Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

267. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–7–67

Washington, May 25, 1967.

THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION

Conclusions

A. The political crisis in China continues. No end is in sight. Among the several possible outcomes, no one is distinctly more likely than others. But whatever its ultimate resolution, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has already done immense damage to the top leadership and the party, has profoundly altered the internal power structure, has greatly unsettled all levels of Chinese society, has unleashed new forces of instability, and has contributed to China’s growing isolation in the world.

B. We have no evidence that the Cultural Revolution has yet had any significant effects on the military capabilities of the PLA or on China’s advanced weapons programs. But the PLA is assuming more and more noncombat tasks and if this trend long continues it would almost certainly affect its combat capabilities.

C. Instability and confusion are likely to persist so long as Mao retains sufficient power and vigor to push his designs for remoulding the party and combating real and imagined threats to his doctrines and policies. Mao could misjudge his power position and go too far. He is now heavily dependent on the military for support; too vigorous efforts to bridle the armed forces could produce a coup against Mao or even fragmentation of the country and civil war. But these are extreme cases and we think it more likely that a basic tendency toward preservation of national unity will persist, despite the divisive impact of the Cultural Revolution.

D. Looking beyond Mao, the Cultural Revolution has made it more likely that the succession will be a disorderly and contentious struggle. The military may play a decisive role, but Lin Piao would not necessarily be their candidate. A collective including Chou En-Lai, some of the military leaders, and even some of the now disgraced party figures, might emerge. In any event we believe that many of Mao’s dogmas and practices are likely to be set aside. This might be a gradual process, though it could come more rapidly if unresolved internal and external problems have been aggravated during the last months or years of Mao’s rule.

E. The political crisis has already focused the leadership’s energies and attention on internal affairs and has at least temporarily damaged Chinese prestige abroad. Within this context, however, China has maintained a relatively active foreign policy, though it has become more rigid in international Communist affairs. For the most part Peking has maintained policy positions which were well established before the Cultural Revolution began. As long as the Maoists retain control, Peking is unlikely to make any important changes in the general line of its foreign policy. At any rate, in the short term, an unremitting hostility to the US and USSR is likely to remain the predominant feature of Chinese foreign policy. It is possible, however, that over the longer term, internal changes in the direction of moderation, if they do occur, will create more favorable conditions for reappraising foreign policy and perhaps for introducing elements of greater moderation.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 90 D 110. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by Helms and prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on May 25 except the AEC Representative and the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was out of their jurisdiction.