Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

87. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I–24635/66

Washington, June 22, 1966, 2:35–3:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Visit of Korean Minister of Defense Kim Sung Eun, 22 June 1966²

PARTICIPANTS

• Defense Department Side
  • Secretary of Defense—Robert S. McNamara
  • Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff—General Earle G. Wheeler, USA
  • Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)—John T. McNaughton
  • Assistant to the Director, Far East Region/ISA—Captain Jon L. Boyes, USN
• Korean Side
  • Minister of Defense—Kim Sung Eun
  • Ambassador, Korean Embassy, WashDC—Kim Hyun Chul (Henry)
  • Assistant Minister of Defense (Installations-Logistics)—LtGen Kim Dong Bin
  • Assistant Minister of Defense (Manpower)—LtGen Mun Hyong Tae
  • Aide to the Minister of Defense—Colonel Nam Sung In

1. Military Ceremony. Full military honors ceremony was rendered Minister of Defense Kim upon his arrival at the Pentagon at 1420 hours. Secretary McNamara presented the Minister with the Legion of Merit (Degree of Chief Commander).

2. General. The Minister spoke in English throughout the visit. He expressed President Park’s appreciation for continued US assistance to the Republic of Korea and the efforts of the Secretary to enhance the morale of Korean forces. Secretary McNamara said that President Park deserved special credit for the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty which has already done much for improving relations in that part of the world. He added that General Westmoreland praised highly the performance of the Korean troops in South Vietnam. The Minister said that the efforts of General Westmoreland, Ambassador Brown, and General Beach had done much to ensure the fighting capabilities of the Korean troops in Vietnam who were happy to be fighting alongside American troops as they had done once before in Korea.

[Here follows discussion of South Vietnam.]

More ROK troops for SVN was put forward by Ambassador Kim. He said that about 25% of the ROK combat troops are assigned guard duties in rear areas. He said that the Koreans want these troops to fight, and, therefore, are thinking about offering reserves to take over rear area positions so as to release ROK combat forces to fight. He said that Korea has many reserves, strongly dedicated, well-trained, and unemployed. The Secretary said that was worth exploring further. He would be willing to see Minister Kim before he left or to see the Ambassador at a later date. If Kim preferred, he could put the idea through regular channels. (Subsequent conversations with MND Kim and Economic Minister Kim, Korean Embassy, Saigon, indicated the Koreans are proposing to offer former Korean military reserves as civilians, for rear area service and security jobs, backing up both US and ROK forces.)

The Secretary said forces in SVN will soon total 300,000 and that the US will continue to increase its forces in SVN. These troops will be removed when no longer necessary, but the US would not at that time permit a vacuum to be created. The Chinese Communists would fill in any vacuum. He said that US installations and construction in SVN might give the Vietnamese a feeling that the US plans to stay. This appearance worried him. The Secretary said that the Korean proposal to provide Korean reserves to SVN would be helpful to increase the number of Asian faces in SVN and would help to offset the large American presence there.

The Secretary said that both the Vietnamese and the Viet Cong were suffering terrible casualties. He said the Vietnamese political institutions were weak. With these factors in mind, he asked for Minister Kim’s thoughts on the possible length of the war. Kim said that this was a difficult question. First, the power in-country must be put in one man’s hands, who would, unfortunately, be called a dictator. This could not be helped during these difficult times. Second, the military must be unified behind this leader and the many internal frictions overcome. He said the period of the war is difficult to predict until these steps are taken. He believed at this time, there are too many factors—leadership, political stability, military stability—to give any predictions.

[Here follows discussion of bombing North Vietnam.]

US–SVN Public Relations. In response to the Secretary’s request for other thoughts of Kim on Vietnam, the Minister said that he thought that there is a need for the US soldiers in SVN to have a greater capability to respond quickly with food and other comforts for refugees and survivors of areas or villages taken under attack. The ROK soldiers always take some of the extra rice furnished by the Vietnamese Government and provide this rice to refugees and survivors. The ROK soldiers are also told to dig wells and take on chores in the damaged areas quickly to avoid hardships on the people. The Americans have lots of equipment and materials but they do not respond quickly to the people’s needs. The Minister said he was not criticizing but only passing on what his ROKFV commanders told him. The Secretary said this was a good point and he would look into it.

Korean Economy and Defense. The Secretary said he was very pleased with the continuing improvement in the Korean economy. Minister Kim said that there was some improvement but that the Korean economy is based on agriculture. The weather plays a major role in the Korean economy since it directly affects agriculture. Last year Korea was fortunate in having good weather. This is the first year’s harvest (spring 1966) in which no rice crisis occurred. Ambassador Kim said the Korea economy is moving upward but will “plateau” in the next few years. This plateau period would be followed by some gradual improvement, the extent of incline being dependent on a number of factors. Ambassador Kim expressed concern that the US, seeing an improving Korean economy, would decrease its grant aid. He said Korea’s grant aid has dropped from $300 million to $60 million. The Secretary said that it is necessary to consider the over-all number of grant-aid commitments of US and to realize that other needy countries must be helped. Their situation is much less favorable than that of Korea. The Secretary said that we must look at the Korean economy and the ROK defense budget. He is concerned about the soldier to population ratio; continuing in the present manner is not good for Korea in the long run. He was not suggesting a change now in view of the SVN situation and the present Korea economy. He thought that Korea and the US must begin to think about the size of Korean forces relative to North Korean forces, and US forces. Our forces must be considered with the size of the ROK Army. The effects of a large army on the Korean economy must be studied. The Secretary said he thought, personally, Korea’s economy was being hampered by the size of its armed forces. Minister Kim said the geographical position of Korea made the people worry about their security. He said the capabilities of China and North Korea cannot be overlooked. If the ROK military is reduced, the people will be reluctant to invest their savings in the country. The US presence in Korea also gives the people confidence in Korea’s future. If these conditions are removed, the people will be reluctant to do anything about Korea’s development. The Secretary said that he understood this situation. He likened it to West Berlin where the people would be reluctant to invest without the presence of strong military forces. The Secretary said he still believed it necessary to explore, together, the correct size of the ROK armed forces and at the same time the methods which might be used to convince the Korean people that reduction in force levels can be undertaken without endangering the country. He proposed that he and MND Kim continue to look at the problems of force size and Korean economic development together, and to hold further discussions on it in the future.

Kim’s Views on Various Policies. The Secretary suggested that he and Minister Kim discuss, after the black-tie dinner (Secretary McNamara’s home, 22 June), the following: US policy on Red China (admittance to UN, US relations with, etc.), the Role of Japan in the Future, India, the Conference in Seoul-ASPAC and its possibilities, and the general security of the Far East.³

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330,OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 4443, Korea 091.112. Secret. Drafted by Boyes and approved by McNaughton on June 28. The meeting took place in McNamara’s office at the Pentagon.
2. Kim was invited to Washington because of the important part he played in achieving National Assembly approval of dispatching additional troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 1111 from Seoul, April 5; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 KOR S) Kim was in Washington June 22–June 25 and, in addition to McNamara and McNaughton, met with Humphrey, U. Alexis Johnson, Berger, and the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. A summary of these conversations is in Secretary of Defense telegram 5496 to CINCPAC, June 28. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea, Cables, Vol. III, November 1965 to December 1966)
3. A memorandum of Kim’s meeting with McNamara and McNaughton on June 25 is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 6648, 333 Korea.