Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

266. Telegram From the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State¹

Taipei, May 24, 1967, 0830Z.

3662. Subj: Country Team assessment of GRC intentions. Ref State 135828 Limdis.²

1. Continuing disorders in widespread areas of Communist China have not stirred the GRC into more militant activities against the mainland. We know of no GRC plans or preparations for any major military, paramilitary, or intelligence operations against Communist China. The more modest programs of which we are aware emphasize political rather than military action; they follow the general line set by President Chiang early this year.

2. We have reported earlier on the small increase in the number of GRC troops on Matsu, the current movement of the 1st Marine Division to the Penghus, and various other military redeployments.³ We continue to view these as part of GRC efforts to disperse its forces for defense against ChiCom attack and not to improve its offensive capabilities against the mainland.

3. An attempted GRC intelligence/incursion operation against the Fukien coast on 6 May ended in disaster, with a small boat and at least seven men lost as a result of Chinese Communist attack. Operations of this kind continue to be attempted sporadically, but steady improvements in ChiCom surveillance and coastal defense capabilities make them extremely hazardous and unproductive. Maritime raids are not a significant part of current GRC planning concerning the mainland, and we have reason to believe that certain responsible GRC officials doubt the efficacy of such incursion attempts.

4. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] report [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] of a “program for strengthening operations behind enemy lines” is a good illustration of the content of current GRC plans concerning Communist China. The “program”, which was approved by Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo on 3 March, specifically rejects a military “counter-attack” because of the “international situation” and because it would reunify the Communists. It calls for political and psychological warfare measures, and in doing so makes clear that GRC plans rest almost entirely on a hope, however ill-defined, that events on the mainland will develop in such a way that GRC influence will be revived.

Hummel

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CHICOM-CHINAT. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Hong Kong and to CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. See footnote 2, Document 242.
3. Hummel discussed the movement of troops to the Penghus and to Matsu in a March 4 letter to Bennett. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT) He commented further in telegram 2656 from Taipei, March 6. (Ibid., POL CHICOM-CHINAT)