Office of the Historian

88. Memorandum for the Record1

Washington, May 22, 1965, 2:04–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Meeting at White House, Cabinet Room on the Dominican Republic, 22 May 1965, 2:30 p.m.

IN ATTENDANCE

The President, SecState, Ambassador Martin, SecDef and DCI2

SecState stated he feels that OAS or another Latin American person with our backing may be the best way to handle.

Ambassador Martin feels that U.S. speaking through an OAS (person)3 would be “face-saving.” SecState agreed.

President asked about number of troops under Imbert and Caamano. DCI replied that they were about equal, but DCI agreed with SecDef and SecState that Imbert would not be able to dislodge Caamano from his positions inside the “new city.”

This would result in great loss of life and completely unacceptable to U.S. and the world to let such go on with all of our troops there and in position to prevent. DCI concurred.

A cable will be sent to Vance and McGeorge Bundy to continue discussions with Imbert, Guzman and the three Chiefs (Army, Navy, and Air Force) to accept a coalition government.4

Mr. Fortas stated that before any progress can be made with Imbert we must have a rather firm arrangement with Guzman and then say to Imbert that this has U.S. approval!

Cable from Ambassador Bennett, #221705Z (Flash 1896) Amb. to SecState.5

SecDef feels we should continue talks with military leaders—it should be clear that we are as interested as they to constitute a constitutional (non-commie) government. It is too early for “ultimatum” [Page 223] stage. We have to know “who is in the back room” behind Guzman before we form a government. Otherwise we may find an “Aristy” telling Guzman to order U.S. out of the country.

The President said:

1.
We thought at San Juan we had an agreement6—to protect Bosch, Dominican people and U.S.
2.
The three tough ones (Rebels) must be put on “an island” to prevent them from influencing Guzmanʼs government.
3.
Tell Imbert he must go along for good of the Dominican Republic.
4.
Vance to move on Imbert and Chiefs to get this accepted.
5.
We wonʼt get all we want from Guzman, Imbert and three Loyalist Chiefs.
6.
If this wonʼt work, then we will have to work solely through OAS.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry Files, Job 80–R01580R, Box 15, Dominican Republic. Secret. Drafted by Raborn on May 24. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)↩
  2. According to Valentiʼs notes of this meeting, the following also attended: Ball, Crockett, Fortas, Mann, Moyers, Bromley Smith, and Dick Goodwin. (Ibid., Office of the President File, Valenti Meeting Notes)↩
  3. On May 20 the OAS elected Jose A. Mora as the new mediator in the Dominican Republic crisis.↩
  4. See Document 91.↩
  5. Document 87.↩
  6. See the attachments to Document 67.↩