Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

304. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, February 23, 1968.

[3 paragraphs (15–1/2 lines of source text) and subject line not declassified]

Attachment

[document number not declassified]

SUBJECT

• Memorandum of Conversation Between Ambassador McConaughy and Chiang Ching-kuo on 12 February 1968

1. Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) said the situation in Tibet caused him particular concern. He said he had received from GRC Intelligence Agents in Tibet reports of serious internal difficulties, which would very likely be compounded by serious food shortages. He believed the USG should watch this situation closely, since in his judgment there was a possibility that some dissident elements in Tibet might ask for assistance from India, in the event that the Maoists tighten the pressures on Tibet even further. If they do not get help, then the dissident elements would likely be wiped out.

2. The Ambassador pointed out that the Indians with all their current internal difficulties would probably be very loath to take any step that might provoke the ChiComs. CCK agreed that the Indians would be reluctant. However, he felt that an opportunity might be presented which should be exploited. He said he thought that British Intelligence might have additional information about the situation in Tibet. He suggested that the U.S. should intensify intelligence operations in Tibet, “In order to see how best to help the Tibetans attain independence.”

3. CCK moved to the present serious situation in Kwangtung province. He said this province seems to contain more military elements that are anti-Mao than most other areas, and it is also the province in which the GRC has the most underground agents. He said the GRC plans to intensify its clandestine work there, and to stage extensive anti-Mao activities in April and May, with particular emphasis on the Swatow area. The Ambassador asked if the GRC in fact had the capability to do this, and CCK replied he felt they did. CCK said the GRC’s efforts in Kwangtung are now scattered, with one major area of activity at Nan-Hsiung (25–10N; 114–20E), near Ch’U-Chiang in the far north of the province. He said he planned to “activate our people there.” He said he would keep the Ambassador [less than one line of source text not declassified] posted about progress and developments.

4. The Ambassador asked if CCK foresaw any possibility that the activities would be so successful that the ChiComs might consider them to constitute a provocative act by the GRC. CCK said he had perhaps not made himself clear; the activities would not be staged in any way that could involve attribution to the GRC and they would not be aimed at any take-over of local power. His agents would simply stimulate and participate in prevailing cultural revolution activities on the anti-Mao side.

5. The Ambassador asked if the ChiComs might not still blame the GRC for instigating the troubles. CCK replied that he did not believe this would happen. CCK said these activities would not be aimed at wresting political power for the GRC in the area, but rather at increasing political instability and chaos. Kwangtung province had been chosen simply because of a combination of agent assets and an unstable situation. The objective would be to achieve increased political instability in the area. He said Swatow appeared to be an unstable area, and that Amoy had similar serious instabilities also. He said that he wished to inform the Ambassador of the above “For the Ambassador’s reference.” CCK then said that he knew the Ambassador was aware that last year the GRC had conducted some small boat intelligence collection raids against the Mainland. He said that, in line with his already expressed intention to avoid provocative action in the present tense Far Eastern situation, “We are suspending these raids now, and should we want to start them again we will consult with you.”

6. CCK referred to reports that IL–28’s were moving to the Nanning and North Vietnam areas, and wondered whether these aircraft were the same ones that apparently assembled in Hsuchow last fall, or whether they are new aircraft recently delivered by the Soviets.

7. CCK referred to his conversation with DCM Hummel on January 29 in which CCK had announced the intention of his government, and the instructions by the Gimo, to refrain from provocative acts against the Mainland, during the new tensions in Vietnam and Korea. CCK reiterated that this was GRC policy and would be carried out, and he added that if there is anything the U.S. Government wants the GRC to do to help, the GRC would certainly cooperate.

8. CCK said he was watching closely the reports of a new ChiCom missile installation at Lung-Chi near Amoy, to try to discover whether they are ground-to-air missiles, or whether they are ground-to-ground missiles that could be a serious new threat to Quemoy.

9. CCK turned to the subject of internal security, in the light of the Communist attacks on the U.S. Embassy in Saigon and on President Park’s residence in Seoul. He thought that the GRC had the situation well under control in Taiwan, although the GRC has recently taken new actions to prevent ChiCom infiltration. He said that last year (presumably during calendar 1967) the GRC had discovered a total of 93 “cases” of attempted espionage. He said that this had been a reduction from the previous year, but that it is obvious that the ChiComs are still making espionage attempts. During the past year, for instance, the ChiComs had been trying to use Mainland People who have sons in the GRC Armed Forces by sending wives and other female relatives from the Mainland to Hong Kong, and from there to Taiwan for espionage purposes. The Ambassador suggested that the ChiComs might also try to land small groups of infiltrators along the Taiwan coast, as the North Koreans have been doing in South Korea. CCK said he thought this would be difficult but not impossible; he thought the infiltration of dependents more likely.

1. Source: Department of State, INR Historical Files, China, 1968. Secret. A copy is attached to a memorandum of February 27 from INR Deputy Director for Coordination William C. Trueheart to Hughes, Denney, and Evans, [text not declassified]. (Ibid., EA Weekly Meetings, 1968)