Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

55. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, June 14, 1965.

1309. For Bundy and Johnson from Ambassador. Subj: ROK troops to Vietnam.

1. President Park has just told me that ROKG has received message from GRVN expressing appreciation for decision ROKG to send division combat troops to RVN and asking that such troops be sent as soon as possible.

2. President points out it obviously impossible for ROKG to act on such a message, which places him in most embarrassing position as he has consistently and publicly denied any decision to send combat troops.

3. President still wishes to send troops and to do so as soon as possible. He asks that anything necessary be done to get formal request from GRVN for combat decision without any prejudgment ROKG position.

4. President still wants such request prior ending present Assembly session June 18 since if he gets request before session closes he may be able to get extension session to consider request. Next session is scheduled for July and President plans devote it to ratification settlement with Japan. He does not want to complicate this later session with troop issue if he can possibly avoid it.²

5. Meanwhile General Howze advises that General Westmoreland wishes marine regimental combat team as soon as possible and plans to use it different location from rest of ROK division. For practical military reasons General Howze feels that if ROK troops are to be used in separate locations request might better be for division plus regimental combat team since division would operate more effectively as complete unit.

6. I have not had time to consider this carefully or to discuss it fully with General Howze, but my preliminary reaction is that in view of confused and checkered history of this matter illustrated by GRVN message referred to above, it would be most unwise complicate political situation by asking for any more than division at this time. I may comment more fully on this point after having chance consider it more carefully with General Beach who assumes command tomorrow.

7. I, of course, made it clear to President Park that no one on US side had told GRVN that ROKG had decided to send combat division. All that we had told GRVN was that we were confident ROKG would give request for combat division very sympathetic consideration.

8. President Park urgently requested that GRVN message be kept completely secret in view obvious embarrassment to his government should its contents become known.

9. Text GRVN request follows separate telegram.³

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Saigon and passed to the White House. No time of transmission appears on the telegram.
2. In telegram 1317 from Seoul, June 15, Brown reported on his conversation with Pak in which the latter recounted his discussions with several DRP Assembly members about sending combat troops to Vietnam. The members urged the matter be submitted to the Assembly as soon as possible so that it would not be “considered at the same session with the Japanese settlement.” Accordingly, Pak was anxious to receive the request and was prepared to ask for a special session of the Assembly to consider it. (Ibid., POL 27–3 KOR S)
3. Telegram 1310 from Seoul, June 14, transmitted the GVN request. (Ibid., POL 27–3 VIET S)