Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

86. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 16, 1966.

SUBJECT

• Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. Colby, June 16, 1966²

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Bundy for FE; Messrs. Colby, Smith, [names not declassified] for CIA; Mr. Jorden for WH; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; and Messrs. Trueheart, Slutz, Cuthell, and Fleck of FE for their respective areas

[Here follows discussion of Laos, Malaysia, and Singapore.]

Korea

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that his chief objective was to stiffen the South Koreans against increasing North Korean subversive efforts. These efforts involved the recruitment of agents in South Korea and the sending across the DMZ of infiltrating groups. He had recommended to the South Korean police a stepped-up effort to arrest agents and collaborators and to round up infiltrating groups. This would require some improved police equipment, largely in the communications and armaments field. Police at the present time were unable to communicate from region to region with sufficient rapidity. They were also considerably out-gunned by the infiltrating North Koreans. The South Koreans, through tapping President Park’s contingency fund, had come up with $50,000 for the purchase of equipment. They probably could raise a somewhat larger sum [1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified].³

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that there were four recent clashes between the South Korean police and North Korean infiltrating groups. The South Koreans had been out-gunned in each of these fire-fights. During one of them a North Korean agent had been captured. He told of the intelligence training of his class of 82 members. The class had been divided up into four groups, one for each area of South Korea. These groups had been further subdivided into teams of three or four men who were heavily armed and were to be infiltrated into South Korea, some by land, others by sea.

In response to inquiries by Mr. Bundy, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] Kim Chong-p’il whom [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] still regarded as a possible “comer” in Korean politics. [1 line of source text not declassified]. Kim continued his scheming and it was clear that if the president made too many mistakes Kim would “get him.” Asked if this was a short term prospect, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] said that [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] thought not, that Kim was continuing to bide his time while developing a political following.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, East Asia and Pacific General File, East Asia, FE Weekly Meetings, January through July 1966. Secret. Drafted on June 21. Koren sent this memorandum to Hughes, Denney, and Evans.
2. Agenda at Tab A. [Footnote in the source text; attached but not printed.]
3. An internal security program had been developed and reviewed by the Country Team in Korea that provided for coordination of anti-infiltration efforts by establishing a national command control center, improving communications systems, and training special forces. Pak agreed to provide $125,000 from Blue House funds to acquire equipment, and the Country Team approved the use of $250,000 in AID funds for communications equipment and some weaponry. (Telegram 1542 from Seoul, June 30; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–7 KOR S)
4. Periodic reports submitted by the Embassy on Kim Chong-pil’s activities since returning to Korea in December 1964 are ibid., POL 12 KOR S and POL 15–1 KOR S.