Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

54. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, June 4, 1965, 1000Z.

1278. Ref A. Embtel 1269; B. Deptel 1224.² Subject: Proposed reduction US force in Korea.

1. I have reviewed with General Howze both the military and political implications of the proposed reduction of US army strength in Korea to 48,700 including transients. Three aspects of the problem are crucial to any decision, namely:

A. The effect of the reduction on the combat strength and effectiveness of the US forces in Korea.

B. The need to restructure the Army in Korea if the contemplated reduction is carried out.

C. Whether the establishment of this level of forces and any restructuring that is carried out because of it will be construed by the ROKG and the public as a weakening of Korea’s defenses and a decrease in the US commitment to the ROK.

2. We are quite aware that the reduced force level would result in total strength (numbers) only about 3000 men below the average of the years 1960–1963, and that for one brief moment of time in the past, which was a low point in the normal fluctuation of strength, the numbers here got down to the figure now proposed. General Howze is nonetheless convinced that, especially with the present structure, the 48,700 level would result in a combat effectiveness of the two US Army divisions in the ROK of little more than 50 percent of the effectiveness contemplated by their tables of organization and taking into account Katusa augmentation. The full tables of organization and distribution of US units assigned to EUSA today call for 69,453 (present for duty—no transients included). A reduced effectiveness had in fact prevailed in the lean years 1960–1963, but the hope had been that strength could one day be improved to levels considered barely adequate to the present structure (i.e., about 55,000, including transients). As a result of strenuous and carefully documented representations made by General Howze after becoming COMUS Korea in 1963, force levels were in fact brought up to this level in 1964.

3. The reduction of military capability involved in a permanent 48,700 ceiling naturally gives me concern.

4. A decision to restructure might have been in order earlier, but the fact that force levels could, and occasionally did, rise to figures regarded as reasonably consistent with the existing structure, made it possible to postpone such a decision. If, however, a new and permanent lower ceiling is to be established, the question can no longer logically be avoided.

5. General Howze has documented to the Dept of Army the need for a restructuring if the force level is to be permanently at the new figure of 48,700 including transients. Basically his plan calls for the reduction of the 7th infantry to a brigade, and a beefing up of the 1st cavalry division. Some units of the 7th infantry would be abolished and the spaces transferred to remaining combat units. In the process some compounds in the 7th division area would be deactivated, and the military port of Inchon would be closed except for the POL terminal. The 1st cavalry would be strengthened as a result of these changes and the 7th division, though restructured as a brigade, would according to military opinion be stronger than it would be if its available manpower were scattered through a large number of units. Such changes are the logical corollary of a decision to limit the total numbers of personnel to a figure at which a number of presently organized combat units are badly below strength. To “retain both divisions at full structure and reduce manning levels” to proposed level as suggested in reftel B would not be militarily sound and would provide in fact less military power than the 48,700 figure could actually provide.

6. So much for the military aspects of the situation. The political problem presented is more immediate. I do not need to repeat here the importance attached by all Koreans to the US military commitment to Korea and the maintenance of US forces here. To meet this concern many high level US officials, including Secretary Rusk and, most recently, President Johnson, have assured the Koreans of continued powerful US forces in Korea and of prior consultation should we decide to reduce our forces here.³

7. As the ROKG and public were unaware of the buildup in 1964, the attrition to about 48,000 in March 1965, and the recent buildup, it is quite possible that they can remain in ignorance of the further reduction to 48,700 which is now proposed. This is however, not certain since the entire strength will now fluctuate around a lesser level.

8. To restructure in such manner as to use the 48,700 most effectively will certainly attract attention, and lead Koreans to the conclusion that the US is reducing its forces. Some of this can be countered. For example, closure of Inchon can be represented as part of a larger program to shift the 8th army’s supply routes and logistic base to the Pusan/Taegu area. However, the ROKG would for purely operational reasons have to be told of the reduction of the 7th division to a brigade and will inevitably inquire as reasons for this restructuring.

9. I do not need to belabor the obvious point that this is no time to give the Koreans the impression that we are pulling out any troops. Nor do we want to give our free world allies or the Communists any such impression.⁴

10. Thus a permanent reduction to 48,700 level makes little military sense without restructuring, but to restructure will do major political damage in weakening the present govt when it needs all possible strength for the ratification of the settlement with Japan and to be able to make a further contribution of troops to GVN.

11. The best solution from both the political and military viewpoint is to rebuild to approximately 55,000 including transients and maintain the present structure. With this we can maintain a reasonable military posture and avoid political problems.

12. A less satisfactory solution would be to reduce to about the average of the last 5 years, or 52,000, and struggle along with the present structure, hoping that by reduction of the proportion of transients we can keep our structure sufficiently filled to be reasonably effective militarily, and being able if questioned by the ROKG about any deficiencies to say that there is no reduction from the average number we have had in the past.

13. A still less desirable solution, for reasons stated above, is to reduce to 48,700 and keep the present structure.

14. A final possibility (preferable from a purely military point of view to that in para 13) is simply to tell the Koreans about the reduction, point out that after it our force levels would be only a few thousand men below the mean level of 1960–1963, that restructuring will improve the effectiveness of the new number, and that with the present situation in South Vietnam this is the best we can do.

15. We should not contemplate this possibility at this time. No matter how presented by us, the headlines in Korea would be “US withdrawing its troops,” and the impact on the ROK-Japan settlement and the prospect of further Korean troops for RVN would be highly adverse for obvious reasons.

16. I therefore recommend that for the next 6 months we adopt the first solution (para 11) or, as a last resort, the 2nd (para 12). The matter could then be reviewed in the light of circumstances then existing.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, DEF 19–2 US–KOR S. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to Tokyo.
2. In telegram 1269 from Seoul, June 4, Brown stated he would discuss proposed U.S. troop reductions with the Country Team and requested that no actions be taken until he reported further. (Ibid.) In telegram 1224 to Seoul, June 2, the Department of State quoted from a Department of Defense letter indicating that troop strength in Korea would be reduced to 48,700. (Ibid.)
3. In telegram 1372 from Seoul, June 24, the Embassy reported that the Korean Government seemed to suspect that U.S. troop strength was being reduced. According to an intelligence report, at least two local police stations were instructed to watch closely the military installations in their locality to determine and report any reductions of U.S. troops. In addition, each police station in an area having a U.S. military base was ordered to recruit an informant working on the base to acquire information about troop strength. That information would then be used to evaluate ROK policy toward furnishing additional troops to Vietnam. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 166 to Seoul, August 12, the Department of State notified the Embassy of decisions made by the Secretary of the Army to reduce “US forces in Korea for gold-flow reasons.” The charges conformed to suggestions advanced by the CT in Korea, namely, that troop levels would be maintained at 53,000 including transients and that Inchon would be used only for POL. In addition, some Pershing missile units and medium-range helicopters would no longer be sent to Korea. (Ibid.)