Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

67. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 13, 1965, 5:10–6:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting in the Cabinet Room 1700, 13 May 1965 on the Dominican Republic

PRESENT WERE

• The President
  For State: Messrs. Ball, Mann, and Kennedy Crockett
• For Defense: Messrs. McNamara and Vance
• For the White House: Messrs. Bundy and Moyers
• For CIA: Messrs. Raborn and Helms

1. The President opened the meeting by reading aloud the three attachments to this memorandum. On attachment number 2, the President thought that the second sentence should be omitted at least until the OAS had declared itself.²

2. Traces were requested on Colonel Coromines,³ the brother of Colonel Enrique Coromines. The undersigned stepped out of the meeting to start this process with both State and the Agency.

3. Admiral Raborn identified the possibility that the Communists in the Dominican Republic might resort to violence when and if an announcement is made that Colonel Caamano has been ousted. He also mentioned the contingency that at some juncture Dominican Communists might cross the border into Haiti in an effort to unseat Duvalier and set up a Communist state there. This in turn led to a colloquy between the President and the Department of State representatives as to what consultations or contingency plans should be made in the event that coups occurred in other Latin American countries, with particular reference to Haiti.

4. The remainder of the meeting was absorbed by two conversations with Mr. C.J. Davidson in San Juan, the first conducted by the President,⁴ and the second by Mr. Bundy.⁵ From these conversations, it emerged that Bosch was sending a Colonel Colonel Caamano, hopefully leading to his accepting Boschʼs solution to the political problem. The President was clearly doubtful that Colonel Caamano would agree to quit. Nevertheless, if Colonel Caamano does agree, then Bosch would talk with Guzman in an effort to persuade him to assume the presidency, after proper support from the Dominican Congress. This would be followed by an approach to Guzman from Mr. Bundy who would also undertake to insure that the five-man OAS committee would approve this approach. It was also decided to give Ambassador Bennett some small insight into the purpose of Colonel Hernandezʼ trip.⁶ It was left to the Department of Defense to arrange by what aircraft and with what arrangements Colonel Hernandez would proceed to Santo Domingo.

Richard Helms ⁷
Deputy Director

Attachment No. 1⁸

San Juan, May 13, 1965.

Dictated by Mr. Davidson 4:15 PM—5/13/65

It is understood that Juan Bosch will support the following objectives:

1. For President, Silvestre Antonio Guzman

2. Juan Bosch proposes that he talk with Balaguer

A. To enlist his support for the plan and the new government, and

B. To inquire whether he would serve in the Cabinet or would suggest one of this associates for the Cabinet.

3. Juan Bosch will support for the Cabinet Julio Postigo.⁹

4. J.B. recognizes that the Cabinet might include a person—whether or not a military officer—who would have a special appeal to the San Isidro forces, and he will endeavor to suggest name or names.

5. J.B. is of the opinion that Colonel Coromines—not his brother, Lt. Col. Henrique Coromines—could be a satisfactory Chief of the Army. Bosch thinks that Coromines is now commander of the Mao fortress.

6. Communists. Last nightʼs paper sets forth the understanding.¹⁰ The detailed procedures will have to be worked out with the new President with the object of accomplishing an effective job utilizing the resources available to all concerned.

7. OAS and the President of the US would appear jointly as functioning to bring this about in cooperation with the Dominican people.

Attachment No. 3¹¹

San Juan, May 13, 1965.

Dictated by Mr. Davidson

Concerning active Communists and Trujillistas, it is agreed that they present the problem for democratic government in the Dominican Republic and that effective measures must be taken by the constitutional government to protect the Dominican people from their subversive activities. These measures will involve their separation from the Dominican community. They may take the form of their internment in some isolated area under Dominican jurisdiction or their departure from the island, identification of such persons to be effective promptly by mutual consultation, and prompt action will follow as aforesaid.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (Helms) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Chron as DDCI and DCI, January 1–December 31, 1965, Folder 13. Secret. Drafted by Helms on May 14. The time of the meeting is from the Presidentʼs Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)
2. Not attached.
3. A candidate under consideration for Secretary of State for the Armed Forces.
4. President Johnson placed a telephone call to Abe Fortas on May 13 at 5:35 p.m. During this 16-minute conversation Fortas outlined in great detail a plan, which is summarized here for the establishment of a coalition government in the Dominican Republic. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 1 and 2)
5. McGeorge Bundy telephoned Abe Fortas on May 13 at 6:30 p.m. to finalize plans for the transportation of the two Dominican military officers from Puerto Rico to Santo Domingo, and discuss arrangements once they arrived. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between McGeorge Bundy and Abe Fortas, Tape F65.24, Side A, PNO 3)
6. In telegram 1018 to Santo Domingo, May 13, Mann, without naming Fortas, informed Bennett and Palmer that an “intermediary” had arranged for two Dominican military officers in Boschʼs confidence, Colonels Hernandez and Herrera, to contact Caamaño once they arrived in Santo Domingo. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP)
7. Printed from a copy that indicates Helms signed the original.
8. No classification marking.
9. Julio D. Postigo, a close personal friend of Juan Bosch, and a member of the Imbert government.
10. Not further identified; however, see attachment 3 below.
11. No classification marking.