Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

305. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 24, 1968.

SUBJECT

• Comparison of Four Memoranda on China

Four memoranda recently sent you on the situation, prospects and policy recommendations with regard to China are compared below. The memoranda are attached, as follows:

Secretary Rusk’s “Policy Toward Communist China” of February 22 (Tab A)²

CIA’s “Communist China’s Troubles and Prospects” of February 22 (Tab B)³

Al Jenkins’ “Thoughts on China” of February 22 (Tab C)⁴

Academic specialists’ majority report, “Memorandum on China Policy” of February 12 (Tab D)⁵

Situation and Prospects

I find no disagreement whatever among the first three papers in their attempts to analyze the situation and the likely prospects for China. (Tab D is almost entirely on policy.) It is natural in addressing a subject of this extensiveness and complexity that the elements in the situation chosen to be covered vary somewhat, but there is a surprising—and comforting—degree of agreement among the three papers as to what is going on in China. The CIA paper is the most complete in this area, but of course appropriately stops short of policy discussion. I think it safe to say that there is general agreement that:

• —China is in a mess, with widespread but mostly small-scale factional fighting, with lawlessness, transportation stoppages, and growing disrespect for authority resulting in significant damage to industrial production and a threat to agricultural production ;
• —dissension at the top causes vacillation and contradiction to emanate from central authority;
• —the Party apparatus is all but destroyed, and it will be difficult to reconstitute it;
• —the military, so far generally intact, is increasingly running the country;
• —despite all of this, China has not yet really come apart, and the sophisticated weapons program, including the nuclear component, so far does not seem to have been badly hurt;
• —while Mao may be retained as a symbol at least as long as he lives, his extreme domestic policies almost certainly will not prevail;
• —limited accommodation with the Soviet Union and/or the United States could come, post-Mao.

Policy Recommendations

All three papers dealing in policy considerations (Tabs A, C and D) believe that we are unlikely to get appreciable reciprocation during the Maoist era from any attempted rapproachment, although the academicians’ paper appears to be somewhat more hopeful than the other two in this regard. All three papers, however, recommend certain steps to be taken unilaterally, where reciprocation is not expected, designed to increase contact and to signal to potential successors to the Maoists that they will have policy options in our regard.

Trade

All three suggest liberalization of present trade regulations, but the academicians would go farther than the other two papers. This rather complex subject can perhaps best be reviewed after we receive State’s more detailed proposals. It may be useful to invite the academicians’ comments, and Congressional soundings will be important.

Travel

Both the academicians and Jenkins would favor the Secretary’s proposal on travel liberalization.

Other Efforts at Contact

For some time we have been making efforts to no avail along the line advocated by the academicians. There appears to be no quarrel with our continuing these efforts, within reason.

One China, One Taiwan

In the attachment to the Secretary’s memorandum the proposition is stated that we should work gradually toward at least tacit acknowledg-ment that we consider Peking and Taipei to represent two separate states. The other two papers do not deal quite so explicitly with this subject, but this concept seems to be implicit in both.

Offshore Islands

The academicians would have us make “determined efforts … to induce the Republic of China to withdraw from the offshore islands (Quemoy and Matsu).” The other two papers do not address this question. I feel that:

• —for a while yet our efforts would be unavailing, and would deeply trouble Taipei;
• —with Chiang’s lessened emphasis on military conquest of the mainland, this withdrawal is less important (although still desirable) from our standpoint;
• —it may be easier post-Mao and/or post-Chiang;
• —meanwhile the status quo is crucially important to the legitimacy of Chiang’s government at the national level: without the islands the national and Taiwan provincial de facto jurisdictions would be geographically coterminous.

Regional Projects

The Secretary’s attachment points out the ultimate desirability of getting China associated in regional developmental projects. This was not mentioned in the other two papers—perhaps because all would agree it is not conceivable under present conditions—but is consonant with the general approach of the other papers.

Broaden Discussion

The academicians would have us engage in a broad bilateral discussion of all the fundamental problems that lie between our two nations. This is congenial to the two government papers, not belabored in them doubtless because the authors knew we have tried to do just that, and Peking is not interested.

Warsaw as an Educational Forum

As long as preachment is avoided, I see merit in Jenkins’ suggestion that we use Warsaw more to whittle away at the Chinese Communists’ hardshell view of the world. The academicians imply much the same thing. If the world is being gradually but willy-nilly knit together both by the acids and the building blocks of modernity, this surely brings both new dangers and new promise. Ignorance of the process itself will increase the dangers, and the Chinese seem to be long on that sort of ignorance. This will not be a bilateral discussion, but our own stated observations which we hope would be usefully provocative.

A Bohlen Counterpart

You have already reacted favorably to this proposal of the academicians.⁶

United Nations Entry

This is one important subject on which there is a categorical difference of opinion. The academicians would have us support Peking’s seating in the United Nations if it wishes to enter on the same terms as other countries. The Secretary is emphatic in his opposition to Peking entry. Jenkins agrees that it is not in our interest to have Peking under its present auspices in the UN, but does not believe it would come in on the same terms as other countries anyway—hence it is safe and seemly for us to be somewhat more relaxed. Perhaps the trend is in that direction, considering our stand on the study committee proposition.

General Comment

Except for the UN issue, there is a very large area of general agreement in the memoranda. Of the three papers, the academicians would have us go farthest toward attempted accommodation, and rather promptly. Jenkins emphasizes the importance of timing with regard to the assumed change-of-dynasty cycle, especially in those steps wherein reciprocation would be at issue. I see merit in our readying the Secretary’s proposals—for another reading against events on the trade package, which will take a bit of work around town. You will presumably wish to get the views, too, of Defense, Commerce and Agriculture.

Walt

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Codeword, Vol. II. Secret.
2. Document 302.
3. Attached but not printed.
4. Document 303.
5. Attached but not printed. The memorandum, unsigned and undated, from the group that met with Johnson on February 2 (see Document 297) is filed with a covering letter of February 12 from Reischauer, stating that the points in the memorandum represented a general consensus and that all had at least majority support within the group.
6. See Document 297. The memorandum cited in footnote 4 above recommended creation of an Office of Ambassador at Large for Asia, or comparable area, at the top policy level of the Department.