321. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

10633. Subj: 24th Closed Meeting.

1.
Meeting began at 1101 hours and concluded at 1418 local time October 23.2 General Woodward believes NK intentions were to probe US thinking on overwrite proposal rather than reject it outright while giving impression that NK side was unyielding on obtaining complete US acceptance of its proposal. Tone of meeting was not as harsh as transcript might indicate and only in last formal statement did Pak speak with vigor.
2.
Pak opened with a review of NK version of Pueblo incident and negotiations. He stated that NK side had submitted a document with correct title and name and that crew could be returned if we signed document. He accused US of making absurd assertions that we wanted to add unnecessary things to document and to “sign it on your behalf instead of signing it as it is.” Called this “petty stratagem.”
3.
General Woodward repeated the exact words he intended to write on the NK document and asked if NK side had specific objections.
4.
Pak said proposal ridiculed meeting and that document they proposed included even terms of receipt we wanted, again asked if US prepared to sign.
5.
Woodward pointed out consistency of US position noting he had never used any other words than “I will acknowledge on a document satisfactory to you” and that he had corrected Pak when he had misquoted him. He then made points in paras C and D of State 254615.3
6.
There was a pause of over 30 minutes while Pak apparently sent for instructions on how to proceed. He then said US had agreed in principle to sign document and on this basis discussion at last meeting had gone to procedures for release of crew. In middle of this US had upset discussions by proposing “some sort of compromise”.
7.
Woodward denied going back on any agreement in principle and said he was surprised at rejection of US proposal and urged its reconsideration. He said if Pak had nothing more to say he proposed the meeting adjourn.
8.
Pak again asked whether US was ready to sign the document and General Woodward repeated his willingness to acknowledge receipt on a document at time Pueblo crew simultaneously released.
9.
Pak then held out a copy of the document and said that Woodward’s name and title were clearly written on it together with the terms of acknowledging of the crew. He then asked “does this mean you will sign here under your name?” Woodward said he would write the receipt on the face of the document and sign his name and title. When asked where, he indicated diagonally across face of document. Reaction from NK side was visibly negative. He then suggested writing and signing on clear space at bottom of document. Again reaction was visibly negative. Woodward then indicated there were other ways the document might be signed. General Woodward believes negative reactions of NK side was deliberate and was intended to draw as much specific information on signing as possible from US side.
10.
Pak then in prepared statement said US could not get crew back without signing document as it was. He said NK patience had its limits and he had said all there was to say. He said he was not interested in continuing empty talks, called the US proposal “shameless games” and said US side should come back when it was prepared to sign. He then accepted Woodward’s proposal to adjourn.
11.
Woodward believes that we must wait at least until the next meeting to determine whether Pyongyang is prepared to make any concessions on overwrite proposal.
Porter
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 33–6 KOR N–US. Secret; Immediate;Nodis; Cactus. Rostow transmitted a copy of this telegram to President Johnson under an October 23 covering memorandum stating that the “North Koreans clarify the ‘over-write’ ploy on the Pueblo; and they reject it, for the time being.” Rostow’s memorandum indicates the President saw the telegram. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Korea—Pueblo Incident—Cactus IIb, Cactus Seoul Cables, March 1, 1968 to October 31, 1968)
  2. Telegram 10634 from Seoul, October 23, transmitted the verbatim text of this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69,POL 33–6 KOR N–US)
  3. Document 320.