain priority and adoption of IQ, we would, in effect, turn it into the DR.

4. Votes by division on AR. Weakest point in AR is expulsion language: “And to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupy at the United Nations and in all the organizations related with it.” If, prior to the first vote (vote on priority), it is reasonably certain that we will not be able to carry IQ, we should ask an African who is not a cosponsor (Tunisia, Ghana) to request a separate vote on the expulsion language. Such a request would be opposed but we would stand a chance of winning a motion for a separate vote and a somewhat lesser chance of defeating the expulsion phrase. If expulsion is deleted, we should abstain on a truncated AR. We should not seek separate votes on other objectionable words in the AR such as “the only legitimate representatives of China in the UN.” We would not have even a slim chance of deleting these words and an unsuccessful attempt would critically damage the interpretation that we would seek to apply to a truncated AR.

5. Interpretation by President. If it appears likely that we will have to resort to a vote by division on the AR, we should inform GA President Malik of our intention and urge him, in event we are successful, to rule on basis of logic that a truncated AR means ROC seat is retained since GA had rejected a proposal for expulsion. Malik likely refuse to make such controversial ruling, in this event we would have to seek some other way to have our interpretation accepted by GA. We would also have to have assurances from ROC that it would not walk out if a truncated AR were to be adopted.

6. Decision to press DR to vote. If expulsion is deleted from the AR and we sustain a reasonably satisfactory interpretation, we should not press the DR to the vote if it appears that it might be defeated. If we are confident that the DR will carry even after adoption of a truncated AR, we should press it to the vote.

7. Attempt to apply IQ to DR. In spite of Zambia’s statement, we understand AR cosponsors are divided on whether to try to apply the IQ to the DR. At present, we believe we have a reasonably good chance of defeating such a motion if submitted. However, if it appears that a large number of countries who vote for our IQ, and who do not wish to have to vote on DR in its present form, will vote for IQDR as part of a balancing act, we should consider revising our DR to drop op paras two and three.

8. Miscellany. As long as it appears that we have a good chance of winning the IQ, we should discourage any delegation from seeking a vote by division on the AR. (Of course some delegation over which we have no influence could make this motion at any time prior to the voting.) Finally, as long as we are reasonably certain of winning the IQ, we should discourage any movement in direction of a moratorium or postponement.

Bush

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, UN 6 CHICOM. Secret; Noforn; Exdis. Repeated to Tokyo, Taipei, Canberra, and Wellington.
2. Telegram 3574 from USUN, October 15, reported on an October 14 meeting between Hsueh and a Mission officer on a fallback position if the IQ resolution failed. (Ibid.)
3. These amendments, transmitted in telegram 2507, September 21, would soften the wording of the Albanian Resolution (AR) by changing the phrase “restoration of the lawful rights” of the People’s Republic of China to “representation.” (Ibid.)