Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

290. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, November 19, 1964, noon.

SUBJECT

• Meeting at the White House—12 Noon

IN ATTENDANCE

The President-Elect, The Vice-President-Elect, Secretary Rusk, Secretary Ball, Secretary McNamara, Secretary Vance, McGeorge Bundy, McCone

The above were present for all topics; others came in as indicated.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Congo and South Vietnam.]

3. Cuba. In attendance: Amb. Thompson.

Rusk outlined the work done by the Thompson Committee on the question of overflights of Cuba,² explaining the position that Castro had taken, forecasting debate in the United Nations, and explaining briefly the alternatives open to us such as satellites, drones, balloons, the Oxcart, or a mixing of all of these.

McNamara advocated satellites, suggesting consideration of a launch pad at Cape Kennedy for an East-West satellite mission.

Rusk then asked for an explanation by me of a plan developed by CIA to fly over the unprotected zones. I explained the plan in considerable detail, using maps indicating that U–2ʼs could fly and photograph 80% of the island and remain out of range of the SAMʼs. However, this would only cover 30% of the priority targets and would not cover the major military or population concentrations. I indicated that the mounting of a satellite 112–B camera for oblique photography would give us useable photography over all of the defended areas with resolution of about 5. This would be better than satellites and could be synchronized with weather. I raised the danger of the redeployment of SAMʼs, indicating that such a move by Castro could be detected by the U–2ʼs if they were equipped with available warning systems. I concluded by stating that I had less confidence in the product from satellites than indicated by Secretary McNamara, that the use of satellites over Cuba would deprive us of some capability over USSR and Communist China, and it would be impossible to refute stories of missiles in Cuba on the basis of satellite photography. I explained in some detail the innumerable times I had gone before Committees of Congress to discuss Cuban missile rumors and had been able to disprove them satisfactorily with U–2 photography. This, I said, could not be done with satellites. The President asked if I was positive that there were no missiles in Cuba. I replied you could not absolutely prove the negative; we were satisfied that all missiles which we had seen had been removed; all missile sites under construction had been destroyed and were non-existent; all secure areas obviously built for nuclear warhead storage had been destroyed and no new ones had appeared. Finally, the redeployment of the SAMʼs, which left the logical missile-launching areas unprotected, made me think the Cubans and the Soviets did not intend to reintroduce missiles at the present time.

There was no decision except to explore the subject further and to continue U–2 surveillance on the most modest reasonable basis subject to further review before or during the UN debate.

Also re Cuba: See addendum.

[Omitted here is discussion of South Africa.]

Addendum

Cuba

Rusk made two important observations: First, that he felt that the purpose of reconnaissance over Cuba was to produce intelligence on the presence of, or the introduction of, offensive missiles, offensive aircraft or other weapons or weapons systems of sufficient range to pose a threat to the security of the United States. Requirements for overflights, whether by manned aircraft, satellites, balloons, drones, etc., should be governed by this criteria. Collateral intelligence would be useful, such as information on military encampments, equipment, deployments, economic developments, etc., in studying Cuba, but should not govern as criteria for establishing requirements for reconnaissance.

Note: This criteria should be passed to COMOR and should be discussed with General Carroll.

Secondly, Rusk stated that he had had a long meeting with Dobrynin and had been told that Castro had stopped all subversive activities and efforts against Latin America and had insisted to the Soviets that neither he nor his government are engaged in any way in such nefarious operations. I stated that our information contradicted this statement as there were a number of developments which indicated acceleration in these activities by the Castro Cubans.

Note: This criteria should be passed to COMOR and should be discussed with General Carroll.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

CUBA

We continue to receive reports and rumors of missiles in Cuba and these we disprove by U–2 photography. I would expect a continuation of such rumors and also a continuation of statements by individuals or members of the Congress similar to those we have witnessed in the last two years. I have depended heavily on U–2 photography to dispel these rumors.

While satellite photography will make some input into our intelligence on Cuba, it will not be conclusive because of the resolution of KH–4 and the small area coverage of KH–7. Also we expect disappointments from satellite photography because of uncertain weather conditions encountered in Cuba and the impossibility of synchronizing satellite missions with Cuban weather. It should be noted that every mission targeted against Cuba will involve sacrifices of intelligence gathering capabilities on the Soviet Union and Communist China.

An east-west orbit would be useful but expensive and KH–4 or KH–7 missions in such an orbit, while covering Cuba more satisfactorily than the present north-south orbit, would not produce intelligence of particular interest in other parts of the world.

U–2ʼs can be flown in the safe corridors and a satellite 112–B camera can be mounted in a U–2 on an angle and thus photography of the defended areas of Cuba as well as the undefended areas can be had with photographic resolution of about 5 feet which will be useful in my opinion and better and cheaper than satellite photography with KH–4 because of resolution and KH–7 because of area coverage. This however would continue the political problem.³

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI (McCone) Files, Job 80–B01285A, Box 6, Folder 10, DCI Meetings with the President, Oct–Dec 1964. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by McCone.
2. See Documents 277 and 288.
3. A notation written by McCone following this paragraph reads: “Rusk discussed Cuba with Dobrynin—who says Castro has quit [subversion] against LA and will probably not attempt shoot down flights against missiles or main targets. This might be done by mix of means.” A memorandum of this conversation on November 18 is in Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Document 72.