90. Letter From the Ambassador to Korea (Brown) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)1
Dear Bill:
Last November 2,2 I wrote you of my impression that a new climate of beliefs and attitudes was beginning to emerge in Korea and I reflected upon its implications for the future. The transformation of the Korean national attitude from one of doubt and dependency to one of increasing self-confidence and hope, which was reported in that letter, has since deepened and become even more of an influence on national and individual action.
In that letter I wrote principally in terms of individual and internal attitudes—what individual Koreans and the Korean Government were doing and hoped to be able to do about the development of their own country and their own personal fortunes. Today I want to place more stress upon Korea’s new conception of its relationship with the outside world, a theme which has become increasingly important in the counterpoint [Page 188] of motivation and concern in Korean thinking. For Korea is no longer, and probably never again will be, the hermit kingdom which it had been for so many years.
Korea has traditionally been a country which looked backward rather than forward, looked inward rather than outward, evaded or deflected relationships with other countries rather than initiated or influenced them.
People have thus tended to think of Korea, indeed Koreans tended to think of themselves, as an introverted people, suspicious of outside influences, fighting to maintain their national individuality and ancient heritage in the face of enormous pressures from countries far more powerful than Korea.
Today we see a Korea actively claiming a position in the outside world; energetically seeking to assert its influence; sincerely expecting, as a matter of right, that greater powers should consult it and respect its opinions.
Today we see in Seoul a procession of distinguished state visitors from all over the world; the Tunku from Malaysia, the Prime Minister of South Vietnam, the Foreign Minister of Japan, the heir apparent in Taiwan, the Foreign Minister of the Malagasy Republic, the Foreign Minister of Argentina, the Vice President of the United States, the United States Secretary of State, the leader of the German Bundesrat, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, the Foreign Minister of Australia. The Presidents of Germany and of the Philippines are expected soon and the Indonesian Foreign Minister has said he would like to come. There is an almost automatic assumption that President Johnson would visit Korea should he decide to travel to the Far East.
We find the Koreans, who for years have been laboring under a self-imposed version of their own Hallstein doctrine in their diplomatic relations with other countries, showing signs of flexibility. Shortly after the overthrow of the Communist Party in Indonesia in the fall of 1965, they began actively to consider and then to approve the establishment of a Consulate General at Djakarta, while a North Korean Embassy is still there. Nevertheless they saw that it could be practically useful to them to establish relationships right away with the new, more pro-Western Indonesian regime. This same flexibility is influencing their thinking and attitudes toward Ghana and other professed neutralist nations.
We see the Korean Foreign Minister planning visits to several Latin American countries and we observe intense Korean diplomatic activities in every corner of Africa seeking representation.
We have the Foreign Minister of Korea stating that he is anxious to hold a conference of the nations providing troops for South Vietnam, not because of any substantive business that needs to be transacted in [Page 189] this manner, but as a means of demonstrating to the world that the United States is not alone in its struggle in Vietnam and has important Asian support.
Perhaps most dramatic, we see the Koreans initiating and acting as host to a conference of the Foreign Ministers of ten Asian nations, not seeking a military alliance, not seeking aid, not seeking support for any purely Korean policy or interest, but providing a forum in which Asian nations can meet together as Asians, get to know each other and begin in a quiet way some concerted attack on Asian problems of mutual interest. This conference did not include just the natural allies of Korea and those whose thoughts run along the same lines, such as China or South Vietnam, but included Japan and Malaysia and, had the Indonesians wished it, Indonesia.
When ASPAC opened, President Pak made a keynote speech which was wise and impressive.3 The Foreign Minister presided with dignity in the open meetings and acted with skill and consideration during the negotiating sessions. The substance of the communiqué and the degree of the agreement was a surprise to all the outside world and to many of the participants.
It is true that the conference probably never would have happened if it had not won the enthusiastic and skillful support of Thanat Khoman, and that the participation of Japan was in large part simply a desire to be nice to the Koreans and to help out in the process of normalization so recently and painfully achieved. But the Japanese, for whatever reason, did come and Khoman did help, and the Conference did take place.
The effect of ASPAC on Korea, of course, has been important. For the first time in its entire history, Korea finds itself in a position of having initiated an international activity, participated in by most of the free world countries of Asia, including the greatest, a traditional enemy, which was by all tests a substantial success.
The worlds of trade, commerce and finance also now offer new horizons to the Korean mood and imagination. A Korean construction company is building a highway in Thailand on a job won in international competition. Korean companies are dredging harbors and moving cargo along the Vietnamese coast. Koreans are pushing their exports not only in Japan and in the United States, but in Southeast Asia and Scandinavia and Africa and Europe with surprising success. Korea is seeking to accede to GATT. An Asian Development Bank is proposed [Page 190] and Korea is active in the process of its establishment, ready to contribute more than its proportionate share of the required assets and anxious to have a position in its executive direction. Korea has repaid a debt of $10 million to the National City Bank of New York. The Government of Korea is promulgating a five year economic development plan which officially contemplates the decline and ultimate abolition of supporting assistance and PL 480 food grants during the period of its life and seeks to find foreign capital prepared to invest in Korea’s economic future.
Thus, to a new self-confidence has been added a new outlook and a new attitude toward the outside world in which Korea now conceives of herself as playing an important part.
This outlook is different in quality and motivation towards Asia, the United States, and the rest of the world. This is natural and derives from Korean self-interest. Korea’s attitude towards Europe, Latin America, and Africa are naturally dominated by great distances, differences in culture and unrelated histories. Its interests are limited and are viewed primarily in terms of two questions: the Korean question in the United Nations and trade. Active diplomacy to win the support of as many as possible of the newly emerging African nations for the Korean position in the United Nations is only common sense. Developing trade ties with Europe and with Africa and Latin America is similarly sensible.
But with respect to Asia, Korea appears to be interested not only in its immediate self-interest, but also in playing a part in policy developments in the area. In the short space of two years Korea has come to believe that it has both the ability and the right to have a voice in Asian policy—political, military and economic. It is willing to pay its way as is shown by its troops in Vietnam, by its contribution to the Asian Development Bank, and by its active participation in the planning for future practical activities of ASPAC.
The Koreans conceive of the free Asian countries as having a responsibility for dealing with Asian problems. They feel that it would be desirable for them to do so without the interference or sometimes even the participation of the United States. They recognize, of course, that the United States has a vital and tremendous interest in Asia. They recognize that Asian power vis-a-vis the communists is negligible, certainly at present, unless supported by United States power. Nevertheless, they feel that it is desirable for all concerned that Asians should take initiative and carry responsibility with respect to their problems. They see no incompatibility between this independence of thought and action and the United States interest.
This emergence of Korea from its eremitic attitude of mind adds still another dimension to our relationship, which will involve problems as well as opportunities. These we will attempt to analyze in more [Page 191] detail as the shape of things to come emerges more clearly. But certain things can now be said in general.
The success of Korea’s ventures into external relationships has of course added greatly to the self-confidence reported in my earlier letter and to the Korean sense of independence.
We have a very special relationship with the Koreans. The Republic would not exist had it not been for us. We make possible its military establishment. We participate in all major economic decisions of its Government. In the central sanctum of the Economic Planning Board there are always Americans. Each provincial Governor has an American advisor. We have unusual intelligence liaison arrangements. The American military review and pass on virtually every aspect of the Korean defense budget.
Everywhere one goes in Korea there are Americans in key places. These men are frequently “advising” men senior to them and as competent as they are. Sometimes their major function is to provide a counterweight to undesirable Korean political pressures. Thus far, to the credit of all concerned, the relationships have been easy and mutually rewarding. We are still needed, and badly needed, in many places and on many problems.
But it cannot be expected that this very intimate and special relationship, so pervasive and so all embracing, can continue, or indeed should continue, as the process of economic growth, political maturity, and international competence proceeds, particularly if it does so at the rapid pace which has characterized the last two years. The problem can perhaps be stated by saying that we have an abnormally close and abnormally good relationship with the Koreans. How can we best move to a close and good relationship with the Koreans that approximates more nearly the type that normally exists between two friendly sovereign nations?
Here in Seoul we have for some time been attempting gradually to establish the psychological and physical basis for this adjustment.
It can, I believe, fairly be said that an appreciable element in the recent growth of Korean self-confidence has been United States stress on the need for increasing Korean initiative and responsibility. For example, we have tried to arrange things so that we comment on their proposals rather than vice versa. This was at first purely political window dressing. It has now become substantive fact. We have encouraged wider Korean contacts with other countries and international institutions. We have helped them develop and establish the institutional arrangements which will enable them better to stand on their own feet. We have placed increasing responsibility on Korean military leaders.
But the umbilical cord has not yet been cut, and its actual and visible severance will be a slow process and a delicate one. It will have to be done in such a way as to avoid the impression that we are reducing our interest [Page 192] or any assistance that is legitimately needed. It is a process which may be resisted at times by the Koreans themselves. It will be wise for us not to view this process as against our interest, nor to conceive of it as constituting the loss of an influence which we could hope to retain.
I do not think that the time has yet quite come for anything much to be done overtly about this. But the time will come, probably sooner than later, and we, as well as the Koreans, must be mentally and psychologically prepared so that we can be in control of the adjustment of relationships as it develops.
Sincerely yours,
- Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, East Asia General. Secret. The letter indicates that Bundy saw the document and had a copy of it sent to Rusk, Katzenbach, Rostow, Kohler, and Harriman.↩
- This letter contained a lengthy commentary on political, social, and attitudinal developments within Korea. (Ibid., Ambassador’s Private Correspondence, 1964–1966)↩
- In an August 17 letter to Bundy, Brown traced Pak’s transformation from an aloof and insecure military dictator into an effective and respected national leader and statesman. (Ibid., East Asia General)↩