Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

208. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, January 9, 1968, 1943Z.

1461. Subj: Political Situation—Assessment and Short Term Prognosis. Ref: State 88306.²

Summary

Relative political stability achieved by Balaguer administration during first 18 months in office now coming under stepped-up pressure as result convergence political, economic and other factors. Further radicalization of public and private posture of PRD as leading opposition party appears clearly underway. Emergence of Wessin and PQD as new anti-Communist alternative to Balaguer complicates political scene in negative sense and at least calls into question firmness and continuity of support in some sectors heretofore solidly committed to Balaguer. Increased militancy (perhaps born of frustration) of extreme left seems to pose threat of renewed violence if and when “target of opportunity” situation occurs, or can be developed. Political timetable during first half 1968 offers enough prospective such situations to warrant concern. In face of all this, Balaguer appears confident he can weather anticipated storms by using essentially same methods and tactics as have characterized his administration to date. While we are less sanguine now than heretofore that he is fully on top of situation and all its diverse aspects, we continue give him better than even chance of survival through May 1968 election. Our strong continued support, always publicly demonstrated, is essential to this outcome. End summary.

1. A. Three weeks hence Balaguer administration will have been in office longer than any Dominican regime since Trujillo assassination. Despite its numerous faults and chaotic situation it inherited, present GODR has provided country with greater measure stability and at least better prospect economic progress (although as of yet negligible social and political progress) than any of its post Trujillo predecessors. It has rekindled hopes of many Dominicans (and others) that there may be, after all, a constitutional solution to Dominican problem.

B. Stability, however—always relative here—is achieved and maintained only through constant attention to delicate equilibrium of forces and through keeping opposition (real and potential) as divided and off-balance as possible. Although he seems be finding it increasingly difficult to do so, Balaguer has so far been able perform both feats successfully and has concurrently been able instill in nation as whole a sense of accomplishment, meager though it may be, beyond expectations of most a short 18 months ago.

C. Two major elements of political scene have displayed constant and ever-increasing inability to reconcile themselves either to Balaguer or to being out of power. These opposition elements are, of course: former Constitutionalists, with emphasis on Communists and PRD radicals but including many IRD moderates and numerous Social Christians; and intransigent right wingers, opportunists and others now lumped into or sympathetic to Wessinista PQD. Unfortunately, their frustration has been heightened, rather than lessened, by Balaguerʼs operation and staffing of his govt and his apparent public insensitivity to very real social problems affecting nation. At this time hard-core Constitutionalists and hard-core “Wessinistas” are seeking seriously undermine if not eventually overthrow Balaguer. Their chances of success in latter endeavor would depend, inter alia, on degree of cohesiveness they possess or can develop within themselves, degree of unity of purpose they can achieve, both internally and with each other, and amount of outside support, i.e., military, Havana (and to a significantly lesser degree Cuban exiles operating with forces of the right) they can draw upon, all available evidence indicates that, at this time, they lack, singly or in any combination, those essential ingredients of success.

2. DR however appears to be entering what may well be its most turbulent period since Balaguerʼs inauguration. PRD has started 1968 off on ominous note. PQD continues operate its rumor mill and appears preparing for major push in some direction. University situation is definitely heating up (SD 1448)³ Caamano lurks in background, possibly with newly forged Cuban ties. Communists, while still split and squabbling, are nonetheless trying to increase their trouble-making potential and their initially most effective force, i.e. 14th June, may have strengthened its ties with Havana. All of these elements are, at least to minor degree, already inter-related. Some PRD members and Communists have on instructions infiltrated PQD. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has had indications in recent months of stepped-up infiltration by Communists of PRD, particularly at neighborhood levels in Santo Domingo, where there has been evidence of some infusion of 14th June elements. Some Golpista-inclined elements of PQD have been discussing coup possibilities with PRD and other elements, and there has been evidence of other contact between PQD and PRD elements in an unknown context. Caamano may now be shared by PRD and 14th June, or may even be on way to becoming titular leader new “constitutionalist” movement of which PRD and 14th may be nucleus in at least informal alliance reminiscent of formal PRD-PRSC combination in 1965, which itself may have had 14th June undertones. Oppositionʼs growing, though still limited, potential will, of course, feed on unrest but will make relatively little headway towards ultimate goal of at least some of its sectors, i.e., Balaguerʼs overthrow, so long as bulk of businessmen, Partido Reformista and, most importantly, armed forces, remain united and behind President. Some erosion these major sectors Presidentʼs support has already occurred, particularly toward PQD, though not to significant degree. Next few months, with their potential for unrest heightened by three-month municipal election campaign scheduled begin February 16, could well produce significant growth of oppositionʼs potential and increased erosion Presidentʼs support.

3. A. Particularly in view PQDʼs probable participation therein, election campaign will bring into open latent hostilities of revolution which remain just barely below surface and provide occasion for possibly serious disturbances. Even should PRD not participate in elections, which not presently certain, it could be fully counted upon to wage vigorous “non-campaign” in pursuit its own interests. Communists are likely to try to join in with harassment of campaigners as they did in 66 elections. Such activities could invite “repression” of left both by authorities and by PQD (and possibly PR) affiliated “vigilantes” and could create atmosphere propitious for inflating ranks of left-wing radicals and extremists and for simulating greater cohesion between these elements of left.

B. To right, including many Reformistas, businessmen, and military elements, such eventualities would in turn translate into visible growth of “Communist threat” and result in heavier pressures on Balaguer to deal with it summarily. Should he not respond satisfactorily, he would run increased risk of losing significant elements of business community and military to PQD, whose attraction for them lies in part in fact it offers Wessin as an acceptable alternative to Balaguer should Pres prove conclusively (to them) that he “soft on communism.”

C. All this, of course, is without reference to any specific plans Communists may have in mind for guerilla actions and/or urban terrorism, to possible PRD plans for “popular uprising”, or to PQD plans for coup attempt. While we have yet to develop hard evidence that any such effort is likely to occur in near future, it is clear that at least some elements of each of three above sectors are actively considering action along lines indicated. In addition, there are two external factors that could trip delicate balance against Balaguer and force him to assume increasingly defensive and authoritarian positions, and make him prey to more and more wolves. For our purposes these factors, both unknown, are (a) those of the conceivable developments in Haiti which would impact adversely here, and (b) just how DR (or entire island) fits into Cuban plans.

4. A. Notwithstanding real possibility of major trouble and some erosion of his support between now and scheduled May 16 elections, we continue estimate of his survivability would necessarily have to be reviewed and reassessed however if, in treading delicate tight rope between now and then, he should make any serious missteps such as miscalculation under pressure of some key issue or of balance of forces and should take action net effect of which would be to alienate significant support or sharply intensify opposition, or if he were to be dealt with unfairly by elements beyond his control, e.g. his own incapacitation, successful exploitation by his opponents of any Communist effort in Haiti, or a major Castro-backed effort against him.

B. Against this backdrop, a brief look at major elements of present political evaluation follows:

5. The PRD

A. We hypothesized last Feb (A–436)⁴ that “PRD would seem have chosen to seek power through revolutionary means.” Sum of partyʼs public, private and clandestine statements, maneuverings and actions since then, particularly in past few months, have tended to reinforce this hypothesis. We also hypothesized that “any movement against the govt in which PRD engaged in foreseeable future would, because of its present isolation from moderate sectors, have to be undertaken in concert with long-discredited elements of military and right, or with extreme left, or with a combination of the two.” Intelligence developed since then, and particularly since last Sep, indicates a disquieting but as yet not precisely measurable degree of cross-fertilization between PRD, PQD, and Communists.

B. We hold to our working hypothesis as the most plausible explanation of PRD actions and statements and estimate that PRD is once again attempting maneuver events so as to create situation favorable to eventual realization of its ambitions. In this it is unfortunately being provided an opening by Balaguer and elements of his administration, most notoriously some elements of the police, whose continued “repression” of opposition elements, however justified its action may be in some instances, is providing ammunition to opposition. PRDʼs first attempt manipulate events to its hypothesized ultimate ends took place last May when political temperature had almost reached boiling point after terrorism that capped six weeks of rising political tension following assassination attempt against Imbert. Since failure that effort, economic situation has deteriorated and hopes then existing for early economic upturn have eroded; dissatisfaction with Balaguer on economic and other grounds have increased [garble] right has organized—albeit loosely—around man (Wessin) it considers palatable alternative to Balaguer and political rightʼs former tolerance of Ires [?] has eroded; and Boschʼs “popular dictatorship” thesis has polarized political opinion to extent (1) it has forced this opinion to support or oppose thesis, and (2) it has confirmed PRD opponents’ suspicion that Bosch and party radicals are intent upon destroying DOM institutions as they presently constituted.

C. PRDʼs public posture and its clandestine activities since Pena Gomezʼs return from Europe in Aug have clearly suggested party radicals have been reading selves and preparing public for events whose ultimate result radicals obviously hope would be installation of dictatorship with popular support. Which in many respects is an echo of Boschʼs “return to constitutionality without elections” of 1964–65. In fact, later slogan in which “constitutionality” refers to 63 Constitution, is being given renewed currency today by partyʼs continuing denial of constitutional character to Balaguer administration, its executive committeeʼs posture on electoral abstention, the growing threat of its legislative blocʼs permanent withdrawal, and its first official invocation of 63 Constitution as basis for party position (as evidenced in its Jan 3 letter to Emb and in Jan 5 broadcast by Pena Gomez, who stated US intervened in 65 primarily to prevent return to constitutionality of 63, and that since PRD still holds to that constitution “it natural” that party would face intervention again should there develop another chance to apply that constitutionʼs tenets).

D. Partyʼs radio broadcasts and its private comments to Emb and as reported [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] particularly in past month, have pointed increasingly to its belief in inevitability of eventual new revolution. Its unusual musical offerings on Christmas Eve (Constitutionalist hymn and Marseillaise) and New Yearʼs Eve (marching song of DOM youths who trained in Cuba prior to Jun 14, 59 invasion effort against Trujillo), all three of which repeated in Jan 6 broadcast, its almost constant public reference to coming “redemption” and “liberation,” its absolute silence on Caamano, its now constant and uniformly contemptuous (and often vicious) personal attacks on Balaguer, its efforts persuade its audience that present situation on “total repression” of peopleʼs hopes and aspirations mirrors or surpasses that of early 65, and its constant reiteration of friendship for military and particularly AF. AF in part war of nerves aimed at extracting concession from govt and in part effort to hold and to increase its radical following. Beyond this they may well be literally intended to signal coming events. Our major present uncertainties as to PRDʼs ability mount major revolutionary effort concern extent of its latent support in military (believed negligible) and possible roles assigned to Caamano, Communists and Cuba in its plans (unknown). We estimate, however, that barring assassination of Balaguer, party and its possible allies lack strength with which to succeed in revolutionary overthrow of GODR unless presently unlikely coup attempt (successful or not) or other action affecting armed forces should split military or otherwise diminish its capability for effective response and thus create power vacuum that PRD and its possible allies could fill to their advantage.

6. The Communists

A. While PRD has been taking on increasingly revolutionary posture, DRʼs three major Communist parties—MPD, 14th June, and PCD—have also adopted more radical posture in recent months. Moscow-oriented PCD has, for the first time known to Embassy, resorted to training guerilla warfare cadres; three such groups of 12–16 personnel each have been identified recently; two were located in Haitian border regions and one in countryʼs northern tier. At least this would seem to indicate that since most recent tricontinental conference PCD has moved toward Havana outlook on revolutionary activity, or, at most, that Dominican Republic may be considered a unique situation by Havana–Moscow axis in which some measure of agreement has been reached by them on its guerilla potential. In either event, these indications signal more extreme posture on the part of the PCD and distinct departure from “pragmatic” approach to which it has adhered in past. 14th June and MPD are being rent by internal dissensions, with MPD in a more advance stage than 14th. Both have encountered ample frustrations in attempting to organize over past months for insurgency effort predicated on more classic approach of Campesino support. They have found that Campesinos do not easily abandon their traditional conservatism; that internal security forces operating throughout interior represent formidable obstacle to clandestine activity of this nature; and that, all aspects considered, this is form of long range endeavor which they are unable to sustain under pressure of their own internal divisions and of government. As their frustrations in these respects have become more pronounced, there has been resultant tendency to look to irrational, quick solutions through process of escalating competition among not only factions in each party but between parties themselves in order prove themselves as most dedicated Marxist-Leninist.

B. Ex-Constitutionalists in form of 24th of April revolutionary movement (M24A) with a net of relationships reaching into 14th of June and PRD have been provided separate political identity recently. According to [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports, Cubans invited 14th June to send group of ex-Constitutionalist leaders to Cuba for training in late September and, month and a half later, provided financial support for formation of new ex-Constitutionalist organization for purpose of participating in “armed struggle.” It is suggestive or even perhaps significant that M24A was resurrected shortly thereafter with public announcement made by two ex-Constitutionalists with 14th June backgrounds. Its efforts have to this point been devoted to organizing affiliates in interior and, if it has any particular political cast, based on presently-known personnel affiliations it is 14th June.

C. Communist Parties are at present in no position embark on insurgency course with hopes of eventual success unless there is reasonable prospect for outside support and assistance in form of either parallel or cooperative endeavors from other political quarters. Critical factor here is PRDʼs attitude toward this form of collaboration and, to lesser extent, that of PQD. If PRD is prone to overthrow Balaguer at earliest opportunity, PCDʼs recent activities and frustrated and irrational mood of MPD and MR1J4 would make them all likely participants if not spearhead of such an effort. There is insufficient evidence upon which to base any estimate of what role might be destined for Caamano. It might only be noted that he would be a catalytic and unifying element for those more radical opposition forces should he reappear, alone or otherwise, in DR in coming months—regardless of sponsorship.

7. Wessin and PQD

Wessinʼs PQD is essentially loose agglomeration of those outside of left who traditionally opposed to or more recently dissatisfied with Balaguer. In addition to many of those who followed Bonnelly (who obtained 45,000 votes) in 1966 election campaign, PQDers include numerous UCNers who voted for Balaguer, many disenchanted Reformistas (according to Vice President Lora and other high PR officials), and unknown number PRD and 14th June members. Bulk of latter elements, however, some of whom have joined PQD on instructions their respective parties, are presumably there for protective, tactical or some other non-Wessinista reason. PQDʼs surprisingly fast growth derived from fact that in Wessin it provided anti-Communist and otherwise acceptable alternative to Balaguer to those who previously had no non-leftist alternative to him. Recent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] information has provided evidence of a split between Golpista and electoral-minded elements in PQD. Wessinʼs significance lies hardly as much in his electoral potential however as in fairly substantial sympathies he retains in military and in his potential for increased attractiveness to military and business community, some of whose elements are believed be contributing financially to PQD. Another consideration is possibility that anti-Castro Cuban exiles may be providing funds and doctrinal stimulus to Wessin for their own purposes.

In event situation should deteriorate to point military should consider Balaguer incapable of dealing with it, Wessinʼs trouble-making potential would indeed be serious.

8. President and Reformistas

A. Balaguer has so far effectively managed to stave off all elements his opposition by stimulating divisions within them, setting them against each other, buying them off, threatening them, cajoling them, playing up to them, and authorizing or permitting certain types of harassment. While playing this risky game of survival (which he has so far had to play less than any predecessor except Bosch, who did not play at all), he has (as did Bosch) deliberately ignored his own party, has not built base of support within government, and has not deemed it necessary to bridge gap between military, business community (i.e., power sectors) and unorganized “sane popular majorities” which together he constantly gives public and private impression are his sole pillars of support. While this has not actually destroyed his party, it has weakened it considerably, though probably not to point it would calmly stand by and watch him overthrown as PRD did with Bosch in 1963. While to many Reformistas Wessin would offer palatable alternative, strong possibility of civil strife and possible PRD victory therein would most likely stir them to Balaguerʼs defense in crunch.

B. Presidentʼs almost total lack of real “political” attention to causes and complaints espoused by PRD and Social Christians (latter feel Balaguer has withdrawn from them in recent months) mirrors his inattention to Reformista complaints and desires and stems from integral part his psychological makeup; he appears sincerely to believe that anything a political party or for that matter a labor organization clamors for is designed solely to satisfy one or another narrow partisan or financial interest and has little to do with wishes of people as whole, as such, he will take only that action that will, he hopes, ensure that clamoring remains within limits of the tolerable. With PRD he often deliberately forgets to do that.

C. Pres sincerely believes the people, not the PR, elected him (as they did). He therefore feels he owes nothing to PR, much to the people. He considers he owes even less to PRD and PRSC, who lost election, but he does owe as much to those who voted for PRD and PRSC and who later joined “sane majorities” as he does to those who voted for him. It is not “sane majorities” who are causing problems, but rather self-serving political (and labor) organizations which, in name of “defending peopleʼs interests are seeking increase prestige and power of relatively few at top of these organizations. He alone was chosen defend peopleʼs interests, Pres believes, and he doing just that and not about to satisfy narrow ambitions of others by distributing credit. But he does have to keep these ambitions in check, and for this he uses bag of so far successful tricks.

D. All this is difficult for more politically sophisticated mind to accept. But it essential to understanding Balaguerʼs modus operandi. Unfortunately, there seems to be no way (and we and others have tried many times ways) to convince him that political organizations do in fact represent large segments of same people whose interest he believes he so zealously safeguarding. And he is safeguarding them, he believes with highly ingrained paternalistic bias, by protecting them from malevolent designs of “agitators” and “Communists” (with security forces) and improving overall economic situation (via business community) from which all people will eventually benefit. In seeking paternalistically provide peace and progress for peopleʼs future, however, he does not seem by instinct or temperament inclined adequately or consistently to recognize basic political necessity of satisfying their psychological needs of present, a failure that opposition more than avidly exploits.

E. Manner and style which Pres runs his administration, never plusses for him, have increasingly become negative factors. It is an “old” govt in terms both of age of most of its leading figures (many of them hacks and throwbacks to earlier era) and of its general approach toward conduct of public business. Concentration of all authority over even minute detail in Pres personally, corresponding relegation Cabinet members (most of whom have not slightest idea what modern govt is about) to mere figureheads unwilling and incapable making routine decisions because they fear Presʼs wrath or have not merest idea his thinking, practically total lack of elementary staff work, consequent readiness by Pres to make ad hoc decisions in vacuum or on basis information or opinion always incomplete and often biased or self-serving, Pres innate distrust “technicians”—his tolerance of notorious crooks in his circle—all of these add greatly to burdens of our own operations here, particularly in aid field, but more importantly they have meant that govt as a whole has over the months failed generate any real degree popular enthusiasm and has fallen prey to secular cynicism of average DOM toward any govt. Up to now, Pres himself has been generally excepted from this popular cynicism. Usual formulation, outside more rabid sectors of opposition on left and right, has been that Balaguer is good, honest, sincere, hardworking man trying to do his best but victimized by a bunch of fools, scoundrels and thieves. This judgment, in both respects, is close to the mark. One of most frustrating—and dangerous—aspects this unhappy administrative situation is that Pres gives every sign to us of realizing incompetence and dishonesty some of his closest associates, yet for many reasons which, at least to us, do not seem persuasive, does almost nothing about it, [garble—thereby incurring?] risk increasingly of losing his present general immunity from direct attack and worsening his already difficult situation.

F. Another factor greatly colors Presʼs view of PRD. Pres firmly believes Bosch and his more rabid followers are sworn enemies of both DR as Balaguer working for it to be, (and of USG with which Pres strongly identifies). He has therefore long since set himself out to destroy Bosch before Bosch can destroy him. His fear of Communist threat is directly related to this struggle, as he believes Bosch, Pena Gomez et al either Communist or next thing to it. To fight Communists, protect “sane majorities” and provide business with investment climate, Pres looks ultimately (and increasingly, as threats to him increase) to military. He is not prisoner of military, but his growing dependence upon it could eventually entail some such relationship unless he can neutralize threat he relying on military to overcome.

G. Threat, however, keeps growing and is fed by his acts of omission and commission and words and those of many of his subordinates and adherents. To PRD and Communists (and to PRSC) Pres has in past two weeks, for instance, offered grave challenge and variety legitimately exploitable issues. He has catered primarily to military (promotions and decorations) to business, military and right in general (industrial exposition speech); and to “sane majorities” (above and Christmas and New Years’ msgs). During same time he has given opposition nothing but issues (cut in Christmas bonus, maintenance of cut in university budget, extra-ordinary military promotion ceremony, series mostly deporable or unpalatably political govt-mental personnel shifts and appointments and, most importantly, apparently gratuitous statement of DOM dependence on US with special emphasis on alleged US determination prevent another Communist takeover in Caribbean or, in effect, another revolution like that of 65).

H. Presʼs recent actions seem to us unnecessarily provocative to considerable range of opponents. Although we can only speculate, these actions could reflect: (1) diminished presidential sense of proportion and perspective; (2) a presidential assessment considerably different from our own as to power balance of moment and action requirements deriving therefrom; or (3) presidential intent to provoke a direct confrontation and showdown with opposition on timing and issues of his choosing.

9. We unfortunately cannot rely Pres to level completely with us as to what he is up to, if he is in fact operating along final line suggested above. Aside from his normal taciturnity on matters involving such important internal questions, we convinced he would not explain himself to us candidly for fear we would raise serious objections, as we quite probably would. In any event Presʼs success in this possible endeavor or in meeting situation stimulated otherwise depends in great measure on military, as he himself fully recognizes.

10. The Military

A. Three high military officers have acknowledged to EmbOff in last six weeks that fair amount Wessinista sentiment exists throughout ranks of military and particularly among former CEFA personnel and in air force. Deputy Army C/S, however, stated this sentiment is held on individual rather than sectoral basis and that, with possible exceptions of smaller air force units, there cannot be considered to be Wessinista “segments” in armed forces. Same officers also acknowledged “Constitutionalist” sentiment in military, but they consider this negligible. On other hand, another of these officers, Col Nivar Seijas, has said that among his precautions against some eventuality he has “ringed” officers of some units, whose loyalty to Balaguer he suspects, with trusted sergeants so as to prevent implementation of anti-Balaguer orders these suspect officers may issue or, if necessary, to arrest or kill them. It is possible that Wessinista and/or Constitutionalist-oriented military elements may have made similar arrangements. Above officers, as well as [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] DAO sources and contacts, generally agree, however, that military as whole remains responsive to its high command and to Balaguer.

B. President has recently taken two significant steps to reinforce this responsiveness and to diminish or at least prevent further growth of Wessinista sentiment. These were his Dec 24 promotion ceremony for 765 essentials lower and middle grade military men, about two-thirds of whom enlisted personnel and over half of whom air force, and his decoration on Jan 5 of 217 navy and 475 army officers, also mostly lower and middle grade. List, however, included Navy C/S Jimenez, Captain Revera Caminero, Armed Forces Secretary Perez y Perez, Nivar Seijas, Military Aides Chief Col Perdomo, and appeared reflect all major currents in both services.

C. In light leftist maneuverings detailed above, unusual drama of Presidentʼs promotion ceremony and his large promotion and decoration lists, which sandwiched ringing anti-Communist “incentive” speech to business community (and military), convey impression that by appeasing power sectors he is attempting erode Wessinista real and potential strength and at same time consolidate his strength in order to meet what he would appear now to consider more immediate threat of major leftist actions, to deal with this contingency with maximum dispatch and with minimum violence, he knows he must have united and effective military support.

D. We estimate that, with possible exception some air force and other essentially isolated elements, Balaguer continues enjoy very strong military support, particularly in face potential left wing threat, and notwithstanding long-smoldering controversy between Perez y Perez and Nivar Seijas factions. Should eventual resolution this controversy prove decidedly unpalatable to one side or other, it possible that some erosion could take place, although it unlikely it would be of significant proportions as long as leftist threat persists. Should Balaguer not take steps considered adequate by military to meet this threat, however, it is likely that elements therein would turn more and more to Wessin as alternative. But this does not seem be matter for concern in immediate future.

E. Given these assumptions, which accurately reflect situation as we best able to determine it as present, we consider Balaguer capable of dealing with any revolutionary or other armed left wing activity unless this should include assassination of President himself or other preemptive action effectively neutralizing capability of military for forceful response (e.g. through assassination of key officers).

11. Summary Prognosis

A. We estimate present uneasy situation will over next 4–5 months become increasingly delicate. In our own thinking we are dividing period to elections in three segments: (1) between now and PRD-scheduled Feb 7 convention (and/or opening of 3–month campaign for May 16 election immediately thereafter); (2) between then and April 24–28; and (3) between then and elections. We suspect that PRD planning some activity, or preparing take advantage activity being planned or that might accidentally be triggered by others, in order extricate self from dilemma of deciding formally on electoral participation question one month hence. We cannot foretell the occasion or the form of this suspected activity, but are impressed that one situation already at hand and offering quite inflammatory potential exists at the UASD. ([less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reports indicate 1J4 intent to spark disturbances focussing on university question and PRDʼs student arm—FUSD—seems heavily involved.) Further, before PRD convention, it would not be unlikely for something to happen on Wessin issue (dormant for many weeks now) and/or concerning Caamano.

B. Should no major activity occur within next month, we would still expect potential for trouble to remain high through May 16 election, with a possible peak toward third anniversary of outbreak of revolution on April 24.

12. As stated above, taking all positive and negative factors into account, we estimate President with our continued economic and political support, publicly demonstrated, has better than even chance of survival through May 1968 election.

13. In response State 89983⁵ separate telegram will suggest actions by Dept which in our judgment would have useful impact on Dominican situation.⁶

Crimmins

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Santiago de los Caballeros.
2. Dated December 22, 1967. (Ibid.)
3. Not found.
4. Airgram A–436, February 26, 1967, reads: “The PRD has become increasingly intransigent since the beginning of the year and has given the strong impression that it is bound on some unknown but dangerous course.… The PRDʼs harsh line, its apparent actions, and its deliberately uncompromising public and private attitude, now resemble its posture during its build-up to the revolution of 1965.… We estimate, then, that the PRD may now be seriously engaged in preparing for another contingency: the chaotic situation that would follow the assassination of the President.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 2 DOM REP)
5. Dated December 27, 1967. (Ibid.)
6. See Document 209.