Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

209. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, January 13, 1968, 1539Z.

1508. Subj: Recommended Actions at Washington Level. Ref: State 89983;² Santo Domingo 1461.³

1. In response Departmentʼs request following is Embassyʼs initial listing of suggestions for actions at Washington level which would have useful impact in existing circumstances:

A. Aid/Economic

1. Readiness to deal quickly and flexibly with negotiating problems as they may arise during Embassy-GODR conversations on new assistance package.

2. Promptest possible processing sixteen million SA loan and subsequent dollar disbursements.

3. Accelerated conclusion of bid and AID/W studies of Tavera Dam project, with object of earliest possible announcement of bid and AID decision to finance (assuming establishment of feasibility). (Ambassador would like briefing on current Washington status and prognosis of studies during his consultations.)

4. Early consideration of special treatment for DR in allocation of sugar shortfalls, bearing in mind electoral stability factors as well as economic balance of payment factors. (We realize normal timing of allocations may not permit pre-electoral impact and certainly cannot be finely adjusted to meet tactical stability needs. At same time, we would want Washington to consider desirability making early statement USG intention take sympathetic attitude toward DR, a statement which would have considerable impact.)

5. Prompt and flexible treatment DL applications.

6. Largest possible FY–68 and 69 DG allocations.

B. Political Military

1. Consideration, on contingency basis, of possible invitation to Balaguer for state visit.

2. High-level, stability-bolstering statements in support of constitutional government in DR, to be made on appropriate occasions to be identified by Embassy.

3. Favorable consideration of request by Dominican Armed Forces for grant assistance on military soft goods.

4. Continued and, if necessary, increased surveillance of potential Golpista elements now in US (e.g., Wessin, Pancho Aguirre).

5. Contingency preparations for departure controls on Wessin, should Balaguer so request.

6. Holding line on issuance visas to notorious Trujillistas, whose presence in US would be prejudicial to US interests in DR, and continued and, if necessary, increased surveillance of those already in US.

Crimmins

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM
2. Dated December 27, 1967. (Ibid.)
3. Document 208.