Office of the Historian

322. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Korea1

Washington, October 24, 1968, 2118Z.

261040. Subject: Instructions for Twenty-fifth Meeting.

1.
Best way to convey to North Koreans that we are not considering straightforward signature of their document would seem to be to call next meeting quickly and simply ask if they are now ready accept our proposal. If Pak objects to early meeting we should not press since they may really be debating overwrite now that its details perfectly clear, and if brought to meeting before debate concluded would temporize with attacks which might dig them in deeper. Best solution might be note through JDO on lines, “I am ready, if you are,” rather than proposing particular date.
2.
General Woodward’s opening statement should be quite direct and brief. Following points should be made:
A.
Since May we have consistently proposed solution which should be acceptable to NK. It is based on their document and on our principle of simultaneous release.
B.
Pak’s allegations we have “upset agreements in principle” are not true. As pointed out last meeting, we have stated our position very carefully, checking both English and Korean versions, and have corrected Pak’s misstatements of it.
C.
If Pak somehow failed to understand, his confusion certainly cleared up by very detailed explanations at October 10 and October 23 meetings.
D.
We now await his response. Does he have specific objections to specific procedures outlined by us?
3.
If Pak again denounces our position in general terms but avoids closing door on any overwrite, Woodward should note that he has already repeatedly responded to these general comments and propose adjournment, adding suggestion that Pak call next meeting when he is ready to take up our concrete proposal for solving this problem.
4.
If Pak opens up business of where Woodward’s signature would be located, Woodward should ask if this is only major problem obstructing solution of matter, indicating that such a problem can certainly be solved. Should Pak respond it definitely is critical problem and that signature must be on line provided, Woodward may say that he can agree to add sentence acknowledging receipt in his own handwriting [Page 725] above that line, then place his signature on it, provided it seems likely that his assent to this procedure will lead to the simultaneous release of the crew.
5.
If Pak responds that no overwrite acceptable and Woodward must sign on dotted line, Woodward should say he will report his regrettable position to his authorities, and he hopes Pak’s authorities will have further thoughts. He should note it will be Pak’s turn to call next meeting and propose adjournment.
6.
If Pak should accept overwrite, State 2552142 continues to provide appropriate guidance.
Rusk
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Priority;Nodis; Cactus. Drafted by Leonard; cleared by Brown, Salans, Steadman, and Walsh; and approved by Katzenbach.↩
  2. See footnote 4, Document 320.↩