Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

91. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to the Ambassador at Large (Harriman)¹

Washington, September 22, 1966.

SUBJECT

• North Korean-Bloc Initiatives on the Korean Unification Question

Background

1. In its July 21 memorandum on the Korean unification problem,² the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) suggested convening of a Geneva-type conference for the “peaceful settlement of the Korean Question.” In its proposal, put forth in the context of the long time DPRK unification position, the DPRK suggested that such a conference could discuss means of attaining a lasting peace in Korea and realizing its peaceful unification. The North Koreans proposed that the conference be attended by representatives of North and South Korea as well as equal numbers of interested governments nominated by each side. They did not explain what the conference would do and continued to insist that outside powers including the UN had no right “to interfere in the internal affairs of Korea.”

2. Since the issuance of the July 21 memorandum the call for an international conference has been a continuing theme in the North Korean propaganda and various diplomatic approaches on the unification question but without any softening of the North Korean terms for unification (withdrawal of foreign troops, unsupervised national elections et al.). The latest major public statement was Vice Premier Kim Kwang-hyop’s September 8 speech in which he mentioned the conference proposal in a low key—while reiterating the standard North Korean unification line.

3. The USSR has publicized the North Korean conference proposal. It requested the UN Secretary General to circulate the July 21 memorandum and in a September 12 broadcast chided the U.S. for having “categorically repudiated” the DPRK conference proposal. In conjunction with the other bloc members, the Soviet Union has also proposed a separate UNGA agenda item on “the withdrawal of all American and other foreign troops occupying South Korea under the UN Flag and the dissolution of UNCURK.” (The USSR had previously proposed a similar item in 1962.)

4. To date there has been no measurable international reaction to the North Korean conference proposal at the UN or elsewhere. The Republic of Korea has publicly dismissed the North Korean call for a conference as a propaganda gesture. The Department spokesman in response to a question commented only that our position in support of the competence and authority of the UN to deal with the Korean question was well known. He did not comment directly on the North Korean conference proposal.

Present Situation

5. We have no evidence at present that the North Korean proposal has caused weakening of international support for our traditional position on the Korean question (UN-supervised elections throughout the peninsula and seating of the ROKG alone in the General Assembly’s Political Committee for the debate on the Korean question).³ However, it is clear that the North Koreans, with the support of the USSR, have embarked on a major propaganda campaign which has as its objectives a.) demonstrating that the U.S. and the ROK fear any serious moves toward unification of Korea; b.) highlighting the fact that large numbers of American troops are still in Korea thirteen years after the year of the Korean conflict; and c.) capturing the tactical initiative on this question, weakening UNGA support for the US–ROK position.⁴

There has been no indication, however, that the North Korean conference proposal is, in fact, a serious substantive initiative to achieve unification nor has there yet been any overt move to contrast our position on the Korean question with our Viet-Nam policy statements regarding negotiations or troop withdrawal.

6. Privately the ROKG has interpreted the North Korean proposal as a tactic to insinuate a new element into the continuing ROK domestic debate on unification, as well as a gambit to weaken UNGA support for the traditional approach to the unification problem. Since there is as yet no demonstrable evidence of loss of international support, the ROKG has not conceded the necessity of changing our traditional tactics. It has emphasized that particularly because of the 1967 elections the Korean unification question must be handled as in the past, emphasizing the competence and authority of the United Nations on the unification question and the ROKG’s favored international position. The ROKG also believes that a positive response on its part could weaken its international position (the ROK is recognized by seventy-five countries, North Korea by twenty-five) by tending to equate the two regimes.

7. While the North Korean proposal has not so far generated any visible reaction, we believe that the conference proposal might elicit sympathetic reactions from some UN members, particularly neutralist countries, seriously complicating our approach to the Korean question at the 21st UNGA and, more generally, could put the ROK and ourselves on the defensive publicly and internationally. Flat rejection of the North Korean proposal could also appear inconsistent with the continued U.S. endorsement of a conference on Viet-Nam, despite dissimilarities in the present situations in Korea and Viet-Nam.

8. Based on the existing wide international support for the Republic of Korea, we and the South Koreans are now in a position to take the tactical play away from the North Koreans on this issue, without jeopardizing our substantive position. In considering future responses to the North Korean-bloc conference proposal, particularly in the UNGA, we believe that both we and the ROKG could adopt a public position which would:

a. make clear that the ROK and the U.S. are ready and willing to sit down with the North Koreans to discuss implementing relevant UN resolutions on unification whenever the North Koreans announce their readiness to accept UN competence and authority;

b. emphasize that the UN forces (including American troops) in Korea under UN resolutions are there to preserve peace and security in the area and that we are prepared to withdraw our forces when the conditions for a lasting settlement have been fulfilled;

c. point out that our position in support of the UN formula for unification in fact assures that the Korean people will have the right to self-determination;

d. expose the North Korean unification proposals for what they are: propaganda devices which would deny to their own people the right to self-determination, in contrast to the UN formula which calls for a democratic election process verified by the UN;

e. point out that the North Koreans, in their propaganda and in their clandestine efforts to infiltrate the ROK, have as their sole objective the overthrow of the democratically-elected government and the social structure of the south. Infiltration of North Korean agents and DMZ incidents continue and the North Korean propaganda continues to attack the Park Government in the most vitriolic terms attempting to incite its overthrow.

9. The public position outlined above would:

a. show that we are not afraid of negotiations but will not compromise on the principles set forth by the UN (free national elections under UN supervision);

b. demonstrate ROKG confidence in its ability to defend its own interests;

c. highlight North Korea’s continuing refusal to accept the UN (or any outside) role in unification;

d. preserve the US/ROK substantive position on the unification question, but in a more publicly defensible context.

10. In response to the Soviet resolution regarding the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea and the dissolution of the United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK), we should make the following points:

a. The UN forces in Korea are there as a result of communist aggression in 1950.

b. These forces are there under UN Security Council resolutions reaffirmed annually since that time.

c. The presence of these UN forces, including the American troops, is the major element in stabilizing a potentially dangerous point of confrontation between the communist bloc and the free world. The proof of this is in the record since the Armistice in 1953. There has been no aggressive action on the part of the UN forces and their presence has effectively deterred any resumption of hostilities in the area.

d. Under the shield provided by these forces, both the Republic of Korea and Japan have made significant economic and political progress.

We are, of course, prepared to withdraw our remaining forces from Korea when the conditions for a lasting settlement have been fulfilled. Their withdrawal before such a settlement has been reached would not contribute to peace and security in the region but rather lead to heightened tensions in an area which has been militarily secure since the end of the Korean conflict.

e. UNCURK is a political organ created by the United Nations to facilitate the unification of Korea. It has not been able to perform its function because of the North Koreans’ intransigent refusal to accept any UN role in the Korean unification question.

f. UNCURK continues, however, to play a useful role in observing the political developments in the ROK and, if the North Korean Regime desires, it exists as a channel for discussion of the unification question.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–4 KOR/UN. Secret. Drafted by O’Donohue (FE).
2. Excerpts from the July 21 memorandum are in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 705–707.
3. U.S. policy objectives with regard to the Korea item at the UN were “to preserve ROK’s favored international position vis-á-vis North Korea, to maintain UN presence in Korea, and to retain UN role in Korean unification on terms acceptable to ROKG and US, with maximum support among GA members.” (Telegram 1873 to USUN New York, February 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 32–4 KOR/UN)
4. While not clearly related to the North Korean proposal, abstention of nine Afro-Asian countries on inscription on the GA agenda of our Korean item is another portent of increased difficulties at this year’s session. [Footnote in the source text.]