Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

154. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, January 6, 1966, 0420Z.

1581. From Bunker.

1. President called me to palace late this afternoon and, in grim mood, informed me that he had decided take drastic action to break impasse over departure of military from both sides. He said that after considerable reflection he had reached conclusion it absolutely essential to remove three armed forcesʼ chiefs as well as constitutionalist military leaders. He therefore planned issue decrees tomorrow assigning Rivera Caminero, De Los Santos and Martinez Arana to posts abroad. Simultaneous decrees would also order Caamano, Montes Arache et al. to foreign assignments. Jimenez would be named MOD, Colonel Enrique Perez y Perez Army C/S, Captain Amiama Castillo Navy C/S and Colonel Beauchamps Javier (reportedly now in Lima) Air Force C/S.

2. Garcia Godoy insisted that only way for PG effectively to govern and take country to elections is through thorough shake-up of top level armed forces. President asserted that, in fact, he is unable to govern outside of limited economic areas. Chiefs ignore his wishes, operate armed forces as “independent power” and obstruct other officials of government in their duties. Attorney General Gomez Ceara finding that he is powerless act in any matter that touches military or involves persons protected by the military, has offered his resignation. Mendez Nunez, “best man in cabinet,” also will resign if armed forces not brought under control. Others, it was indicated, could probably be expected take this position. If he does not move, President claimed, PG will collapse.

3. Garcia Godoy then listed a number of grievances against chiefs—duplicity by Rivera Caminero in responding to orders for transfer of troublesome local commanders, apparent stealing by Martinez Arana, inflicting of indignities by military on visitors to Presidentʼs office and house, and generally arrogant attitude all around. Principal complaint, as before, was that chiefs seemed to be protecting terrorists in and out of military ranks.

4. Larger political issues also involved. According to President, responsible moderates and conservatives have been urging him make clean sweep of leading military on both sides. (In addition to Cabinet members of this category, he mentioned in this connection Salvador Ortiz and Virgilio Perez Bernal, a prominent local builder.) President said he convinced Balaguer shares this view and may even so state publicly. (We have conflicting reports on this question.) Finally, in Garcia Godoyʼs opinion, country looks to him to open way to elections. Under present circumstances elections would be impossible, as Central Electoral Board President Liz has allegedly stated in private. President concluded, therefore, that only by solving countryʼs major problem—that of the contending military factions—could he create climate for elections.

5. Garcia Godoy conceded that it might appear he was acting in response to pressure from Bosch and extreme left. Nevertheless, he thought removal from scene of constitutionalist military would ultimately weaken Boschʼs hand. As matters now stand, he said, PRD can be expected to reap maximum advantage from anti-military sentiment in country. This would obviously no longer be case if issue of military leaders resolved. (I pointed out that these are highly debatable points; that, in particular, we have evidence Bosch himself has put forward idea of trading Caamano and company for chiefs.)

6. In conclusion, President said he fully realized possibly grave consequences of his decision. Chiefs might simply ignore or refuse obey his orders when decrees published. He would then have no choice but to resign, offering turn government over to armed forces in event Vice President Castillo and other cabinet officers followed his lead. Outcome, President thought, would depend to large degree on attitude of IAPF and ad hoc committee. It was his opinion that with these behind him chiefs would not challenge orders.

7. I responded to this presentation with observation that Presidentʼs scheme obviously held certain attractions in theory but question had to be answered as to how it would work out in practice. His objective—and ours—is to hold free elections. Great progress had been made in preparing way until unfortunate events in Santiago. Did this setback, I asked, mean that President should abandon gradualist approach that had achieved so much before December 19? Would it not be better part of wisdom to take action re military on both sides in at least two stages as we had previously suggested? Presidentʼs reply, in effect was that his decision now made and could not be changed.

8. I did prevail on Garcia Godoy to hold off until my colleagues could be brought down from Washington, promising him that we would do utmost have them here by noon tomorrow. I have not so far been able to reach either Penna Marinho or Duenas but hope schedule can be met. Few minutes ago, when I reassured Garcia Godoy by telephone on this point, he informed me that Cabinet meeting now in session and it appeared “decision final”.

9. Ambassador Bennett and I are meeting with President early tomorrow to resume discussion. We plan explore possibility of less drastic approach to problem, drawing on excellent suggestions in Deptel 711.² We will have additional comments and recommendations following tomorrowʼs session with Garcia Godoy.³

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Received at 12:09 a.m. and passed to the White House, CIA, and DOD.
2. Document 153.
3. See Document 156.